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OPERATIONAL REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
This Operational Review of the effectiveness of procedures and practices that 
facilitate the identification, placement and safeguarding of vulnerable young 
people in custody was commissioned by the Minister for Correctional 
services, Mr Paul Goggins MP following the verdict of a Coroner’s Inquest into 
the death of Joseph Scholes at HM Young Offenders Institution Stoke Heath 
in March 2002.  
 
The Operational Review first summarises the findings of investigations, 
including the Coroner’s Inquest, into the circumstances of Joseph’s death. 
From the range of conclusions and recommendations of those investigations, 
the Operational Review identifies key areas of concern that need to attract 
attention if services are to meet their safeguarding responsibilities and hold 
public confidence. In later chapters, the Operational Review examines how  
improvements in specific areas of policy and practice can be developed and 
implemented.  
 
As author I would like to place on record my thanks for the full support and 
assistance that has been offered during the preparation of this Operational 
Review. Special thanks go the Professor Rod Morgan, Chairman of the Youth 
Justice Board and to the managers and staff at YJB headquarters. Similar 
thanks are extended to Mr Nigel Hancock, Head of the Safer Custody Group 
(now part of the National Offender Management Service) and to Mr Ron Le 
Marechal, Head of the Prison Service Juvenile Group and their respective 
team colleagues.  
 
I would also wish to thank Mr Stuart Robinson, Governor of Warren Hill YOI 
and Mr Peter Smallwood, Governor of Stoke Heath YOI for their generous 
assistance during my visit to their establishments. Finally I would like to thank 
Chris Holmes and Kathryn Coleman of the Safer Custody Group and Karen 
Jewiss of the YJB for their support and assistance with the excellent briefing 
that I received to inform the Review. 
 
 
 
 
David Lambert CBE 
 
Chair of Norfolk ACPC 
 
October 2005 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Joseph Scholes 
 
 
John Joseph Peter Scholes, known as Joseph or Joe, died by hanging at 
Stoke Heath Young Offender Institution on 24 March 2002. He was a little 
over 16 years old and was in the second week of a 24 month Detention and 
Training Order (DTO) for attempted robbery.   
 
Joseph’s life had not been easy. His parents separated in 1995 and he had 
had an unsettled existence, with frequent changes of house and school. From 
about the age of 12, Joseph became of concern to Trafford Social Services 
Department. He alleged that he had suffered physical and sexual abuse. He 
began to harm himself and became involved in substance misuse. A 
psychological assessment diagnosed Depressive Conduct Disorder and found 
that Joseph was a risk both to himself and to others. In November 2001, he 
jumped from a first floor window (possibly in an attempt to commit suicide) 
and was involved in a violent altercation with the ambulance crew who came 
to assist him. This incident resulted in a conviction for affray.  
 
In December 2001, after the police had found him living in a car park in a 
caravan, he was placed in a children’s home in Manchester. On the night of 6 
December, he went out with three other children from the home. They 
committed a number of robberies, were arrested and subsequently tried and 
convicted. The judge, who accepted that Joseph’s involvement had been 
peripheral and that there were concerns about his ability to cope with a 
custodial sentence, sentenced him on 15 March 2002 to a 24-month 
Detention and Training Order (of which up to half would have been spent in 
custody). He was placed in Stoke Heath Young Offender Institution. Because 
of his vulnerability he was accommodated in the Health Care Centre. Ten 
days into his sentence, in spite of a high level of care and a number of 
measures that had been taken to safeguard him, Joseph was found hanging 
from the bars of his cell. 
 
There have been a number of investigations and inquiries into aspects of 
Joseph’s death. The Prison Service conducted its own investigation; the 
Youth Justice Board (YJB) undertook a Serious Incident Review; and Trafford 
Area Child Protection Committee held a review under Chapter 8 of the 
Department of Health guidance, Working Together to Safeguard Children. An 
inquest was held over 10 days in April 2004. The jury returned a verdict of 
accidental death and pointed to systems failures that had contributed to it. 
 
Following the inquest, the coroner wrote to the Home Secretary identifying a 
number of areas of concern and recommending a public inquiry. On 16 
September 2004, in a Written Statement to Parliament, the Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for Correctional Services announced three 
measures he was taking in response to the coroner’s concerns: the 
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Sentencing Guidelines Council was asked to consider the sentence Joseph 
had received; the Youth Justice Board was asked to take account of the 
coroner’s concerns in drawing up its plans for the future of the secure estate; 
and  I was appointed to review the operational issues arising from Joseph’s 
case – those relating to the roles of the Youth Offending Team (Yot), the YJB 
and its placement team and the young offender institution itself. 
 
 
Earlier reviews and investigations into Joseph’s death 
 
 
The investigations and reviews referred to in the previous paragraph, 
including the inquest, identified a number of areas of concern. These were: 
whether Joseph’s sentence was appropriate; whether placing him in a young 
offender institution was in his best interests; and whether an adequate 
assessment was carried out pre-sentence. More generally, they questioned 
the suitability of the arrangements for placing children who are at high risk; the 
efficiency of arrangements for transmitting information to and within young 
offender institutions; and the adequacy of care and supervision arrangements 
in young offender institutions - and particularly of safeguarding measures. 
Apart from the two issues the Sentencing Guidelines Council and the Youth 
Justice Board have been asked to consider, these issues form the content of 
the current Operational Review (OR). The OR looks at the particular 
questions raised by Joseph’s case within the context of the broader 
operational questions that have been identified. 
 
 
Assessment of young people  
 
 
Information on young people in the youth justice system is collected and 
transmitted by Youth Offending Teams (Yots) using the Asset form. This 
system was introduced by the YJB in 2000. It provides for an assessment of 
“dynamic risk factors” and includes an opportunity for the young person to 
give his or her own views.  The consensus of the investigations into Joseph’s 
death was that the Asset relating to him was less than satisfactory. It lacked 
important information. Best practice requires that Asset should be a “living 
document” and should be updated to include post-sentence information. 
Judgements need to be informed by evidence.  Since Joseph’s death, the 
YJB has taken a number of steps to improve practice relating to assessment. 
It has commissioned guidance for Yot staff. This OR strongly supports the 
principles underlying that guidance and the advice it gives. The four-tier 
categorisation of risk it employs is a useful basis for prioritisation.  The YJB 
has developed the template for a Vulnerability Management Plan, to be used 
in the case of higher-risk young people. Practitioners have commented 
favourably, but it may need to be made more comprehensive. This OR 
therefore recommends that it be reviewed within a reasonable time of its 
introduction. The YJB has also issued guidance on the sharing of information 
between agencies.  
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Placement of young people in custody 
 
 
Offenders under 18 who are sentenced to custody are placed in one of three 
types of establishment: a young offender institution; a secure training centre 
or a secure children’s home. The YJB’s placement team decides which type 
of establishment each young person should go to. A review in 2003 of the 
placement function noted the team’s strengths and achievements, but also 
various limitations, such as the lack of information of acceptable quality that 
was being provided to the team. It recommended a number of improvements. 
This OR can report that these have now been put in place. They are detailed 
in a policy statement issued in July 2004 and a revised protocol (September 
2004), which requires all placements of at-risk young people to be reviewed 
within three working days.  
 
The placement team bases its decisions on indicators of risk. This OR 
considers that these need to be redeveloped in line with the four-tier 
categorisation referred to above. Further enhancement of the placement 
operation can be achieved by: improved completion of the Asset 
documentation and supporting evidence; closer dialogue between Yots and 
the placement team about assessments of vulnerability; more information 
sharing (which should be facilitated by the forthcoming introduction of a 
secure e-mail network) and shared decision-making; the establishment of an 
audit trail; and quality assurance of placement decisions by the head of the 
placement team.  This OR commends the very responsive approach the team 
has demonstrated. 
 
 
Child Protection and Safeguarding 
 
 
Child protection and the safeguarding of young people in young offender 
institutions have received considerable attention in recent years. The 
approach to safeguarding set out in Prison Service Order (PSO) 4950, which 
was originally issued in 1999, went wider than the consideration of child 
protection as defined by the Children Act 1989 and subsequent guidance. The 
child protection protocol attached to PSO 4950 prescribed detailed 
safeguarding arrangements to be put in place at each young offender 
institution, including a Child Protection Committee and Child Protection Co-
ordinator and deputy. It also encouraged the development of links with the 
local Area Child Protection Committee. A revised version of PSO 4950, with a 
much stronger emphasis on safeguarding and child protection, was issued in 
September 2004.  This OR strongly supports the advice in the revised Order 
that the Co-ordinator posts should be at senior level, preferably as full-time 
Safeguards Managers; it also supports the recommendation that a 
Safeguards Committee should be set up in each establishment.  
 
Safeguarding in young offender institutions was the subject of an important 
judgement of the Administrative Court in November 2002. This established 
that the Children Act 1989 applied to children in young offender institutions, 
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with the consequence that local authorities continued to owe duties to those 
children (though subject to the requirements of imprisonment). The judgement 
prompted a joint review by the YJB and the Prison Service of safeguarding in 
young offender institutions, which made a wide range of recommendations for 
improved services and practice. These are in the process of being 
implemented. The most notable recommendation was the appointment of 
social workers in young offender institutions to improve safeguarding and 
ensure that local authority obligations to children are properly fulfilled. This 
OR welcomes the YJB’s decision to fund the appointment of 25 social worker 
posts. 
 
Liaison with Area Child Protection Committees is a key element of 
safeguarding practice, but, to date, it been rather patchy. The new 
arrangements under the Children Act 2004 should make for a more consistent 
approach. It is important that young offender institutions should be involved in 
developing the new Local Child Safeguarding Boards to be established under 
the 2004 Act. 
 
 
Reception of young people into young offender institutions 
 
 
The circumstances of a young person’s arrival at, and first impressions of, a 
young offender institution are bound to have a strong influence on his or her 
adaptation to custody.  PSO 4950 sets out in detail the arrangements to be 
put in place for receiving young offenders into young offender institutions. The 
establishment needs immediate information about the young person, including 
any risk he or she might pose to himself or to others. However, it appears that 
over a quarter of trainees continue to arrive without the relevant papers. That 
is a matter of concern. The creation of a secure e-mail system should assist 
transmission of information, but quality improvements depend upon improved 
skills and awareness on the part of Yots.  
 
PSO 4950 requires the provision of 24-hour health care facilities at 
establishments that take young people direct from court.  The young person is 
to be medically examined within 24 hours, and assessed for risk of suicide or 
self-harm. The YJB’s National Standards require that these assessments 
must be begun within one hour of arrival. Following the assessment, a health 
care plan must be prepared. Recent figures suggest that over 99 per cent of 
young people admitted to YOIs are assessed as required within 24 hours.  
 
Concern has been expressed about the practice of searching young people 
on arrival. This OR accepts that body searches are necessary to prevent 
drugs or potential weapons from being brought into an establishment. 
However, as PSO 4950 makes clear, such searches must be conducted with 
proper sensitivity.  
 
There are several areas where current practice in young offender institutions 
can be improved. Some split-site establishments, which house under-18s and 
18-20 year olds in adjacent accommodation, have combined reception 
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facilities for both age groups. This OR recommends that the YJB should 
continue its drive to establish separate facilities. If there are large batches of 
new arrivals, it is important that adequate staffing and organisational 
arrangements are in place. Reception facilities need to be kept in good 
condition, as badly-maintained facilities can give the impression that the 
establishment is not a safe place. Transport arrangements from court are not 
always adequate, particularly where long journeys are involved. This OR 
welcomes the YJB’s move to provide separate escorting arrangements to and 
from court for all juveniles. It is essential that the YJB and the Prison Service 
should monitor policy and practice relating to escorting and reception. 
 
 
Regimes for under-18s in young offender institutions 
 
 
PSO 4950, which specifies the regime for under-18 year olds, states that the 
regime should promote their well-being and healthy growth. Like Joseph, 
many trainees are from unstable backgrounds, have mental heath problems 
and at some time in their lives have been in local authority care. A significant 
number also have learning difficulties. The emphasis on safeguarding is 
therefore crucial.  
 
The induction process, which lasts one week, should provide the trainee with 
the information he or she needs, in a form that is easily understood. This OR 
commends the induction booklet prepared for trainees on Stoke Heath’s “A” 
Wing. 
 
The PSO requires the drawing up of a sentence plan, including an individual 
learning plan, within 10 working days of arrival. Investigations into Joseph’s 
case have made recommendations about the timing of the initial planning 
meeting. This OR considers that in high-risk cases it should take place within 
3-5 days. Other issues examined include the quality of record-keeping, the 
policy of storing information in several locations, and the arrangements for 
access to records, particularly medical records. The YJB and the Prison 
Service need to develop an efficient record storage, access and retrieval 
system for the juvenile secure estate.  
 
For each trainee, a personal officer is appointed to provide support and to 
promote contact with the trainee’s family and Yot supervising officer. The 
personal officer should also act as a role model. This OR recognises the 
practical difficulties in providing one-to-one personal officer support 24 hours 
a day. The team approach recommended in PSO 4950 has been criticised, 
but this OR considers that it may offer a workable model, provided it is 
modified to ensure that a single officer is in the lead.  
 
One of Joseph’s greatest anxieties was that he would be bullied if he moved 
from the Health Care Centre to a residential wing. It is essential that 
establishments have an effective anti-bullying policy. PSO 4950 requires that 
establishments operate a policy approved by the Area Manager and appoint 
an Anti-Bullying Co-ordinator. The Child Protection and Safeguards Review in 
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2003 found that existing policies were too reactive, training was inadequate 
and there were only limited support services and intervention programmes. It 
recommended a robust programme of improvements. This OR can report that 
there have been some positive developments - most young offender 
institutions now have an anti-bullying committee, for example – but there is 
much more that can be done.  
 
 
Protection against suicide and self-harm 
 
 
Young offenders as a group face greater risks to their health than other young 
people of the same age. In the population at large, increasing numbers of 
young people face mental health problems and a substantial proportion of 
these are sent to young offender institutions.  Responsibility for health care 
provision in young offender institutions is transferring to Primary Care Trusts 
and discussions are taking place between the YJB and Department of Health 
on increasing the number of secure psychiatric hospital beds. 
 
The Prison Service has taken a range of measures since 2001 to help prevent 
suicide and self-harm. This OR notes the progress that has been made to 
date and the serious approach of staff and managers in young offender 
institutions. However, the measures are not juvenile-specific and young 
offender institutions need to adapt them to the needs of under-18s. 
 
This OR looked at the use of “safer cells” and constant observation as 
methods of seeking to prevent suicide. Both can be necessary in very high-
risk situations, but they are not solutions to the problem and more positive 
interventions are needed to assist a young person who feels suicidal.  
 
On 23 March 2002, the day before he died, Joseph had a telephone 
conversation with his mother in which he spoke about self-harm. It has been 
suggested that monitoring the telephone conversations of at-risk young 
people could assist in preventing self-harm. That would have very large 
resource implications. A more manageable option, which this Operational 
Review recommends, is that the telephone conversations of those at-risk 
young people who are accommodated in Health Care Centres should be 
monitored in this way. 
 
During his first four days in the Health Care Centre at Stoke Heath,  Joseph 
was dressed in “safer clothing”, a single garment designed to minimise the 
risk of its being used for purposes of self-harm. The inquest jury expressed 
concern that removing a young person’s ordinary clothing and requiring him or 
her to wear safer clothing could be dehumanising. This OR has looked at the 
use of safer clothing as a safety measure and at the alternatives to the 
removal of ordinary clothing. Safer clothing can have a role to play, but the 
aim should be to keep its use to a minimum.  There is a risk that young people 
may conceal suicidal feelings in order to avoid having their own clothes taken 
away. Staff will require good practice guidance and support to enable them to 
assess situations and consider alternative strategies for preventing self-harm. 
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This OR recommends that the YJB Performance Monitor should conduct 
regular sampling exercises to monitor the extent to which safer clothing is 
used. 
 
 
Training 
 
 
Staff training has an essential part to play in ensuring effective implementation 
of measures to prevent young people in custody from harming themselves. 
There have been significant developments in this area, notably the new 
Professional Certificate in Effective Practice (Youth Justice). The YJB’s target 
is that 80 per cent of practitioners should have qualified to receive this by 
2006. Other training initiatives include work on how to complete the Asset 
documentation. This OR welcomes the initiatives the YJB has planned. It 
strongly supports the commissioning of a training needs analysis and the 
development, as proposed, of a safeguarding package. The Juvenile 
Awareness Staff Programme (JASP) for all staff in young offender institutions 
is another welcome development. The module on vulnerability assessment 
might bring further benefits if more time were allocated to its delivery. This OR 
commends the training package “Understanding Self-harm” which forms part 
of the “Self-harm Toolkit” which the Prison Service Safer Custody Group 
made available in September 2004.  
 
 
Quality assurance in the secure estate 
 
 
An active programme of quality assurance within the secure estate is 
essential if improvements recommended above are to be realised. YJB’s 
establishment of the Effective Regimes monitoring framework is an 
encouraging development. It is important that this should not become over-
bureaucratic.  
 
Serious incidents in the youth justice system, such as a death in custody, are 
the subject of investigation and review by various agencies. This OR 
welcomes the YJB’s decision to revise its Serious Incident Review process 
and align it with other review frameworks. There is scope for closer alignment 
of Serious Incident Review practice with the procedure for ACPC Chapter 8 
reviews.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Since Joseph’s tragic death, a wide range of measures have been taken to 
improve safeguarding of young people in young offender institutions. This OR 
has examined them and made recommendations for improvement. The YJB 
and the Prison Service have shown a commitment to change. More can be 
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and needs to be done to ensure the safety of the often very vulnerable young 
people who are remanded or sentenced to custody. 
 
Since Joseph’s tragic death, a wide range of measures have been taken to 
improve safeguarding of young people in young offender institutions. This OR 
has carefully examined them and made recommendations for improvement. 
The YJB and the Prison Service have shown a commitment to change and 
have developed a set of policies and procedures that focus directly on 
safeguarding issues and have the potential capacity to deliver a more 
effective and safer service. But much more can be and needs to be done.  
 
It remains important to recognise the key part that both quality control, 
through compliance and active management, and quality assurance - through 
inspection, monitoring and active learning - need to play in ensuring that the 
safeguarding framework is fully implemented and embedded. It is also 
important to develop a workforce that is dedicated to the underlying 
philosophy of care in custody and committed to the task of ensuring that the 
welfare of the young person is paramount. 
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OPERATIONAL REVIEW 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A Death in Custody 
 
1.1 Joseph Scholes sadly died at Stoke Heath Young Offenders Institution 
(YOI) on 24 March 2002.  He was 16 years and one month old at the time and 
was only nine days into a two-year Detention and Training Order imposed by 
the Manchester Crown Court on the 15 March 2002. Because Joseph had a 
known history of vulnerability and self-harm he had been placed in safer 
accommodation in the Stoke Heath Health Care Centre. However, during the 
afternoon of 24 March 2002 an industrial craftsman at the YOI while checking 
for a maintenance problem found Joseph hanging from strips of linen attached 
to the window bars of his cell. Staff tried to revive Joseph and a prompt 
response was reported from the emergency services, but Joseph was 
pronounced dead at North Staffordshire Hospital later that afternoon. 
 
Joseph Scholes – the history of a very vulnerable young man 
 
1.2 John Joseph Peter Scholes, known as Joe or Joseph, was born on 20 
February 1986. Joseph’s parents married in1988, but separated in 1995. Mrs 
Scholes reported that the family had led an unsettled life with financial 
problems, frequently moving house and changing the children’s schools. 
There is little coordinated information about Joseph’s early childhood, but 
some indications that all might not be well for him. 
 
1.3 In October 1998 Trafford Social Services Department dealt with 
allegations that [X], with whom he was living at the time, was hitting him. The 
matter was investigated, but it appears to have been concluded that there was 
not enough evidence for criminal proceedings. Both the Police and Social 
services appear to have been satisfied with verbal assurances from [X].  
 
1.4 Later that year, in December 1998, Manchester Social Services 
Department were presented with a range of worrying issues about the family. 
[Details of further allegations omitted.] Manchester investigated these matters, 
in consultation with Trafford Social Services Department, but eventually 
concluded that no action would be taken on the grounds that there was 
insufficient evidence and that [the children] were now safe living with their 
mother. 
 
1.5 Two years later, in December 2000, Joseph repeated [some of these] 
allegations. There was a joint police/social services investigation but again no 
action taken on child protection grounds, although Mrs Scholes was provided 
with advice about various support options. However, Joseph was by then 
nearly 14 years old and concerns were being raised about his behaviour and 
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mental health. By January 2001 Joseph was being treated for depression by 
his General Practitioner who also advised that he should receive 
psychological help. From this time on the Family and Child Treatment Service 
(FACTS) reported that Joseph’s behaviour was becoming increasingly 
unpredictable and aggressive from this time on. There were several instances 
of exclusion from school. 
 
1.6 During 2001 Joseph’s behaviour continued to generate growing concern 
to his doctors and school, including concerns about the degree of his 
substance misuse and increasing threats of violence to his mother. His 
medication was increased and the Child and Adolescent psychiatrist 
requested an urgent assessment from the Prestwich FACTS Team. The 
psychiatrist continued to press for an assessment through July into August 
amidst growing concern about an escalation of Joseph’s violent behaviour, 
particularly towards his mother. At the beginning of August after having been 
reported missing by his mother and damaging her car, Joseph was 
accommodated overnight at a family unit and then went to live with his half-
sister, Claire. During the following weeks the situation remained difficult, but 
by 11 October both Joseph and Claire had moved to live back in Trafford with 
Mr Scholes.  
 
1.7 On 10 November 2001 police attended Mr Scholes’s home to assist an 
ambulance crew. It was reported that Joseph was in a violent state and had 
jumped from a first floor window, then run off. He was found nearby, but was 
violent to the ambulance men, punching and kicking and making verbally 
abusive threats. Joseph was restrained and arrested for affray. On 13 
November the Child and Adolescent psychiatrist saw Joseph and she 
arranged continuing treatment and follow up pending transfer to Trafford NHS 
and Social Services. 
 
1.8 Later that month a psychiatric assessment was completed by the FACTS 
team. This assessment concluded with a diagnosis of Depressive Conduct 
Disorder, with abuse of alcohol and other substances. The assessment linked 
Joseph’s offending behaviour with self-preservation. Joseph was considered a 
risk, both to himself and others, and a view was offered that if he should end 
up in custody then the risk of self-harm could well increase. The FACTS 
assessment report recommended a detailed risk-reduction strategy. 
 
1.9 At the end of November 2001 Trafford Youth Offending Team (Yot) 
eventually referred Joseph to Trafford Social Services Department and sought 
information from Manchester. Both Mr and Mrs Scholes were in the process of 
moving away from the area and Joseph experienced a rootless few days after 
Mr Scholes is alleged to have ejected him for unacceptable behaviour. When 
Joseph was found by the police living in a caravan in a car park, he was made 
the subject of a Police Protection Order. By 1 December 2001 Trafford SSD 
agreed to place Joseph at their Northenden Road Children’s Home. This was 
considered a good placement option as the home had a stable resident group 
of children without a significant history of offending. 
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1.10 On 6 December 2001 it is reported that Joseph told a social worker that 
he was settled and getting on well with staff and other residents at the home. 
That night, however, he went out with a group of three other children and, 
after taking alcohol, took part in three street robberies involving mobile 
telephones, he was arrested and the following day, charged and bailed. 
 
1.11 On 11 December 2001 Joseph appeared in court to face the affray 
charge. He was convicted and sentenced to a one year Supervision Order: he 
would continue to live at the children’s home and engage in a range of 
interventions aimed at anger management, victim empathy, offending 
behaviour and substance misuse issues. Over the next few weeks Joseph 
continued to demonstrate his vulnerability and there were many instances 
where he was a serious management problem or threatened self-harm. In 
February Joseph saw a second Child and Adolescent psychiatrist who 
expressed extreme concern about Joseph’s ‘fragile emotional state’ and 
recommended containment and constant vigilance. 
 
1.12 On 26 February 2002 Joseph appeared at Manchester Crown Court and 
pleaded guilty to the robbery charges. He was convicted and remanded on 
bail for reports. The next day there was a serious incident at the children’s 
home. Joseph was seen to be under a great deal of pressure and very 
‘unwell’, had cut himself several times, including his face and had damaged 
his bedroom with graffiti. Joseph also went missing from the home between 7 
and 9 March 2002. He returned of his own volition, but on 12 March 2002 was 
charged with breach of bail. 
 
1.13 On 15 March 2002 Joseph appeared for sentence at Manchester Crown 
Court. He received a two year Detention and Training Order. Later that day he 
was transferred to HM YOI Stoke Heath at Market Drayton. 
 
 
Investigations into the Circumstances of Joseph’s death 
 
Prison Service Investigation   
 
1.14 Following Joseph’s death at HM YOI Stoke Heath on 24 March 2002, an 
investigation was immediately initiated by the Prison Service. On the day 
following the death the West Midlands Area Manager for Prisons instigated an 
investigation to be conducted in accordance with Prison Service Order 1300 - 
Investigations. The investigation was completed on 17 May 2002. 
 
YJB Serious Incident Review 
  
1.15 All deaths in custody are subject to a Serious Incident Review that is 
conducted by a senior YJB manager or an independent consultant. Such a 
review was initiated into Joseph’s death. (The Chief Executive of the Youth 
Justice Board (YJB) may also commission a Serious Incident Review of any 
other incident that they considers requires one.) A Local Management   
Report into the circumstances of Joseph’s death was prepared by the 
Operations Manager of the Trafford Youth Offending Team immediately after 
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the event. This report was completed on 17 April 2002. This report was then 
forwarded to YJB in June 2002 and contributed to the Serious Incident 
Review. An interim report was presented to the YJB on 18 September 2002. A 
final report was prepared and presented to the YJB Audit Committee on 11 
May 2004 consequent to receipt of the Coroner’s verdict on 30 April 2004. 
 
Chapter 8 Case Review by Trafford ACPC 
 
1.16 Following advice received from the Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) 
and the YJB, Trafford Area Child Protection Committee (ACPC) agreed to 
conduct a full Review of the case under the auspices of Chapter 8 of 
Department of Health guidance ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ 
1999.  An independent author was commissioned to prepare the Overview 
Report and also chair the multi-agency panel established to steer the review 
process. The Chapter 8 Case Review commenced work on 20 September 
2002. The Trafford ACPC received and agreed the final Overview Report in 
the summer of 2004. 
 
The Inquest 
 
1.17 Mr John Ellery, H.M. Coroner for the Mid and North Division, County of 
Shropshire, conducted an Inquest into the circumstances of the death of 
Joseph Scholes at Shrewsbury between 19 and 30 April 2004. The Inquest 
was held with a Jury. The Inquest heard evidence, either in writing or person, 
from 55 witnesses. As well as receiving documentary evidence and the 
reports of investigations conducted by the agencies into the circumstances of 
the death, the Coroner commissioned his own Independent Psychiatric Report 
of the case.   
 
1.18 At the conclusion of the Inquest, the Jury returned a unanimous verdict 
of “Accidental death in part contributed because the risk was not properly 
recognised and appropriate precautions were not taken to prevent it.” The 
Jury made clear that this was primarily a systems failure and that Joseph’s 
death was not attributable to any one individual or group of individuals.  
 
1.19 Following the Inquest Mr Ellery wrote to the Home Secretary on 5 May 
2005. Mr Ellery drew to the Home Secretary’s attention to a number of 
concerns about the sentencing, placement, care and containment of Joseph 
Scholes that the Inquest had not been able fully to examine. The Coroner 
considered that these were policy and operational issues of such moment that 
only a public inquiry would provide a platform for their full consideration. 
   
1.20 Chapter 2 of this Operational Review provides a summary account of 
each of the above four investigations and reports their main conclusions and 
recommendations for action and service improvement. 
 
A matter of public concern - the Political Context 
 
1.21 Following Joseph’s death, his mother, Mrs Yvonne Scholes sought the 
assistance of her constituency MP, Mr Chris Ruane in pressing for a full 
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public inquiry. This resulted in the launching of a public campaign to support 
the call for an inquiry into the death and wider related issues. In December 
2003 Mrs Scholes and her advisers met the Minister for Correctional 
Services, Mr Paul Goggins MP. Mrs Scholes was assured that the 
government was seriously committed to reducing the numbers of apparent 
self-inflicted deaths in custody and apprised her of the three-year Safer 
Custody programme. However, she confirmed that she still wished to press 
on with her call for a public inquiry in order that other wider-ranging issues of 
youth justice and penal policy could be examined.  
 
1.22 On 28 January 2004 Chris Ruane MP asked the Prime Minister for his 
support for the call for a public inquiry. The Prime Minister replied in terms of 
the necessity to await the completion of investigations, including the 
Coroner’s inquest, prior to providing a final reply.  
 
1.23 The matter was then given a much fuller parliamentary airing in the 
House of Lords on 11 April 2004 when Lord Dholakia presented the case for 
the establishment of a public inquiry into Joseph’s death and wider related 
issues of sentencing, penal policy and practice. Lord Dholokia was strongly 
supported by Baroness Stern, Baroness Howe, Baroness Walmsley, the Earl 
of Listowel and Viscount Bridgeman. Lord Bassam replied for the Government 
and also followed up with a written response to questions raised during the 
debate. Again the government’s position was informed by the need to await 
the, by then, imminent outcome of the Coroner’s Inquest.  
 
1.24 On 30 June 2004 both Lord Dholakia in the Lords and Chris Ruane MP 
in the Commons, supported by 78 other MPs, raised again the question of the 
establishment of a public inquiry. The Government responded to this call in a   
Ministerial Statement on 16 September 2004. 
 
Ministerial Statement  
 
1.25 Following full consideration of the Coroner’s recommendation that there 
be a public inquiry into the circumstances of Joseph’s death, the 
parliamentary airing of that matter, the wishes and views of Joseph’s family 
and continuing support for that course of action in the professional media, the 
Minister for Correctional Services, Mr Paul Goggins MP made the following 
Statement to parliament on 16 September 2004. 
 
“I am now able to announce the measures I have taken and am taking to 
ensure that the matters arising from Joseph’s tragic death and the coroner’s 
recommendations are properly considered. 
 
The issues fall into three broad categories. They are: the appropriateness of 
the sentence Joseph received; the effectiveness of relevant operational 
procedures in identifying, placing and safeguarding vulnerable young people 
in custody; and whether the juvenile secure estate has adequate 
accommodation to meet the needs of vulnerable young people. 
 
The steps I am taking to deal with these are as follows: 
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 I have referred the circumstances in which Joseph received a custodial 
sentence on three counts of attempted robbery to the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council, requesting it to take this case into account in its 
current work to draw up guidelines on sentencing for robbery: 
 
 I have appointed a former Assistant Chief Inspector of the Social 
Services lnspectorate to examine the operational issues raised by this 
case, including through the coroners Inquest. I have also asked him to 
provide a summary account of all investigations that have been 
conducted into Joseph’s death; 
 
 I have asked the Youth Justice Board, which is preparing proposals for 
its vision for the future juvenile custodial estate, to take full account of 
the points made by the coroner on the adequacy of custodial provision 
for vulnerable young offenders. 
 
I consider that the above measures are the most effective means of 
addressing the matters the coroner has drawn to the Home Secretary’s 
attention and what lessons should be learned from Joseph’s death. I am 
grateful to the coroner, and to Joseph’s family, for highlighting the issues that 
are of concern to them. Nothing can bring Joseph back, but I do want to 
ensure that everything is done to prevent the repetition of such a tragic event.” 
 
 
Terms of Reference for the Operational Review 
 
1.26 Terms of Reference for the Operational Review were formulated by the 
Home Office and these articulate the objectives to be achieved by the review 
process.  The agreed Terms of Reference are as follows:   
 
The review will analyse: 
 
¾ The policies, procedures and practices for the placement of young 
offenders, taking account of any recommendations that the Youth 
Justice Board or Home Office have made since Joseph Scholes’s 
death, and whether further improvements can be made. The review will 
refer to the Prison Service investigation, the Serious Incident Review 
on Joseph Scholes undertaken by the YJB and the work commissioned 
by the YJB Placement Programme Board and the Trafford ACPC 
Chapter 8 review.  These contain recommendations that encompass 
both correctional services and the safeguarding of children. 
 
The review will consider: 
 
¾ Whether the information and documentation that a Youth Offending 
Team (Yot) prepares for sentencers on young people at risk of a 
custodial sentence/placement is adequate and appropriate, taking into 
account the work that the YJB is doing on the management of risk in 
the community. 
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¾ Whether improved guidance is needed on the Yot’s assessment of 
vulnerability or risk. 
 
¾ Whether existing methods for the transfer of documentation between 
the Yot, the court, the Youth Justice Board Placements Team and the 
receiving establishment need improvement. 
 
¾ The adequacy of YOI reception procedures and arrangements for the 
care of vulnerable trainees. 
 
¾ The appropriateness of protective clothing for young offenders at risk of 
self-harm. 
 
¾ Whether relevant changes are needed to staff training, in particular 
regarding the quality of the Asset assessment form, the risk of harm 
section and advice that the YJB is producing for Yots: and the 
reception and care of vulnerable trainees. 
 
The review will be a fundamental part of informing the family of Joseph 
Scholes about progress and ensuring action is undertaken by the key 
agencies following his death. 
 
The review, in addition to findings on the matters listed above, will include a 
summary account of all investigations that have been conducted into Joseph 
Scholes’s death and the operational issues arising from them.  It will outline 
any implications for the juvenile secure arrangements as a whole and identify 
any recommended improvements. The review may make recommendations to 
the Minister on any good practice that is relevant to or becomes apparent 
during the review. 
  
Review process 
 
1.27 There are two stages to the review process. First, a summary of the 
findings and recommendations of the four investigations into the 
circumstances of the death of Joseph Scholes at Stoke Heath YOI in March 
2002.  From this examination a set of key themes and issues are identified 
that will need to be addressed if improvements in services and in young 
people’s safeguarding are to be achieved. Second, an examination and 
appraisal of the operational and procedural arrangements that are now in 
place to ensure the safeguarding of young people in custody in YOI. An 
important aspect of this appraisal has been to note any changes or 
improvements in the safeguarding arrangements that have been developed 
since the time of Joseph’s death, with particular attention to the key issues 
pointed up in the investigations. 
 
1.28 The primary purpose of this Operational Review has therefore been to 
assess whether the arrangements for safeguarding, in all its aspects, are 
robust enough to ensure that young people are held safely in custody and that 
their welfare remains paramount. The nature of this Operational Review does 
not include comment on the quality of performance within that safeguarding 
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framework by either the individual YOI or the juvenile YOI service as a whole. 
Such appraisals are available in the Thematic Studies and the inspection 
reports on individual institutions prepared by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 
and reviews of service published by the YJB. This Operational Review can 
therefore only assure that young people are going to be held more safely if 
there is effective performance against the safeguarding framework and its 
requirements. 
 
1.29 The Operational Review has been conducted as follows:  
 
• Examination and summary of the four investigations into the 
circumstances of the death of Joseph Scholes at HMYOI Stoke Heath  
• Examination of documentation related to the YJB and Prison Service 
policies, practice guidance and operational procedures 
• Examination of relevant research studies and Service Reviews 
• Examination of inspection reports and studies published by HM Chief 
Inspector of Prisons  
• Examination of relevant Serious Incident Reviews  
• Briefing and discussion of relevant matters with the Chairman of YJB, 
Prison Service and YJB officials 
• Briefing about the YJB Placements Function 
• Visits of Observation to two YOIs, Warren Hill and Stoke Heath 
• Consultation with Head of Youth Justice Service, Norfolk YOT 
• Consultation with member of HM Prison Inspectorate. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  
 
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DEATH OF JOSEPH SCHOLES 
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This chapter of the operational review summarises, in an abbreviated way, the 
investigations into Joseph Scholes’s death at Stoke Heath YOI. Two of the 
investigations, conducted by the YJB and the Prison Service, also informed 
the case review conducted under the auspices of Chapter 8 of Working 
Together to Safeguard Children 1999 by Trafford ACPC. That review in turn 
informed the Coroners Inquest.  
 
2.1 Investigation by the Prison Service 
 
Conduct of the Investigation 
 
2.1.1. The death of Joseph Scholes at HMYOI Stoke Heath on 24 March 2002 
was immediately investigated by the Prison Service. On the day following the 
death the West Midlands Area Manager for Prisons instigated an investigation 
to be conducted in accordance with Prison Service Instruction 1300 - 
Investigations. The investigation was conducted by Mr Neil Croft, the then 
Governor of HMP Hewell Grange. Mr Croft completed his investigation on 17 
May 2002. 
 
2.1.2 The investigation was required to find out what had taken place, to 
establish its cause and the manner in which it was managed.  In particular the 
Senior Investigating Officer was to: 
 
• establish the facts pertaining to the apparent cause of death 
 
• establish the degree of compliance with Prison Service policy and the 
local strategy for the care of the suicidal 
 
• establish whether any changes to the operation of the suicide 
awareness strategy should be recommended 
 
• establish whether a separate investigation was required under the 
Code of Conduct and Discipline 
 
In addition, the Investigation was required to make recommendations to 
prevent or avoid recurrence, specifically related to HMYOI Stoke Heath or the 
Service in general and on better handling of such incidents in future. The 
investigation was also invited to highlight for recommendation any examples 
of good practice. 
 
2.1.3 Mr Croft conducted a very thorough Investigation that involved the 
detailed interviewing of all relevant members of staff at Stoke Heath and 
representatives of agencies outside of the prison who had knowledge of 
Joseph prior to his reception at Stoke Heath. The Investigation visited and 
inspected the accommodation where Joseph had died. The Investigation also 
reviewed the policy and procedures for the prevention of self-harm at Stoke 
Heath and related these to the YJB National Standards, with particular 
reference to their application to Joseph and his care. The Senior Investigating 
Officer also conducted additional enquiries following a response by Mrs 
Scholes to an invitation to contribute to the Investigation. 
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2.1.4 The Investigation, in recognition of the multi-agency aspects of the care 
and management of Joseph, also reported to an inter-agency advisory panel 
established to reflect these responsibilities. Membership of the panel included 
representatives from the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman’s Office, the 
Prison Service Safer Custody Group, Shropshire Social Services Department, 
and the Youth Justice Board. The panel met to consider the initial and final 
reports of the Investigation. On those occasions they were joined by the 
Investigating team and the Governor of HMYOI Stoke Heath. 
 
Main Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Appropriateness of Sentence 
 
 2.1.5 The Investigating team concluded that there were questions to be 
asked about the appropriateness of Joseph’s sentence to custody, in respect 
of both his own culpability and disposition to criminal behaviour, and in 
relation to the treatment of the other participants in the offence.  The 
investigation came to a firm view that Joseph’s background, family history and 
his psychiatric depression all contributed to an evident lack of self esteem that 
manifested itself through drugs, alcohol and self-harm. They considered that 
Joseph was a sad and depressed young man, who was not criminally minded, 
and whose shock and remorse at having inadvertently been caught up in a 
single episode of street robberies doubtless added to his feelings of 
worthlessness. 
 
2.1.6 The Investigation recommended that the circumstances of the case be 
referred to the Prison Service Safer Custody Group. They were asked to 
consider whether the case should be drawn to the attention of the Lord Chief 
Justice. 
 
Appropriateness of Placement 
 
2.1.7 The investigation also examined the appropriateness of the decision to 
place Joseph at a YOI and not seek a placement in a Local Authority Secure 
Children’s Home (LASCH) or Secure Training Centre (STC). The investigation 
notes that Joseph was placed at a YOI ‘because of a lack of alternative 
spaces’. Having considered Joseph’s circumstances in great detail the 
investigating team concluded that the more appropriate placement would 
have been a LASCH. 
 
2.1.8 The Investigation recommended that there should be a review of the 
provision of places in the LASCH sector so that future allocation can be made 
on the basis of need rather than expediency. They also considered that 
facilities for young people demonstrably at risk of self-harm or suicide might 
be developed in the YOI sector. Such facilities might offer regimes more 
closely equated to the nature of care and containment provided by LASCHs. 
The Investigation appreciated that such developments would take some time 
to come to fruition and so recommended that the YJB should undertake a 
review of its approach to placements of highly vulnerable young people. This 
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review has taken place and forms a part of the YJB Strategy for the Secure 
Estate for Juveniles, a consultation paper issued in November 2004 [see 
paragraphs 4.16 to 4.22] 
 
2.1.9. The Investigation noted that shortly after Joseph’s reception at HMYOI 
Stoke Heath the community Yot worker had applied for him to be re-allocated 
to a LASCH as soon as possible. This was an appropriate course as it 
followed up on concerns expressed in his report to the court that had advised 
that a custodial sentence would present a serious risk related to Joseph’s 
capacity for self-harm. However there was no consultation or liaison with 
Stoke Heath about this and the YOI remained unaware of this application. 
  
2.1.10 The Investigation concluded that the procedure for handling and 
communicating about such applications appears unclear and so 
recommended that the YJB and the Prison Service jointly review the relevant 
operational guidelines contained in the YJB Secure Placements manual, with 
particular reference to applications to change initial placements. This work 
was completed in the first half of 2004 [see Chapter 6].  
 
Quality of Care and Safeguarding 
 
2.1.11 The Investigation concluded that, Joseph having been received at 
HMYOI Stoke Heath, all appropriate reception procedures were carried out 
satisfactorily and that Joseph received a high level of care and attention, 
wholly in accordance with Prison Service policies. Joseph’s psychiatric history 
and history of self-harm were appropriately noted. The appropriate Self-Harm 
At-Risk Form (F2052SH) was opened. On admission he was located in the 
Health Care Centre, initially in a safer cell with CCTV observation, and later in 
an ordinary cell but still under at-risk supervision and observation. 
 
2.1.12 The Investigation looked closely at the quality of information and 
assessment available to ensure a fully supportive care plan for Joseph. The 
Investigation concluded that more detailed medical information should have 
been available to support the basic information provided in the health record 
and the Risk Dossier. Some of this additional information came from Joseph’s 
mother, Mrs Scholes, who had advised that compliant behaviour on Joseph’s 
part should not be taken at face value and that this masked Joseph’s ‘at risk’ 
disposition. The Investigation team were unable to conclude, however, that 
any additional information would have had any critical impact on Joseph’s 
care given the high level of care already being given, and concern expressed 
by healthcare staff and others. 
 
2.1.13 The Investigation also concluded that the YJB minimum standard that 
required a case review for individual trainees to be carried out within 10 days 
of arrival at YOI should attract revision, particularly in respect to young people 
assessed to be at risk. The Investigation recommended that in such cases an 
initial review should be held within 24 hours, followed by a more detailed 
review within 7 days. 
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2.1.14 The Investigating team considered the use of safer cells in Joseph’s 
case and for similar circumstances. They concluded that in Joseph’s case it 
would have been inappropriate for him to have shared a cell with others, but it 
was their view that such facilities should be provided if suitable 
accommodation was made available. At the time of the Investigation the team 
concluded that the accommodation was inadequate and so recommended 
that the Governor of HMYOI Stoke Heath review that form of provision. 
 
2.1.15 The Investigating team adjudged that the quality of health care 
provided to Joseph at Stoke Heath was good and appropriate to his level of 
need. He had been fully assessed on arrival and his medication regime noted 
and continued. The Investigation commended the work of the staff in the 
Healthcare Centre, a setting that was considered by all to be an out of date 
and inadequate facility. The investigation noted Prison Service plans to 
replace this facility and urged expedition. 
 
2.1.16 The investigation noted that Stoke Heath had a planned strategy to 
encourage Joseph to move from the Health Care Centre to a normal location 
on one of the training wings. It was noted that this was a strategy that had 
been adopted successfully in a number of previous cases when dealing with 
at-risk trainees. A week after his admission Joseph went to A wing for just a 
few hours on two occasions, the second occasion being the day prior to his 
death. Another trainee, known to Joseph outside the YOI, confirmed that they 
had talked about general issues and that Joseph seemed safe and happy 
during these brief visits. The Investigating team did not offer comment on this 
practice and its impact on Joseph. 
 
Managing self-harm and suicide    
 
2.1.17 The Investigating team concluded that in the circumstances of 
Joseph’s death the procedures for responding to a serious incident of self-
harm were correctly and speedily implemented. They also concluded that 
Stoke Heath’s suicide awareness strategy is of good quality and that there 
was evidence that it was applied with care and determination throughout the 
YOI. 
 
2.1.18 However, the Investigation felt that their examination of the care of 
Joseph Scholes demonstrated that there were grounds for further tightening 
of these procedures. On Saturday 23 March 2002, the day before Joseph took 
his own life he had telephoned his mother. A transcript of the telephone call 
showed that Joseph stated that he was not happy to be at Stoke Heath and 
wanted his mother to press for his transfer to a LASCH. In this conversation 
Joseph told his mother that he would hang himself to help expedite a move. 
He arranged to call his mother on the following Tuesday and she told him of 
her plans to visit him on the following Thursday. During this call his mother 
was supportive and encouraging.  
 
2.1.19 YOI staff were not informed at the time of the content of Joseph’s 
conversation with his mother – information that might have alerted them to his 
intentions. The Investigating team noted that although telephone calls are 
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routinely recorded, there are no arrangements to directly monitor the 
conversation of trainees under ‘at risk’ supervision and for relevant 
information to be passed immediately to staff supervising individual trainees. 
They recommended that such arrangements be introduced at HMYOI Stoke 
Heath and be considered for adoption throughout the Prison Service. 
 
 
 
2.2 Youth Justice Board Serious Incident Report 
 
Conduct of the Investigation 
 
2.2.1 Investigations of Serious Incidents by the Youth Justice Board can be a 
one or two stage process depending on the nature of the serious 
incident[Xref: Chapter 12 ]. In the case of the death of a young person in 
custody the YJB provides its Chief Executive with discretion to commission a 
Serious Incident Review [SIR]. This may be completed by a senior member of 
YJB management or an independent consultant. YJB serious incident 
procedures also require the local Yot manager to prepare a Management 
Review report of the circumstances of the serious incident. This report is then 
forwarded to the YJB and, in the case of a death in custody, this contributes to 
the Serious Incident Review.  
 
2.2.2 In the circumstances of Joseph’s death a local Management Review 
report was prepared by the Operations Manager of the Trafford Yot 
immediately after the event. She completed her report on 17 April 2002. This 
report was forwarded to YJB in June 2002 and contributed to the Serious 
Incident Review being prepared by Mr Brendan Finegan, YJB Serious 
Incident Review Manager. Mr Finegan completed an interim Review and this 
was presented to the YJB on 18 September 2002. A final Report was 
prepared and presented to the YJB Audit Committee on 11 May 2004 
consequent to receipt of the Coroner’s verdict on 30 April 2004. 
 
2.2.3 The YJB Serious Incident Review relied for its information and evidence 
on documentary sources, including the local Management Review and 
associated paperwork, a serious incident report provided by the YJB 
placement team and the interim Prison Service report. The Trafford Yot 
Management review does not say whether any members of Yot staff relevant 
to the case were interviewed in the course of the review. 
 
Main Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Quality of Assessment of Joseph’s vulnerability 
 
2.2.4 The Yot completed an Asset assessment on Joseph in December 2001. 
This indicated that Joseph would be vulnerable due to his own behaviour and 
was at risk of self-harm or suicide based on information provided by his 
mother. No other evidence to support the judgement about vulnerability was 
provided in the Asset form. This assessment was forwarded to the YJB 
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Placements Team on 13 March 2002 who had already been alerted to the 
possibility of a custodial sentence for Joseph. 
 
2.2.5 The Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) prepared on Joseph was of good 
quality and in the view of the YJB Serious Incident Reviewer provided a fair 
picture of the young person, his needs and abilities. The PSR indicated the 
scope of multi-agency contact with psychiatric health services and Social 
Services, and gave clear indication of Joseph’s vulnerability to self-harm. The 
PSR reported that the psychiatric assessment had advised that a custodial 
sentence would escalate Joseph’s self-harming and that if he were to be 
placed in a secure placement then he should have access to regular medical 
review with regard to his medication and disposition to self-harm. The PSR 
set out a robust plan for the supervision of Joseph in the community, based 
on a highly restrictive Community Punishment and Rehabilitation Order.  
 
2.2.6 Following sentence a Post Court Report (PCR) was completed and this 
also stressed his vulnerability and provided explicit detail of his history of 
anxiety, depression, attempted suicide and self-harming behaviour, and his 
medication requirements.  
 
2.2.7 The YJB Review concluded that there was a substantial body of 
evidence that supported an assessment of Joseph as an extremely vulnerable 
young person who would be likely to experience more risk if placed in 
custody. The YJB Review noted variation between the indifferent quality and 
impact of the initial Asset assessment of Joseph’s vulnerability and the force 
of the information provided in the PCR. The Review therefore recommended 
that in future all information should be transferred into Asset documentation 
and that Asset judgements should be supported by clear evidence. 
 
Placement of vulnerable young people in security 
 
2.2.8 The YJB Review noted that on 13 March 2002 the YJB Placements 
Team were alerted to the possibility of a request for a secure placement on 15 
March 2002. The Trafford Yot forwarded a Booking form and Section 14 of the 
Asset document. Based on the two documents the Placements Team, 
following internal ‘Indicators of Risk’ procedures allocated Joseph to HMYOI 
Stoke Heath.   
 
2.2.9 The YJB Review examined this placement decision within the context of 
the differential availability of beds between YOIs, STCs and LASCHs across 
the juvenile secure estate. (No male STC places were available.)  On the day 
of Joseph’s placement there were 6 beds available for young men in LASCHs, 
but these were already allocated to 3 young people returning on secure 
remand, two 14 year olds sentenced to DTO and a bed for an 11 to 13 year 
old. The Review noted that LASCH beds were limited and therefore allocation 
depended on striking a difficult balance between competing risk and 
vulnerability factors presented by the young people. The YJB Review 
accepted that, despite the Prison Service deploying its best efforts to provide 
for the care and safety of juveniles, LASCHs will often be seen as a ‘safer 
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placement’ and not regarded as a ‘prison’ by those workers within the youth 
justice system who oppose custody for children. 
 
2.2.10 The YJB concluded that more clarity and transparency needed to be 
introduced into the placement arrangements. The Review recommended that 
the Placements Team should develop new guidance on the decision making 
process and make this available to Yots and the providers of security. The 
guidance should articulate clear processes and criteria for decision making, 
including the matter of deciding between competing vulnerabilities, and for 
reviewing placement decisions. These improved processes should also allow 
for periodic (annual) auditing on a case and activity basis. The Review also 
recommended that definitive YJB placement policy be published that clarified 
the differences between the three sectors within the juvenile secure estate. 
 
Issues of Communication 
 
2.2.11 The YJB Review identified some possible frailties in the exchange of 
documentation both within the YJB and between the Yot and HMYOI Stoke 
Heath. As noted above the YJB Placements Team made their decision on a 
limited range of information, even though the Local Yot management review 
reported their understanding that the PSR, the PCR, the Asset and Risk 
Asset had been sent to the team. In fact the PSR was sent to the Placement 
team on 21 March 2002 when Trafford Yot made a further request that 
Joseph be transferred to a LASCH.  
 
2.2.12 YJB National Standards require that the YOI and the Yot share the 
responsibility for the effective transfer of information to coincide with the 
arrival of the young person. The YJB Review concluded that evidently enough 
relevant information was transmitted to the YOI to inform an initial assessment 
by YOI staff of Joseph’s vulnerability. Information confirms that the Asset, 
PSR and PCR were forwarded to the YOI (but not all on the day of his 
reception) and that a Vulnerability Alert form was faxed through from the 
Placements Team. The Review notes that staff at Stoke Heath responded 
appropriately to these alerts and placed Joseph accordingly.  
 
2.2.13 However, the YJB review expressed some uncertainty about the 
robustness of the onward transmission of detailed information from the Yot to 
YOI staff, particularly about Joseph’s psychiatric history, and considered that 
this may have impacted on the quality of decision making about the 
arrangements for Joseph’s care planning and oversight. The YJB Review 
recommended that the practice of information exchange between YOI health 
units and other locations in the establishment be subject to review, in 
particular for young people regarded as vulnerable. Overall the Review has 
recommended to the YJB that the transfer and quality of documentation, 
particularly that related to Child and Mental Health information needs to be 
improved   
 
2.2.14 Shortly after Joseph’s admission to Stoke Heath the YOI staff informed 
the Yot officer of the steps that they had taken to safeguard Joseph in view of 
his vulnerability. In response to this information the Yot officer made a formal 
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request, on 21 March 2002, to the YJB Placements Team that Joseph be 
transferred to a LASCH. There is no confirmation that this request was known 
by or discussed with the YOI. The YJB Review therefore recommended that 
the ability of units within the secure juvenile estate to request transfers on 
grounds of the level of risk that a young person presents or other issues of 
safety should be extended. 
 
2.2.15 The YJB Review also explored a particular aspect of this case that 
concerned the fact that the Yot officer who had prepared the PSR was on sick 
leave at the time of Joseph’s court appearance and sentence and that 
Joseph’s case was passed to a new Yot officer. There was concern about 
continuity in this situation and support for Joseph and the YJB Review 
recommended that manning guidance for such situations needed to be 
reviewed. 
 
Strategic Overview  
 
2.2.16 An over-riding conclusion of the YJB Review was that the 
circumstances of the case reinforced the Youth Justice Board’s strategy for 
the secure estate which, in its current draft, envisions the promotion of a 
service staffed by Governors and staff who are experienced and trained in 
dealing with young people and the development of special, intermediate units 
for the most vulnerable. 
 
 
 
2.3 Trafford ACPC Chapter 8 Case Review 
 
Conducting the Case Review 
 
2.3.1 Following advice received from the Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) 
and the YJB, Trafford Area Child Protection Committee (ACPC) agreed to 
conduct a full Review of the case under the auspices of Chapter 8 of DH 
guidance ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ 1999. [A brief description 
of this process can be found at Annex 2]. An independent author, Mr Robin 
Hughes, was commissioned to prepare the Overview Report. Mr Hughes also 
chaired the multi-agency panel established to steer the review process. The 
Chapter 8 Case Review was commenced on 20 September 2002 and was 
completed by 19 May 2003. The Trafford ACPC has received and agreed the 
final Overview Report, but it remains confidential and has not been placed in 
the public domain. 
 
2.3.2 To provide a structure for the Overview Report the ACPC agreed that 
the following three questions would set the parameters for the review: 
 
o In view of the history of self-harm linked to anti-social behaviour over a 
period of years, what can we learn from the way that agencies worked 
together on Joseph’s need for a risk-reduction strategy? 
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o Joseph having been convicted and sentenced to custody, what can be 
learnt from the decision to send him to HMYOI Stoke Heath? 
 
o Joseph having arrived at Stoke Heath, what is to be learned from the 
way the prison is equipped to look after such a vulnerable child, 
including policies and procedures, the physical environment, specialist 
health support and what actually happened in Joseph’s case? 
 
2.3.3 The Overview Report draws together the evidence and conclusions 
collected and analysed through the individual agency management reviews. 
Agency management reviews were undertaken by Shropshire County 
Council, Manchester Social Services Department, Trafford Social Services 
and Education Departments, the YJB and Trafford Youth Offending Team, 
Greater Manchester Police, the Prison Service and relevant NHS Trusts. The 
Overview Report was a full and thorough work of analysis and presented its 
findings with an authority based on detailed evidence. The Chapter 8 Review 
made 40 recommendations for service improvement addressed to all relevant 
agencies. The following paragraphs highlight those most pivotal to the inter-
relationship between the Trafford SSD, YJB, the Yot and the Prison Service. 
 
Main Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Quality of pre-sentence work 
 
2.3.4 The Chapter 8 Review confirmed that the court received explicit advice 
about Joseph’s vulnerability, his history of self-harm and attempted suicide. 
Remarks made by the Child and Adolescent psychiatrist who had treated 
Joseph since May 2001 were reported to the effect that Joseph had a history 
of depressive symptoms associated with substance and alcohol misuse, and 
episodes of deliberate self-harm [words omitted]. The court were also advised 
of concern, on the part of both the Yot officer and the Trafford Adolescent 
Support team, that Joseph would be at increased risk of self-harm if 
sentenced to custody. Both the Yot and Social Services staff reported 
positively on Joseph’s response to supervision and residence in the children’s 
home. The Yot proposed the imposition of a Community Punishment and 
Rehabilitation Order.  In the event, Joseph was given a custodial sentence 
although the Chapter 8 Review noted that the trial judge, in referring to the 
Social Services advice, stated that their concern about Joseph’s vulnerability 
would be passed on.        
 
Placement of Joseph in Custody 
 
2.3.5 The Chapter 8 Case Review concluded that a more effective early 
warning system needed to be developed as this would hold the potential for 
advance consideration of children’s needs and could have allowed Joseph’s 
name to be pencilled-in against possible placements ahead of sentence. The 
Review emphasised the importance of good information being available to the 
YJB Placements Team on the day of sentence and noted that there had been 
different views about what information had been made available and to whom. 
The Review concluded that, in the event, if only the Asset form and Risk-
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Asset were available, this would be insufficient as they did not provide an 
adequate assessment of the full range of the child’s needs. The Review 
recommended the need for improvement, focussing on the provision of fuller 
information, including medical information and a greater degree of interaction 
between the Yot officer and the YJB Placements Team. 
 
2.3.6 Overall, the Chapter 8 Review concluded that Joseph would have been 
more appropriately placed in a Local Authority Secure Children’s Home. The 
Review appreciated that there were problems with the availability and supply 
of such accommodation, but reflected on the fact that the sector had an 
excellent record for preventing self-harm and suicide. Clearly, given the 
current availability, it would always be necessary to make a strong and fully 
evidenced case for such a placement and the Review recommended that 
more explicit eligibility criteria for placement in a LASCH should be published 
and that referrers should be required to support their requests with information 
referenced to those criteria. 
 
2.3.7 The Review noted that there had been some issues about what 
information had been initially provided to Stoke Heath. There were also 
problems finding a mutually convenient time for the Yot officer to visit the YOI. 
The review recommended that this area of practice should attract some 
tightening up and in those cases where it is considered that placement in a 
YOI carries unacceptable risk, the Yot should communicate with the YOI 
within 24 hours to ensure that everyone is fully briefed to contribute to a 
protection plan and then initiate a transfer request as soon as the disposal in 
court is made.  
 
2.3.8 The Review also recommended that this action should take place well 
inside the required visiting time set by National Standards (10 days) and 
preferably within the 3 days recommended by the Trafford Yot Serious 
Incident report. It should be noted that YJB National Standards are minimum 
standards and do not preclude a meeting taking place within three days where 
a high level of risk is presented. 
 
Care and Supervision of Joseph at Stoke Heath 
 
2.3.9 The Chapter 8 Review expressed some serious concerns about the 
nature of the accommodation provided for Joseph and other trainees at the 
Stoke Heath Health Care Centre. The Review noted that both the Prison 
Service Investigation and reports by the Prison Inspectorate (Inspections in 
2000 and 2001) had adjudged the unit as inadequate for purpose. The 
Review referred to a report by the Safer Prisons Unit (June 2002) that 
considered the Health Care Centre to be too small and inflexible in use, in 
poor physical condition and failing to meet reasonable standards for daily life 
and good health. This report had also identified dangerous features in all six 
cells. The Chapter 8 Review recommended urgent action to eliminate the 
unsafe features of the accommodation and provide continuous and direct staff 
surveillance of any child or young person considered at risk of self-harm. The 
Review noted that there were plans to replace the unit in 2005/6. 
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2.3.10 The Chapter 8 Review confirmed the view reported in the relevant 
agency management reviews that staff who looked after Joseph at Stoke 
Heath were diligent and professionally concerned to care for and safeguard 
him. However, this was a responsibility shared between a number of nurses 
and doctors, and the review concluded that for a young person in Joseph’s 
situation a ‘key worker’ should be appointed within 24 hours of their arrival 
and be charged with the responsibility for oversight and coordination of all 
aspects of the young person’s detention and care.  
 
2.3.11 The Chapter 8 Review confirmed that when Joseph arrived at Stoke 
Heath, staff and doctors were aware that he was a young person at risk, but 
they did not know how serious was his vulnerability nor how his mental state 
affected his behaviour.  It remains unclear who at Stoke Heath saw what 
reports and when. It was agreed that it was some days before his psychiatric 
history became available. This is a crucial issue in the review of the case and 
the Chapter 8 Review recommended a full review of the arrangements for 
ensuring that the YOI gets all relevant information and that this spells out 
respective responsibilities. The arrangements should ensure access to the 
information by relevant staff within the YOI. Where a risk of self-harm is 
identified then psychiatric histories should be available at admission or very 
soon after. 
 
2.3.12 The Chapter 8 Review also drew attention to the arrangements for 
record keeping at the YOI Health Care Centre. Information about a young 
person is kept in four different, but interrelated folders. The Review concluded 
that this provided a potential for some confusion, not helped by the quality of 
some of the recording.  The Review thus recommended a review of record 
keeping so as to reduce this possibility. In particular, non-medical staff with 
direct responsibility for a young person at risk of self-harm need to know what 
is happening even if the information is held on a medical file. This access 
should of course be subject, at all times. to the medical consent rules. 
 
2.3.13 Joseph was seen by doctors on 20 and 21 March 2004. No further 
psychiatric records had been received up to this point nor, it is suggested, had 
Health Care Centre staff received the relevant information provided by the 
Yot. It would appear that Joseph’s general attitude and behaviour during 
those early days in the Health Care Centre allowed staff to conclude that he 
was ‘settling in’. He had not tried to harm himself and denied to staff any 
thoughts about doing so. During the first two days there were problems 
related to his eating and washing, but these passed and the records describe 
a compliant, undemanding boy making a slow adjustment to his 
circumstances. Staff remained alert, however, to concerns about his state of 
mind and medical notes record on 22 March 2004 that ‘Joseph is a very 
depressed, damaged young man. He will require a lot of support and close 
monitoring’.  
 
2.3.14 Joseph remained in the Health Care Centre, but preparations were 
made for his eventual transfer to A Wing. The Chapter 8 Review reports his 
expressed opposition and anxiety about this move and this concern is 
evidenced in a series of logged reports. As noted, staff at Stoke Heath 
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actioned a careful plan to introduce him to that possibility. However, Joseph 
remained resistant to the notion and continued to express his unwillingness to 
move to the last. 
 
2.3.15 When in the Health Care Centre Joseph was subject to a prescribed 30 
minute observation regime. As Joseph died within 20 minutes of the last 
recorded observation, the Chapter 8 Review recommended that YOIs adopt a 
15 minute observation interval where young people are assessed as at 
serious risk of self-harm and are accommodated in a ‘safer’ cell. If the cells 
are not deemed ’safe’ then the Chapter 8 Review recommended continuous, 
direct observation. In all circumstances, managers should monitor compliance 
with these arrangements on a daily basis. 
 
Assessment and Planning 
 
2.3.16 In Joseph’s case assessment and planning for his period of detention 
had hardly begun. Information had not been systematically collected, collated 
and assessed. Although there were plans to hold the initial planning meeting 
within the 10 days prescribed time-scale, the Chapter 8 Review considered 
that this represented too long a period in the case of a young person with the 
degree of risk presented by Joseph. A period of 24 hours is recommended for 
any young person subject to the serious risk procedure. Such an early 
meeting would allow for an assessment of the quality of specialist information 
available, a consideration of the possibility of a transfer application to the YJB 
Placements Team and the possible need for further specialist consultation, 
particularly from a Child and Adolescent psychiatrist. 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Coroner’s Inquest, Mid and North Division, County of Shropshire 
 
The Coroner’s Inquest 
 
2.4.1 A Coroner’s Inquest into the circumstances of the death of Joseph 
Scholes was conducted at Shrewsbury by Mr John Ellery, H.M. Coroner for 
the North Division, County of Shropshire, between the 19 and 30 April 2004. 
Coroners are required to hold a jury-led inquest for all deaths in prison 
custody. The Inquest was held with a Jury. The Inquest heard evidence, either 
in writing or person, from 55 witnesses. As well as receiving documentary 
evidence and the reports of investigations referred to earlier in this chapter, 
the Coroner commissioned his own Independent Psychiatric Report of the 
case. This was prepared by Dr. Malcolm Bourne, Consultant Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatrist, a member of the C.A.T.T Partnership. Dr Bourne 
conducted his own investigation and also drew on the Trafford ACPC Chapter 
8 Review prepared by Robin Hughes. The Coroner commended both reviews. 
 
2.4.2 At the conclusion of the Inquest, the Jury returned a unanimous verdict 
of “Accidental death in part contributed because the risk was not properly 
recognised and appropriate precautions were not taken to prevent it.” The 
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Jury made clear that this was primarily a systems failure and was not 
attributable to any one individual or group of individuals.  
 
2.4.3 Following the Inquest Mr Ellery wrote to the Home Secretary on 5 May 
2004. Mr Ellery drew the Home Secretary’s attention to a number of concerns 
about the sentencing, placement, care and containment of Joseph Scholes 
that the inquest had not been able fully to examine. The Coroner considered 
that these were policy and operational issues of such moment that only a 
public inquiry would provide a platform for their full consideration. A summary 
of those points and issues follows. 
 
 
Main Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Quality of Pre-sentence Information 
 
2.4.4 The Inquest concluded there were weaknesses in both the quality and 
handling of information at the pre-sentence stage. Although the Jury accepted 
that the Asset format was an appropriate way to bring together relevant 
information about the young person, they were critical of the Yot for its 
completion of the Asset assessment material and drew attention to the ‘Don’t 
Know ‘responses to key aspects of the Asset framework that they considered 
inadequate. Attention was drawn towards the importance of providing 
additional documentary evidence to support the Asset judgement, especially 
where vulnerability was the issue. The Coroner emphasised throughout the 
importance of providing a good psychiatric assessment of the young person 
and ensuring that the court and all relevant parties were in possession of this 
material. 
 
Allocation Arrangements 
 
2.4.5 The Inquest was unanimous in its conclusion that the placement of 
Joseph in a YOI was not appropriate and that he should have been placed in 
a Local Authority Secure Children’s Home. The Inquest heard evidence about 
the allocation arrangements and the difficulties in matching young people’s 
needs and appropriate services given the limited capacity of the local 
authority secure sector. The Coroner expressed great concern about this 
situation and also drew attention to those vulnerable 16 year olds who, 
because of their age, appeared even less likely to be able to access a secure 
children’s home.  
 
2.4.6 The Coroner also recommended that the system for placement should 
hold open for a longer period the possibility of transfer to more suitable 
accommodation. Young people who are disturbed and vulnerable need to 
feel, and be made aware, that their initial placement may be reviewed. The 
Jury recommended that young people such as Joseph should be held in some 
temporary intermediate provision outside the main YOI estate while such 
considerations took place.  
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Quality of communication 
 
2.4.7. The Coroner and Jury were concerned by what they perceived as 
failures in the communication arrangements and the passing of information 
between professionals. They made a general recommendation that these 
arrangements should be subject to review and improvement. In particular, 
they drew attention to their concern about the availability of the psychiatrist’s 
report and the gaps in communication between the Yot and Stoke Heath in 
respect of the transfer application. They also felt that more prominent means 
should be found by which to signal levels of risk. 
 
Stoke Heath YOI Health Care Centre 
 
2.4.8 The Inquest concluded that the care and attention given to Joseph by 
the medical, nursing and YOI staff at Stoke Heath Health Care Centre was 
provided in an appropriate way. However, there was unanimous 
condemnation of the building and its facilities. 
 
Use of Safe Clothing 
 
2.4.9 The Inquest learnt that Joseph had spent his first four days and nights in 
the Health Care Centre wearing only safer cell clothing with no underwear. 
Although this clothing was issued for Joseph’s self protection, the Coroner 
and his Jury were concerned with the possible de-humanising aspects of this 
approach and recommended that the practice be reviewed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MAIN THEMES AND ISSUES ARISING FROM THE INVESTIGATIONS 
 
This chapter of the Operational Review draws together, from the four 
investigations, a set of key themes and issues that need to be addressed if 
improvements in services are to be achieved. These matters are addressed in 
the various later Chapters of this Operational Review as indicated. 
 
3.1 Appropriateness of Sentence 
 
3.1.1 The Prison Service Investigation was concerned that custody was not 
an appropriate sentence for a young man with Joseph’s level of risk and 
limited criminal history. They recommended that the circumstances of the 
case might be used to inform future sentencing policy. 
 
3.1.2 There was also implied criticism in the Trafford ACPC Case Review, and 
by the Coroner, of the appropriateness of the sentence for a young person 
with Joseph’s needs. 
  
3.2 Appropriateness of Placement 
 
3.2.1 All of the investigations concluded that young men who presented 
Joseph’s level of risk are not appropriately placed in a YOI and that every 
effort should be made to secure their placement in a Local Authority Secure 
Children’s Home. 
 
3.2.2 The four investigations appreciated the current problems of supply and 
accessibility of this accommodation and supported an urgent review of the 
sector. 
 
3.2.3 More explicit eligibility criteria for placement in a LASCH should be 
published and referrers should evidence their applications against those 
criteria. 
 
3.2.4 There should be consideration of the development of discrete facilities 
within the YOI sector for young people demonstrably at risk of self-harm or 
suicide. This proposal accords with the YJB’s draft Strategy for the Secure 
Estate for Juveniles.   
 
[See Operational Review, Chapter 4] 
 
 
3.3 Quality of Pre-Sentence Assessment Work 
 
3.3.1 The investigations concluded that the Pre-Sentence report prepared by 
the Yot was of high quality and provided a good picture of Joseph, his needs, 
abilities and vulnerability. By contrast, there was criticism of the quality of the 
Yot officer’s assessment of Joseph provided through the Asset assessment 
format. Attention was drawn to the need to complete Asset in a full and 
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unambiguous way, and to provide evidence to support the assessment 
markings. 
 
3.3.2 The investigations concluded that, by one means or another, the court 
had received explicit advice about Joseph’s vulnerability, his history of self-
harm and attempted suicide. It had also been made clear that there were 
concerns about an increased risk of self-harm if he were sentenced to 
custody. 
 
3.3.3 The YJB Serious Incident Report recommended that all information, 
including that acquired post-court, should be transferred into Asset 
documentation, and the Asset judgements be supported by clear evidence. 
 
[See Operational Review, Chapter 5] 
 
 
3.4 Placement of Children at High Risk in the Secure Estate 
 
3.4.1 All the investigations closely examined the operations of the YJB 
Placements Team. There was a general conclusion that, accepting the 
complexity of the team’s task and the difficulties inherent in managing three 
sectors of provision with differential levels of availability, more transparency 
needed to be introduced into the placement arrangements, and a more clearly 
defined and better informed process for determining placements. 
 
3.4.2 The Placements Team should develop new guidance on arranging 
secure placements and make this available to Yots and the providers of 
security. This guidance should articulate clear processes and criteria for 
decision making, including the matter of deciding between competing 
vulnerabilities, and for reviewing placement decisions. 
 
3.4.3 There are issues about the quality of information required by and sent to 
the Placements Team. The Trafford Review concluded that where only the 
Asset materials were available, this would provide an inadequate assessment 
of the child’s needs. Fuller information was needed and a greater degree of 
interaction between the Yot and the YJB Placements Team. 
 
3.4.4 When a child presents with an extreme level of risk, then a more 
effective early warning system should be developed. 
 
3.4.5 The investigations also examined the arrangements for post-initial 
placement transfer applications, an area that had not been handled 
satisfactorily in Joseph Scholes’s case. The arrangements for making such 
transfer requests need to be clarified and relevant operational guidelines 
reviewed. 
 
[See Operational Review, Chapter 6] 
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3.5 Reception at YOI – Issues of Communication 
 
3.5.1 On admission to the YOI all appropriate reception procedures were 
carried out satisfactorily and Joseph received a high level of care and 
attention, wholly in accordance with Prison Service policies. His history of 
mental health problems and self-harm were noted and he was placed in the 
Health Care Centre, initially in a safer cell with CCTV observation, and later in 
an ordinary cell but still under at-risk supervision and observation. 
 
3.5.2 However, all four investigations express reservations and uncertainty 
about the robustness of the transmission of information between the Yot and 
the YOI. They express particular concern about the availability of Joseph’s 
psychiatric history and the impact that any absence may have had on the 
quality of decision making at the YOI about arrangements for his care 
planning and oversight. 
 
3.5.3 It was possible to conclude that enough information was available at the 
time of Joseph’s reception at the YOI to identify him as a vulnerable young 
man, but that the full picture was not available until much later. There is a 
strong general recommendation that arrangements for the transfer and quality 
of documentation, particularly that related to Child and Adolescent mental 
health information, be reviewed and improved. 
 
3.5.4 The investigations also highlight the need to review, and improve the 
quality and closeness of, collaboration between Yot officers and staff at the 
YOI. These concerns focus on both the need to more tightly manage the case 
planning process, including ensuring the continuity of cover for Yot case 
holders, and effective sharing of information to enable applications for 
placement transfer to be made by other members of staff.     
 
[See Operational Review, Chapter 8] 
 
 
3.6 Care and Supervision Issues at YOI 
 
3.6.1 All four investigations concluded that the care and attention given to 
Joseph by the medical, nursing and YOI staff at the YOI Health Care Centre 
had been provided in an appropriate manner. The quality of health care 
provided was good and appropriate to his level of need. 
 
3.6.2 However, the investigations were unanimous in their criticism of the 
physical environment of the YOI Health Care Centre and the accommodation 
provided. Prison Service plans to replace the facility were welcomed and 
expedition recommended. 
 
[see Operational Review Chapter 11] 
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3.6.3 All the investigations looked closely at the quality of information and 
assessment available to ensure the drawing up of a fully supportive care plan. 
As noted above, more detailed medical information should have been made 
available at an earlier stage. 
 
3.6.4 In terms of good care planning practice in the case of a young man at 
very high risk such as Joseph, the investigations each conclude that this 
should take place as soon as possible and well within the maximum ten day 
standard set by the YJB National Standards. The Prison Service investigation 
proposed that this might be a two stage process, an initial review meeting 
taking place within 24 hours, followed by a review meeting in 7 days. 
 
3.6.5 The Trafford ACPC Review drew attention to the fact that the care of 
young people in custody is a shared team responsibility. In the case of a 
young person identified as being at very high risk it is suggested that a 
personal officer (key worker) be appointed within 24 hours of their arrival and 
be charged with responsibility for coordination of all aspects of the young 
person’s detention and care. 
 
3.6.6 The investigations expressed concern about the arrangements for 
recording at the YOI. Information is maintained at a number of file locations 
and a more integrated arrangement needs to be developed. There were also 
issues about the onward transmission of information between units within the 
YOI. There is a particular issue of making information held on medical files 
available, with appropriate safeguards, to non-medical staff with direct 
responsibilities for a young person at risk. These arrangements would benefit 
from review.  
 
[See Operational Review, Chapter 9] 
 
3.7 Safeguarding – managing self-harm and suicide 
 
3.7.1 Overall, the investigations concluded that the YOI’s suicide awareness 
strategy was sound and that there was evidence that it was applied with care 
and determination.  
 
3.7.2 However, some tightening up is advised. The Prison Service 
investigation recommended that arrangements should be made to directly 
monitor the telephone conversations of trainees under ‘at risk’ supervision and 
to pass on relevant information to staff supervising those trainees. 
 
[See Operational Review Chapter 10] 
 
3.7.3 There are issues to be considered about the balance between safer cell 
use and levels of observation in ordinary accommodation. Joseph Scholes 
had been subject to a 30 minute observation regime when accommodated in 
a normal cell. Regrettably he died within 20 minutes of the last recorded 
observation. Where safer cells are used the Chapter 8 case review 
recommended that the observation period be 15 minutes. If the room is not 
deemed ‘safe’ then continuous, direct observation is recommended. 
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[See Operational Review, Chapter 11] 
 
3.7.4 The Coroner’s Inquest was concerned to learn about the use of safer 
cell clothing and recommended that this practice be reviewed. 
 
[See Operational Review, Chapter 11] 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
 
THE JUVENILE SECURE ESTATE 
 
   
4.1 Since 1 April 2000 most young people under the age of 18 years who 
commit offences and are sentenced to a period of custody receive a Detention 
and Training Order (DTO). The Youth Justice Board is responsible for the 
placement of these trainees. The length of a DTO sentence can be for any 
period of time between 4 months and 2 years, with the first half spent in 
custody and the second half spent under supervision of a local Youth 
Offending Team (YoT) in the community. Under the terms of this order young 
people can spend their sentence in either a Young Offender Institution (YOI), 
a Secure Training Centre (STC) or a Local Authority Secure Children’s Home 
(LASCH). Young people awaiting trial or sentence can also be remanded in 
custody. One third of the capacity in YOIs is utilised by un-sentenced young 
men on remand.  
 
4.2 The Prison Service is responsible for the placement of young people 
sentenced for longer periods of custody under sections 90 and 91 of the 
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. This measure replaced 
detention for grave crimes under section 53 (1) and (2) of the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933. 
 
4.3 The YJB is responsible for commissioning secure provision for young 
people and for purchasing individual places within the secure estate. The 
Board determines how much of its total budget should be allocated to 
purchasing.  In the year 2004/5 the purchasing element is set at £259.5m, 
resulting in 3% growth over the level for 2003/4. The purchasing budget is 67 
% of the YJB overall budget for the year (£377.9m). [Ref 1. YJB Corporate 
and Business Plan 2004 /7] 
 
4.4 The secure juvenile estate is comprised of three sectors: Young Offender 
Institutions (YOI), Secure Training Centres (STCs) and Local Authority Secure 
Children’s Homes (LASCHs). At October 2004 the configuration of the secure 
estate was as follows, 
 
         Boys        Girls        Total 
YOI Places       2612                           88         2700** 
STC Places         174         100           274* 
LASCH Places         182           53           235* 
     Total        2968         241          3209 
 
 
* Some of the places in STCs and LASCHs can be used for both boys and 
girls. 
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** The YJB also takes up 200 beds from 600 additional Prison Service beds 
allocated to the YJB in connection with the Street Crime Initiative. 
 
Young Offender Institutions 
 
4.5 The bulk of the provision (83%) for young men sentenced to DTOs is in 
the YOI sector, managed by the Prison Service. The YOI sector currently 
offers a capacity of 2700 beds.   The places are spread throughout the YOI 
estate which comprises 13 Establishments, with capacities varying between 
28 and 360, giving a mean capacity of 216 places. Split sites, where young 
people are accommodated alongside YOI provision for 18 to 21 year olds, 
account for 55% of the capacity. There are four sites solely for juveniles. 
During 2003/4 there was an average occupancy level of 83% in YOIs and the 
average annual unit cost was £50,000.  
 
Secure Training Centres 
 
4.6 There are four STCs in England and all are contracted by the YJB from 
private sector providers of correctional services. The sector provides 274 
beds in four purpose built centres of roughly equal size that offer education 
and care in secure conditions to young people up to the age of 17 years. The 
STCs offer high staff to child ratios and are consequently more expensive 
than YOIs. Contractors agree to provide services against a contract agreed 
with the YJB. In 2003/4 the average annual unit cost was £150,000. 92 % of 
STC provision was occupied that year.    
 
4.7 It should be noted that in 2002 at the time when the decision where best 
to place Joseph Scholes was being made, there were only three STCs in 
operation, thus limiting access to that sector. As noted by the investigations 
into his death the discussion about preferred placement centred on the choice 
between a YOI and a LASCH. Placement in an STC does not seem to have 
been considered and this may have been due to the fact that they were no 
vacancies in that sector.  
 
Local Authority Secure Children’s Homes  
 
4.8 LASCHs work with a much wider range of children and young people, 
both in terms of age but also in the extent of the reasons for their 
accommodation at the children’s home. The focus of their work is on very 
vulnerable children who present a range of challenging behaviours that are 
commonly very difficult to manage, and who have serious physical, emotional 
and psychological problems. The reasons that children and young people are 
placed in LASCHs vary considerably. Some of the children will be Looked 
After children placed for entirely welfare or behavioural reasons. Other 
children will be placed, either on secure remand or DTO sentence, for criminal 
justice reasons. LASCHs enjoy high adult to child staffing ratios compared to 
YOIs. 
 
4.9 The YJB contracts for 235 places in this sector across the country. The 
YJB also has the capacity to spot-purchase places in units that are not under 
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contract. In 2003/4 the reported annual occupancy level in LASCHs was 
111%. This level includes spot-purchases over and above the contracted 
level. The average unit cost was £165,000.   Understandably, access to 
places in this sector is difficult and there is often a situation of excess demand 
for the accommodation by both the care authorities and the YJB. 
 
Young Women in Custody 
 
4.10 The YJB places most girls and young women, including 17 year old 
young women assessed as at risk of self-harm or suicide, in a LASCH or 
STC. Other 17 year old young women are placed in the three YOIs for women 
where 88 beds are available for juveniles.  In certain circumstances young 
women are also placed at Holloway prison. For example there were 7 young 
women accommodated at that prison in October 2004. A recent initiative will, 
however, see all 17 year old girls being placed in 5 small self-contained units. 
 
4.11 This small population of girls and young women has highly complex and 
varied needs and difficult decisions have to be made about the appropriate 
placing of individual young women. Whilst the aim is to locate young women 
in YOI as near to their home as possible, increased numbers beyond agreed 
capacity at the establishment of choice can cause the young people to be 
housed nearer to young adult offenders. Because there is inflexibility in the 
system due to the small number of establishments, placements are 
sometimes made at long distances from the young person’s home, so causing 
problems with the maintenance of links with family, Yot workers and their 
home community. 
 
4.12 The female secure estate has peculiarities that complicate the 
arrangements for the safeguarding of the young women. These 
establishments also house young women who are pregnant, young women 
who have babies and young adult offenders with their babies in Mother and 
Baby Units. There is a general lack of appropriate facilities to accommodate 
the needs of young women with children. Housing young women with children 
on an adult Mother and Baby Unit is considered unsatisfactory and this group 
of young mothers need specific support to enable them to care for their babies 
and be cared for themselves. 
 
YJB Placement Policy 
 
4.13 There are marked differences between the three types of provision and 
an understanding of these differences is key to determining a placements 
policy and any arrangements for the placement of individual young people. 
The key to ensuring appropriate and safe placements of young people is a 
clear understanding about which young people need to be placed where and 
why. The inherent complexity of the balance between demand and supply in 
respect to the availability of suitably tailored accommodation within the current 
configuration of the secure estate makes this even more important. This is an 
issue that is currently being addressed by the YJB as the third element of the 
Minister for Correctional Services’ plan of action following the death of Joseph 
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Scholes. The re-formulation of the YJB strategy for the secure estate should 
offer more flexibility and a wider range of placement options.  
 
4.14 A contemporary assessment of the level of demand for places for  those 
children and young people identified as ‘vulnerable’ still indicates that there 
are, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, insufficient places for 
such children outside the YOI sector. This is a situation of concern and has 
been commented on by both the investigations into the death of Joseph 
Scholes and by David Gilroy in his YJB Serious Incident Review into the 
death of Gareth Paul Myatt at Rainsbrook STC, June 2004 [Ref 22]. Gilroy 
notes that over 4000 15 and 16 year old young people assessed as 
vulnerable were placed in YOIs in 2003/4. At the heart of this issue is the 
need to define more precisely what is meant by ‘vulnerability’ and this is 
explored more fully in later sections of this Operational Review. Certainly the 
YJB would contend that it should be possible for a substantial number of the 
4000 young people currently identified as vulnerable to be provided with 
appropriate educational and health services within the YOI sector. 
 
4.15 Strategic planning for the secure estate is made more difficult by the fact 
that demand is subject to changes in the external world, particularly variations 
in sentencing policy and practice. The YJB is obliged to accommodate all 
young people sentenced to a DTO or remanded to custody and the level of 
such demand, both in terms of number of placements and their length, is not 
in the gift or control of the YJB. It is therefore difficult to accurately match 
demand and supply over time.  
 
4.16 The YJB has an overall strategy to reduce the use of custody and reduce 
the number of secure places by the development of more intensive and 
effective community based interventions; in particular the Intensive 
Supervision and Surveillance Programme (ISSP). Some progress towards this 
goal was made in 2003/4 that delivered a 13 % reduction in the use of 
custody for young offenders, but these gains have been lost in 2004 by a rise 
in sentences of custody. There is some current debate about whether this 
reverse in progress towards the target may be due to an unplanned and 
unpredicted increase in the number of young people receiving custody as a 
result of breaching their Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs).    
 
4.17 Given the above, it is important that the YJB should have a clear 
Placements Policy that articulates how the places within the secure estate are 
to be utilised and how access to these places is managed through the 
effective working of the YJB Placements Team. To that end the YJB issued a 
Placement Policy statement in July 2004 [placed at Annex 3A]. This statement 
commits the YJB to place children and young people in a secure 
establishment that can most effectively manage their needs and risk factors 
as identified by Yots and make decisions based on the best ‘fit’ between the 
risk presented by the young person, the availability of places within the three 
sectors and the needs of other young people already placed. The YJB 
commits to place all under 15 year olds in the LASCH and STC sectors.  
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4.18 The YJB Placements Policy also provides for the maintenance of a 
dedicated Placements Team that is adequately resourced and trained to deal 
with placement decisions. The Placements Team will work collaboratively with 
other relevant stakeholders to ensure the effective operation of the placement 
system, detail the processes and criteria for placing young people in secure 
accommodation, and maintain an out-of-hours service for placements and 
incident management. The detailed workings of the Placements Team are 
examined in Chapter 6 of this Operational Review. 
 
Draft YJB Strategy for the Secure Estate for Juveniles 
 
4.19 In October 2004 the YJB prepared a Consultation Paper [Ref.2] that set 
out a broad vision for the secure juvenile estate for the next three years. The 
strategic vision takes into account the Governments policy intentions as set 
out in the Green Paper Every Child Matters and its companion paper Youth 
Justice-the Next Steps [Ref. 5C]. The strategic vision is based on the 
following operational principles. 
  
The YJB believes that all institutions within the secure estate should: 
 
  Be run by staff committed to working with children and young people, 
who are adequately trained in this area of work, and who have 
completed nationally approved training in effective practice work with 
juvenile offenders 
    Minimise the likelihood of harm to young people, through rigorous 
safeguarding measures which include well developed self-harm, 
suicide and bullying prevention programmes, measures to prevent 
harm from adults, and provision of independent advocacy services 
    Provide high quality physical and mental health services, and 
substance misuse services 
   To the greatest extent possible be separate from facilities for adults 
    Comprise relatively small living units, even if within larger institutions 
    Have regimes which are fundamentally geared to the individual 
educational training, recreational cultural and personal development 
needs of juveniles and which are not disrupted by unnecessary 
transfers 
    Employ an approach to behaviour management that emphasises to the 
greatest possible extent, positive encouragement and reward rather 
than physical restraint or negative sanctions 
    Cater to the diverse characteristics and equally valid needs of young 
offenders in a manner which does not discriminate on the basis of 
gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity or religion 
    Be located as close to the young offenders’ community ties as possible 
    Be characterised by end-to-end sentence planning arrangements 
focused from the outset on the resettlement of the young persons in 
the community 
    Foster to the greatest extent possible, consistent with their well-being, 
young offenders links with their families or carers and community ties, 
and the community-based agencies with whom they dealt prior to their 
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incarceration and with whom they will have to deal following their 
release 
    Be subject to regular inspection and continuous accountability 
arrangements. 
 
4.20 The YJB accepts that to achieve a secure juvenile estate that is based 
upon, and is able to fully embrace in practice, the above vision will not be 
achieved easily and may indeed take some time. They accept that the current 
range of provision is less than ideal; that there is a geographical imbalance in 
provision, many YOI units being still housed in large, traditional cell block 
buildings on sites shared with young adult prisoners and that much more 
needs to be done to train and develop staff in all establishments in positive, 
child-centred care and control methods. There is also a need for additional 
high quality educational and vocational training that prepares the young 
people for their return to, and resettlement, in the community. 
 
4.21 The YJB accepts that it will take some time to achieve its ambition and 
much will depend on sentencing trends over the next three years and the level 
of funding available to the juvenile offender sector. The Board remains 
committed to a reduction in the use of custody and the additional development 
of community based punishment options for dealing with offending. The YJB’s 
stated aim in the Consultation Paper is a reduction of 10% in the daily 
population of juveniles in custody by the end of the 3 year planning timeframe. 
 
4.22 The YJB Consultation Paper proposes the following reconfiguration of 
the juvenile estate, 
 
• All boys under 15 years old and all girls under 17 years will continue to 
be cared for in STCs or LASCHs. The overall number in these sectors 
will not exceed 510, unless further significant resources become 
available 
 
• 17 year old girls will remain in Prison Service accommodation, but will be 
housed in dedicated units separate from adult women prisoners. 
 
4.23 Importantly, the YJB has agreed that an initiative should be launched 
that will explore the development of smaller scale ‘intermediate’ units within 
selected YOIs. The units will be designed and appropriately managed and 
more intensively staffed so as to meet the needs of a minority of older young 
people identified as ‘particularly needy’. There is general agreement that 
some older boys cannot, for a variety of reasons, cope with the mainstream 
YOI population and also cannot be placed with much younger, smaller or less 
mature children in an STC or LASCH. Should such developments take place 
this would be a welcome addition to the range of provision currently available 
to young people with such special and demanding needs. 
 
4.24 The YJB is also exploring alternatives to full security, including the 
possibility of extending the quantity of open YOI accommodation (currently 60 
open beds are provided in one YOI) and the provision of units with a secure 
perimeter only. Another alternative may be the development of closely 
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supervised accommodation within a community location. These proposals are 
welcome and recognize the fact that the juvenile population in custody is not a 
homogeneous group. 
 
4.25 This Operational Review is predominantly concerned with the capacity of 
the YOI sector to keep young people safe and ensure their welfare, 
particularly in respect of those young people who self-harm or threaten 
suicide. It is encouraging therefore to note that, in the YJB Consultation 
Paper, the YJB restates its commitment to maintaining a strategic 
safeguarding policy for the YOI estate. In the next three years the YJB is 
committed to: 
 
 Implement, with the Prison Service, and where affordable, the 
recommendations arising from the recent review of safeguarding 
arrangements in YOIs 
 
 Fund, in line with the recommendations of the ADSS/LGA/YJB report 
on the Application of the Children Act (1989) to Children in Young 
Offender Institutions, 25 local authority staff to undertake duties 
under the Children Act 1989 in YOIs 
 
 Complete the roll out of advocacy services in YOIs 
 
 Review behaviour management arrangements, with particular attention 
to physical restraint and segregation, and to implement a Code of 
Practice in relation to these matters 
 
 Develop a more stable, specialised workforce for juvenile 
establishments. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF VULNERABILITY AND RISK 
 
 
 YJB Assessment Policy 
 
5.1 The YJB’s assessment policy is based on the belief and understanding 
that all young people who come into contact with the criminal justice system 
have a multiplicity of personal needs and difficulties. Planning action and 
services to meet these needs can only proceed on the basis of a 
comprehensive assessment that takes into account the full extent of a young 
person’s personal circumstances, attitudes and beliefs. As this population of 
young people continue to present an ever more challenging range of 
maladaptive behaviours, then the need for the development and practice of 
high quality and confident assessment becomes essential. 
 
5.2 This fact has been recognised by the YJB from the outset and high quality 
assessment is seen as central to achieving the YJB’s overall objective of 
reducing offending by young people. To achieve this end the YJB introduced 
Asset in April 2000. Asset is a structured assessment tool used by all Yots 
across England and Wales on all young offenders who become their 
responsibility. The assessment instrument is designed to look at the young 
person’s offending behaviour and identify a multiple of factors or 
circumstances that may have contributed to that behaviour. Information 
gathered in this way can be used variously to inform the court process, post 
court intervention programmes or plan for action and services to meet the 
particular needs of the young person. 
 
5.3 Following the introduction of Asset, a validation research study of the 
Assessment instrument was conducted at the end of the first 18 months by 
the Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford [Ref 2]. This research 
provided a well-evidenced profile of 3,395 young people (from 39 Yots) and 
demonstrated the worth and potential of the approach for greater 
understanding of offending by young people, both in general and in particular 
groupings. The results of the study led to the issuing of a second validated 
version of the assessment tool in 2002. It is that version that has been 
examined by this Operational Review [Ref. 3]. 
 
The Asset assessment process 
 
5.4. The Asset assessment tool provides a structure for recording and 
analysing a wide range of relevant information. This information is obtained by 
the Yot assessor through interviews with the young person and their family, 
and by gathering evidence from other sources including reports and other 
relevant information from professionals in other agencies with whom the 
young person has had contact. The Asset form requires the assessor to bring 
all this information together. This process is completed either electronically or 
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by hand. A series of questions are posed that the assessor needs to answer 
with reference to the information and evidence available. The assessor is then 
asked to make a judgement about the information and decide a ranking 
between 0 and 4 that indicates whether the issue under consideration is 
associated with the likelihood of further offending by the young person. 
Detailed guidance is provided to the assessor within the Asset framework 
document, as are scoring exemplars to assist the assessor with rankings.  
 
5.5 As well as analysing the young person’s offending behaviour, the core 
Asset assessment framework identifies 12 ‘dynamic risk factors’, as follows: 
  
Living arrangements, Family and Personal relationships, Neighbourhood, 
Education, Training and Employment 
Lifestyle, Substance use, Physical health, Emotional and mental health 
Perception of self and others, Thinking and behaviour, Attitudes to offending 
and Motivation to change. 
 
These 12 risk factors are all assessed and ranked. An aggregation of scores 
through the rankings is considered to give a general indication of the extent of 
offending-related factors in the young person’s life. (The higher the total score 
the greater the likelihood or further offending.) 
 
5.6 The core assessment framework also requires the assessor to identify any 
positive factors in the young person’s life that might curb or stop offending. 
The assessment finally requires the assessor to make judgements about the 
young person’s vulnerability to self-harm or suicide and also to their capacity 
to cause serious harm to others. If these factors are present then further 
detailed assessment related to these issues is required. Sometimes this may 
include the completion of a mental health screening tool. 
 
Completion of Asset  
 
5.7 Whilst there is no doubt that the Asset provides a valuable, well designed 
and validated assessment framework, as with any instrument of this nature its 
effectiveness relies heavily on the quality of information gathered and the skill 
and judgement of the assessor. As noted, the investigations into the death of 
Joseph Scholes drew attention to the fact that the Asset form prepared and 
presented to the court was inadequately completed and not satisfactory.  
 
5.8 The jury at the Coroners Inquest into the death of Joseph Scholes made a 
particular point about their unhappiness with ‘don’t know’ responses within the 
Asset report. Some guidance on the use of ‘don’t know’ responses is given in 
the Introduction to the Asset framework. This guidance states that the 
assessor should not tick the ‘don’t know’ box as an easy option to reduce the 
time required for an assessment, nor allow it to be seen as a sign of an 
inadequate assessment. The guidance advises assessors to use the option of 
‘don’t know’ constructively by, for example, indicating in the evidence box the 
reasons for the lack of knowledge or identifying what additional information 
needs to be obtained so as to inform a decision. The response ‘don’t know’ 
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can also act as a signal to other colleagues who may become involved in the 
case or acts as a marker when the assessment is reviewed. 
 
5.9 In all instances, details about why there is an information or judgement 
gap needs to be provided. Unless this is the case then degrees of uncertainly 
will remain in the minds of those who have cause to utilise the Asset report to 
inform their own decisions.  The YJB consider that removing the ‘don’t know’ 
option is likely to lead to assessors either just leaving questions blank or 
feeling forced to give a yes/no answer that may actually be inaccurate. This 
point links with the more general issue of ensuring that judgements are clearly 
and substantially informed by evidence. This is a matter that needs to be 
strengthened, perhaps by management action to reinforce the notes of 
guidance and through professional training and supervision. 
 
5.10 By their nature and design, Yot teams are made up of individual officers 
who come from a range of relevant disciplines and professional backgrounds. 
Their experience of assessment activity in those disciplines and agencies may 
vary substantially, either because assessment may have not been a 
significant activity for them in their former role or because the techniques of 
assessment or case planning used by their former agency were substantially 
different.  One of the strengths of the Asset approach is that it provides a 
standardised framework, supported by preparation and training tailored to the 
approach. Different disciplines drawn from a balanced agency mix should 
bring strength to the various components in the assessment process, and 
whilst sharing expertise and experience across teams should lead to better 
informed assessments, pressures of work are more likely to develop in Yot 
staff a ‘jack of all trades’ disposition. 
 
5.11 The investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes drew attention to the 
fact that there was a qualitative difference between the completed Asset and 
both the Pre-Sentence Report and the Post-Court report. It is important for 
Yot managers and their staff to ensure that these documents are completely 
compatible in both information content and quality of assessments. The YJB 
confirm that Asset should include information received post-court and this is 
clearly stipulated in the current training for Asset and in In-Service training for 
APIS (Assessment, Planning Interventions and Supervision). The Asset 
should be conceived as an ongoing document that is accessible to updating 
and review as new information becomes available or the circumstances of the 
young person change.  
 
Broadening the basis of Assessment 
 
5.12 The Government’s Green Paper Every Child Matters, issued in 
September 2003 [Ref. 5A] as the consultation stage leading up to the 
introduction of the Children Bill (now the Children Act 2004), proposed the 
development of a common assessment framework [paragraphs 4.13 to 4.17]. 
The Government had noted that children and young people, especially those 
identified as in special need, were likely to be subjected to a range of 
assessment and assessment techniques during their childhoods. The 
Government took the view that there may be grounds for the development of 
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a common assessment framework that would reduce unnecessary duplication 
of agency- or discipline-based assessments, and also lead to improvements 
in inter-professional relationships. 
 
5.13 This policy proposal has been welcomed. In their response to the 
consultation in March 2004 Every Child Matters – the Next Steps the 
Government confirmed the production during 2004/5 of a common 
assessment framework that would build on existing assessment tools:- the 
Department of Health Assessment framework for the assessment of children 
in need and their families, the Connexions Assessment, Planning, 
Implementation and Review (APIR) system, the Special Educational Needs 
code of practice, assessments conducted by health visitors and the YJB 
Asset tool. This work provides a further opportunity to enhance aspects of the 
Asset assessment, and whilst continuing to recognise the importance of the 
tool for assessing offending there will be more opportunity to pursue a more 
focussed needs-based assessment for individual young people [Ref. 5B]. 
 
Young person’s Views 
 
5.14 Another of the strengths of the Asset framework is the opportunity that it 
provides to learn about the young person’s own views about their needs and 
circumstances through the completion of the ‘What do YOU think?’ format. 
The investigations into Joseph Scholes’s death demonstrate how vitally 
important it is to listen to young people and build those perceptions of their 
situation, some of which may be very different to those of the worker, into 
case assessments, care plans and decisions about appropriate intervention. 
The format also provides the opportunity for the young person to draw 
attention to issues that they are worried about and which may be hidden from 
the Yot worker. The format can also be used to assist the development of a 
constructive relationship between the Yot worker and young person. 
 
5.15 The Asset guidance accepts that the ‘What do YOU think?’ form is a 
limited instrument and advises flexibility in its use. What is important is to 
engage with the young person and use the format to obtain the best possible 
picture of their views and feelings. This is an area of practice where 
experience and expertise play an important part and Yot workers, as with all 
other professionals working with children and young people, should receive 
skill training in communicating with young people. This is especially necessary 
when working with vulnerable, disadvantaged or disabled children or young 
people. A helpful reader can be found in ‘Communicating with Vulnerable 
Children’ David Jones. [Ref. 6] 
 
Management of Risk 
 
5.16 The Operational Review has noted that the YJB has currently 
commissioned revised guidance on the management of risk from Wilkinson 
and Baker entitled ‘Managing Risk in the Community’. A draft of this 
guidance has been made available to the Review. [Ref. 7].  In this draft 
guidance  ‘Managing Risk in the Community ‘ establishes a set of principles 
that should be applied to the management of risk whether it be risk of re-
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offending, risk of serious harm to other people or risk of vulnerability. This 
Operational Review strongly supports these principles. 
 
o The focus of engagement with a young person should be the reduction 
of risk, recognising that eradication may not be possible; 
 
o Practice should be risk-led and the needs of young people that are 
most closely connected with increasing risk should be given priority. 
This will also involve balancing the rights and freedom of an individual 
young person against the risks they may pose to themselves and 
others; 
 
o It is important that wherever possible the young person is actively 
involved in risk assessment and management. This will require us to 
pay attention to diversity - of young people, of their circumstances, of 
their patterns of behaviour - in order to deliver a responsive service; 
 
o Risk led practice should be based on specific descriptions of risk in 
terms of behaviour, circumstances etc, rather than generalised 
labelling of an individual young person; 
 
o In the youth justice system Asset is at the heart of risk assessment 
and risk management which are linked and ongoing processes. Asset 
should be used in all cases to ensure that risk decision making is 
evidence-based, that decisions are properly recorded and reviewed 
and that they lead to appropriate action; 
 
o Risk assessment and management are the responsibility of the 
organisation as a whole and require appropriate policies, systems and 
resources to be in place: however each individual member of staff must 
also take personal responsibility for their own actions. 
 
5.17 ‘Managing Risk in the Community’ offers a detailed examination of the 
management of risk in both a policy and practice context. The guidance is 
comprehensive in its coverage of matters related to the assessment and 
management of risk and the preparation and support of Yot staff who have to 
implement it. The guidance contains a range of information to help managers 
improve practice in this area and help create an environment in which 
practitioners feel more confident about working with risk. 
 
5.18 The guidance provides sound advice about the following components of 
arrangements for managing risk: 
 
 There must be clear definitions of the risks under consideration and the 
identification of different levels within each category of risk 
 There must be suitable arrangements for the allocation of cases, along 
with decisions about prioritizing and about the intensity and nature of 
interventions related to the type and levels of risks identified 
 There must be clear procedures for managing all types of risk and 
specified procedures for various groups of staff, sections within the 
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Youth Offending Service and external agencies, the secure estate and 
the courts 
 There must be arrangements that minimize the risk to staff 
 The management arrangements should clearly articulate roles and 
responsibilities for staff and managers within Yot and interagency 
relationships with courts, other agencies and the secure estate 
 The arrangements should articulate the qualities, skills and knowledge 
needed by all members of staff in direct linkage to their roles and 
responsibilities in relation to risk 
 The management arrangements should encourage working together as 
a team, including the most appropriate use of specialist skills and 
knowledge within the Youth Offending Service 
 Work should be planned with other agencies, including the 
promulgation of local information sharing protocols, availability of 
specialist resources and coordination of interventions 
 Issues of confidentiality and disclosure should be agreed within and 
between agencies drawing on current legislation and YJB guidance 
 There should be arrangements for the monitoring and review of risk 
management at all levels and of aspects of the process from individual 
case audit through to inter-agency working arrangements. 
 
5.19 This Operational review endorses the approach set out in ‘Managing 
Risk in the Community’ and considers that the publication, implementation 
and integration of this guidance into Yot practice should represent a major 
step towards improving the understanding and management of this 
challenging area of work.   
  
Indicators of Vulnerability  
 
5.20 The validation research by Oxford University quoted above noted that 
approximately 20% of the young people were considered vulnerable to harm 
because of the behaviour of other people, specific events or circumstances. 
The study reported that 25% were vulnerable because of their own behaviour 
and 9% were considered to be at risk of self-harm or suicide. This figure rose 
to 15% in the case of young women. This represents a substantial number of 
young people at risk and underlines the need to ensure that the assessment 
framework is able to capture them and reflect the degree of their individual 
vulnerability in the Asset report. 
 
5.21 Vulnerability in this context has been defined in terms of the young 
person being faced with specific and direct risks such as being the subject of 
physical abuse, bullying or threatening behaviour, emotional or sexual abuse, 
or concerns about self-harm and suicide. This is a more limited definition than 
one that might see all young people who become young offenders as 
vulnerable and disadvantaged by virtue of their circumstances. It is 
appreciated that it is sometimes difficult to maintain a clear distinction 
between these two ‘loose’ categorisations, but one of the problems that has 
beset the identification of the more vulnerable young people, and the effective 
matching of their needs with appropriate resources, has been that they have 
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been ‘masked’ by numbers of the less clearly defined ‘vulnerable’ young 
people.  
 
5.22 It is therefore important that staff of Yot teams are well informed about 
this complex area, both through their training and by being given access to 
specialist resources to assist their understanding and practice. One view 
fielded from Yots during this Review is that the Asset framework emphasises 
concerns about risk of dangerousness and re-offending, but is weaker on 
vulnerability and self-harm. There appears to be an expectation that 
professionals will already know about this area from their former training and 
professional work, but this confidence may be misplaced. More information 
and preparation would appear to be required. Whilst the Introduction to the 
Asset framework provides some helpful guidance, this only gives a basic 
understanding of this area of experience and practice.  
 
5.23 If this important area of practice is to be more fully understood, then the 
availability of specialised guidance would be beneficial. In ‘Managing Risk in 
the Community’ a graduated approach to defining levels of vulnerability is 
posited and this may suggest itself as a reasonable move towards a more 
refined understanding of vulnerability. 
 
5.24 ‘Managing Risk in the Community’ proposes a four-tiered 
categorisation of vulnerability. 
 
Low Vulnerability: in this situation there are no specific behaviours, events or 
people currently indicating risk 
 
Medium Vulnerability: some specific vulnerability, but this might be of such a 
nature that it can be addressed as part of the normal supervision process 
 
High Vulnerability: in this situation there are clear indications of specific 
vulnerability that require attention in the near future and may require the 
involvement of other agencies, people or specialist professionals. The 
management of the young person’s case may need additional supervision and 
monitoring (e.g. case oversight by middle or senior managers) 
 
Very High Vulnerability: in these cases the circumstances or the behaviour 
of the young person would be assessed as meeting the statutory child 
protection threshold for ‘significant harm’ and/or immediate action might be 
required to prevent imminent harm to the young person, primarily in respect to 
an episode of actual or threatened self-harm or suicide. Immediate action may 
involve intensive multi-agency working, support and monitoring. 
 
5.25 This categorisation has merit and although it is appreciated that the 
categorisation does not have hard boundaries, it does ‘unpack’ the concept of 
vulnerability and allow differential approaches and interventions to be thought 
about and adopted. ‘Managing Risk in the Community’ suggests that if 
vulnerability is assessed during completion of the core Asset at Medium 
Vulnerability level or above then a Vulnerability Action Plan should be 
prepared. As noted above, the core Asset provides an overview of all the risk 
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and protective factors and acts as a gateway for commissioning more 
specialist assessment where this is required. In many instances where a high 
level of vulnerability is focussed on self-harm or suicide then the completion of 
the mental health screening tool will be an essential component of a full 
assessment of needs.  
 
5.26 ‘Managing Risk in the Community’ builds on the current guidance on 
vulnerability in the Asset framework and provides well-informed advice 
geared directly to the various judicial and practice processes undertaken by 
Yot teams. The draft guidance points to professional reference sources on 
both self-harm, suicide and mental health issues that will assist practitioners 
to more fully understand the needs of young people displaying these 
behaviours and so inform judgements about appropriate preventative, 
management and therapeutic responses.  
 
5.27 At the end of the process of assessment of a vulnerable young person it 
will be important to complete a Vulnerability Action Plan, if the assessed level 
is Medium Vulnerability or above. ‘Managing Risk in the Community’ makes 
it clear that these plans should indicate: 
 
 What information needs to be shared and with whom 
 What referrals need to be made or systems triggered 
 Whether monitoring is required and how this is to be done 
 What interventions and support need to be put in place 
 What external (e.g. monitoring) or internal (e.g. enhancing young 
person’s ability to deal with stress/self directed anger) controls need to 
be put in place. 
 
These factors have informed the design of the Vulnerability Management 
Plan form [Version 2-August 2004]. This layout is currently on one side of 
paper and would not appear to do justice to the amount and complexity of 
information, advice and planning that needs to be conveyed if the young 
person is to be adequately protected.  
 
5.28 The question of a possible re-design of the plan to accommodate more 
information and planning has been raised with the YJB. The YJB report that 
feedback from Yots who have seen and tested the new Plan have been very 
positive and the Yot-specific format is seen as a useful addition to Asset. The 
current preference is for the retention of the shorter format that practitioners 
can complete thoroughly rather than have a longer, more detailed document 
that does not get completed. If a young person becomes involved with other 
agencies then additional planning and review documentation will be required.  
This Operational Review therefore recommends that the new format be 
thoroughly reviewed after a suitable period of use. 
 
Risk of Serious Harm 
 
5.29 The Asset framework also requires assessors to undertake additional 
assessment work if the young person is identified as having engaged in harm- 
related behaviour directed at others. In these circumstances a Risk of Serious 
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Harm (ROSH) full assessment form has to be completed. Again this recently 
revised format is limited if not supported by good quality evidence and 
information. 
 
Issues about Information  
 
5.30 The effectiveness of any assessment conducted within the Asset 
framework is highly dependent on the quality and relevance of information 
gathered to inform the assessment, either by interview, case history work or 
reports sought from other agencies relevant to the young person’s life and 
family. In recent years much progress has been made in enjoining agencies, 
particularly in the field of safeguarding children and young people, to share 
information on an open and confident basis. It is appreciated, however, that 
some obstacles still remain, particularly with respect at the interface with 
mental health services and psychiatry and how information from those 
sources is handled within the Yot. This relates to issues about patient 
confidentiality and the particular interpretation by the NHS of the Caldecott 
rules on access to patient identifiable information (Data Protection Act 1998).  
 
5.31 The Operational Review has noted that the YJB has issued guidance on 
Information Sharing and has agreed an information sharing protocol between 
Yots and the police. Local Yots also have mutual information sharing 
responsibilities by virtue of their linkage with interagency fora such as the 
local  Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) and the Area 
Child Protection Committee. As noted above, the Government through the 
Children Act 2004 is committed to the creation of an integrated set of services 
for children and young people and an important part of that resolve is to 
engineer a shared information base about children. This resolve should 
provide leverage to overcome any residual problems. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
PLACEMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 
 
YJB Placements Policy 
 
6.1 As noted earlier in Chapter 4, in July 2004 the YJB issued a Placement 
Policy [Annex 3A] that commits the YJB to: 
 
 maintain a dedicated Placements Team that is adequately resourced 
and trained to deal with placement decisions 
 place children and young people in a secure establishment that can 
most effectively manage their identified needs and risk factors 
identified by Yots 
 make decisions based on the best ‘fit’ between the vulnerability of the 
young person, the availability of places within the three sectors and the 
needs of other young people already placed 
 place all under 15 year olds in the LASCH and STC sectors 
 detail the process and criteria for placing young people in secure 
accommodation  
 work collaboratively with other relevant stakeholders to ensure the 
effective operation of the placement system 
 maintain an out-of-hours service for placements and incident 
management. 
 
This policy statement represented the culmination of a considerable amount 
of service review and development work within the YJB Placements Team 
over the past two years. 
 
Independent Review of the YJB Placement Function 
 
6.2 In December 2003 the YJB commissioned an independent review of the 
placement function and work of the Placements Team. This review was 
conducted by Mr Matthew Dieppe and reported in February 2004. [Ref.8] The 
aim of the independent review was to assess the robustness of placement 
procedures and practice, so as to ensure that decisions made by the 
Placements Team maximised the safeguarding of the most vulnerable young 
people. As well as examining the policies, procedures and practice of the 
Placements Team, Mr Dieppe’s review was informed by the YJB Serious 
Incident Report and the Trafford ACPC Review into the death of Joseph 
Scholes, together with reports of six other Serious Incident Reviews of deaths 
in the secure estate.  
 
6.3 In his appraisal of the work of the Placements Team Mr Dieppe 
emphasised the difficulty of the team’s work and considered that they were 
able to demonstrate some considerable achievements. The team had the 
capacity to: 
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 achieve the primary task of making placements successfully on a day 
to day basis. They ensure all court remands and sentenced young 
people under the age of 18 are placed each day 
 maintain capacity within the system to respond to fluctuations of 
demand for placements, and support the wider management of the 
secure estate  
 retain the confidence of the secure estate. Placement requests and 
bookings to the secure estate are rarely challenged 
 remain a learning and evolving team, committed to the task and keen 
to explore ways of improving practice 
 maintain a good record of retaining staff and a commitment to the 
support and development of staff       
 learn and address most of the main lessons from the Serious Incident 
Reviews.  
 
6.4 However, the independent review also identified a range of challenges to 
the effective functioning of the team and the placement process, challenges 
that would need to be addressed if the YJB’s aspirations for a high quality 
placement service were to be achieved. Mr Dieppe concluded overall that he 
felt unable to affirm confidence in the ability of the Placements Team to make 
effective and informed judgements about placement decisions, due primarily 
to the lack of information of an acceptable quality from some Yots when 
supporting requests for placements. He also considered that the system for 
Vulnerability Alerts operating at that time captured too many children and 
young people. The Alert system failed to sufficiently discriminate and identify 
those children most at risk. 
 
6.5 The independent review also drew attention to a number of other factors 
that limited the effectiveness of the placement function. Some of these factors 
related to the processes for the transfer of information, including under-
developed computer based information retention and retrieval systems, and 
the continued use of Fax that had show itself to be unreliable. Other factors 
related to resource availability, especially accessible provision within the 
secure state for vulnerable young people and specialist services, such as 
psychiatry. 
 
6.6 The independent review recommended a number of important service 
improvements [placed at Annex 3B] and these have been actioned by the 
Placements Team consequent to the review. In the main these improvements 
are now enshrined within the Placements Policy (July 2004) and a revised 
Placements Protocol, issued in September 2004.  
 
YJB Placements Protocol, September 2004 
 
6.7 At the time of Joseph Scholes’s death the YJB Placements Team 
operated on the basis of a Placement Protocol, placed as Schedule 7 to the 
2001/2 Service Level Agreement between the YJB and the Prison Service. A 
similarly worded protocol is extant as part of the SLA for 2004/5. The protocol 
sets out some very broad principles for placement decisions primarily based 
on YOI catchment areas and the wish to minimize distance from home. It 
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advises that young people considered vulnerable should, if possible, be 
placed outside the Prison Service estate or be made the subject of a 
‘Vulnerability Alert’. The Placements Protocol also covers arrangements when 
beds are out of commission, the placement of young people subject to section 
90 or 91 detention, young people placed in adult prisons and arrangements 
for young women.  
 
6.8 The YJB has now revised the Placements Protocol in the light of the 
independent review [Annex 3C]. This now gives prominence to the 
identification of risk and provides clearer guidance on the placement process 
and the information required to make a well-informed placement decision. The 
Protocol also sets out arrangements and requirements for the safeguarding of 
vulnerable young people on their admission to YOI. The Protocol also sets out 
the process by which transfers of young people between establishments can 
be achieved. Generally the revised Protocol is very focused on the needs of 
children and young people and has a strong safeguarding thread running 
through it. 
 
The Placement Alert Form 
 
6.9 One of the key changes in the administration of the placements function in 
the light of the service reviews has been to improve the arrangements for Yots 
who are seeking placements. This has been facilitated through the completion 
of a Secure Facilities Placement Booking Form. This provided basic 
information about the young person, their home, ethnicity and offence 
circumstances and where their case had reached in the judicial process. The 
form also asked the Yot officer to indicate degrees of vulnerability and attach 
any supporting evidence. 
 
6.10 This Booking Form has now been replaced with the YJB Placement 
Alert Form. This new form is issued to Yots and travels with very clear and 
informative guide-notes that set out procedures to be followed for the different 
categories of young person [court ordered secure remand, DTO or section 
90/91 sentence]. The new form and guidance also recognizes that some 
young people may now, because their offence may have been of a violent or 
sexual nature, be subject to the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
(MAPPA). There is also now added emphasis on the provision of quality 
information about the assessment of risk. 
 
6.11 As a consequence of the Joseph Scholes review both the new form and 
guidance ask the Yot to specify their preferred sector for the young person’s 
placement and provide information about placement policy in the three 
sectors (see paragraph 6.16).  Overall this new application form is a marked 
improvement on the earlier format and should provide the Placements Team 
caseworker with better quality and fuller information about the young person 
and their placement needs. 
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Follow-up to Placement Decisions 
 
6.12 The Placement Protocol now requires the Placements Team caseworker 
to review all placements where an alert has been sent within three working 
days. If sufficient concerns about suitability of placement are identified, prior 
to the next court appearance (if the young person is remanded) a move of 
placement would be considered. In all cases the Placement caseworker will 
continue to monitor all vulnerable placements made to YOIs.   This may 
include attendance at a case review at the YOI in order to consider together 
with staff and the young person’s Yot worker whether a move is appropriate. 
 
The Assessment of Risk 
 
6.13 The revised Placements Protocol now sets out in much greater detail 
the information about vulnerability that is required from Yots who have primary 
responsibility for making that assessment. Whilst the full completion of the 
Asset documentation remains at the heart of the assessment process, the 
Placements Team now require as much supporting evidence as possible. 
Armed with this it should be possible for members of the Placements Team to 
distinguish with greater confidence the varying levels of risk that children 
present. 
 
6.14 In coming to these judgements the Placements Team members utilize an 
internal ‘Key Indicators of Risk’ framework. The information is assessed under 
the following three headings:   
 
Risk of harm to self  Previous serious suicide attempt 
 Previous self-harm attempt 
 Potential self-harmer 
 Expressing or displaying depression 
 Bullying victim 
 
Welfare Indicators On Child Protection Register or previous 
 Looked After child or on Care Order 
 Mental health treatment or concerns 
 Physical/emotional immaturity 
 Learning Difficulties 
 
Risk to Others  Previous conviction for violent crime 
 Convicted sex offender 
Previous or current inappropriate sexual 
or aggressive behaviour 
 
6.15 Both Mathew Dieppe and David Gilroy in their respective reviews 
consider that useful as the ‘Indicators of Risk’ instrument is for bringing 
together all the available information to inform the judgement, which is the 
instrument’s stated purpose, more work is required to identify criteria for 
ranking vulnerability. They both suggest that there should be a further review 
of the choice of indicators, the process of assessment and final judgments 
and the development of appropriate skills and training. 
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6.16  Some movement in this direction may be achieved if the proposed four 
tiered categorization of risk factors articulated by ‘Managing Risk in the 
Community’  [see paragraphs 5.22- 5.26] is incorporated into the placements 
application process. This will bring some congruence to the assessment and 
hopefully facilitate even-playing field discussions about prioritization between 
Yot Officers and the Placements Team case workers. 
 
Priority Setting 
 
6.17 The Placements Protocol provides important advice about the 
prioritisation of requests for placement in LASCHs and STCs. All 12 to 14 
year old boys and 12 to 16 year old girls are given priority access to these 
facilities. The next priority group  are 15 to 16 year old young men, whom the 
Yot must have assessed as vulnerable on the grounds that either there has 
been, or there is a serious risk of, an incident of self-harm or suicide. Or the 
Yot has assessed the young man as vulnerable because there are a high 
number of other risk factors present. The final priority is offered to 17 year old 
young women who have made, or are at risk of making, a serious attempt at 
self-harm or suicide. 
 
6.18 As the case of Joseph Scholes indicated, it is the quality of information 
about the nature and seriousness of risk that best informs the decision making 
in these circumstances.  It is important to note that it is Yots that retain overall 
case management responsibility for all young people, including those 
assessed as vulnerable and placed in a YOI. If a Yot has any concerns about 
a young person placed in a YOl the Placement Protocol advises them to 
discuss these directly with the YJB Placements Team. Given the limited 
availability of accommodation suitable for the most vulnerable there will 
always be situations where a preferred placement cannot be made for lack of 
available beds. However, lessons from the reviews of Joseph Scholes point to 
the possibility of Yots making it clear at the earliest possible stage that they 
will be seeking such a bed and preparing a case for transfer immediately post-
sentence. 
 
6.19 This Operational Review would wish to support the aim of achieving a 
higher and more confident level of decision making, but this will only be 
attained by the development of features of the placement process already in 
place. The Placements Team is a learning organization and would appear to 
have the capacity to provide first class service.  Greater confidence in this 
area will be achieved by: 
 
 improved completion of the Asset documentation and supportive 
evidence. 
 closer dialogue between Yot officers and Placements Team 
caseworkers about the judgement of degrees of vulnerability 
 shared knowledge and assessment of placement options 
 shared decision making about preferred placement options and 
contingency planning 
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 moderation, through supervision, of placement decisions by the head 
of the Placements Team 
 establishment of a placements decisions audit trail. 
 
6. 20 Perhaps the most crucial element in this framework is the development 
of mutually confident dialogue and shared working between the staff of the 
Yot and the Placements Team. In the YJB Serious Incident Report into the 
death of Joseph Scholes some ideological tension was noted between those 
Yot officers who believe that placement in a YOI should be avoided at all 
costs and the reality of the situation and the limited availability of alternative 
accommodation. Fears were voiced in that report that there might be a danger 
of Yot ‘over-egging’ the vulnerability assessment to achieve such a place. 
This Operational Review has been assured that that is not the case, although 
there are concerns about regimes at some YOIs. Whilst some of this may be 
historic, it is important that Yot staff are provided with good quality and 
contemporary information about positive developments within the YOI estate.  
 
Transfers 
 
6.21 The investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes at Stoke Heath YOI 
concluded that the application to transfer Joseph out of the YOI and into a 
LASCH after his admission had not been handled satisfactorily and that the 
arrangements for making such requests needed to be clarified and relevant 
operational guidelines reviewed. This work has now been completed by the 
Placements Team and incorporated into the new Placement Protocol. 
 
6.22 The Placement Protocol confirms that it is possible for young people to 
be transferred across the secure estate depending on their circumstances and 
in some instances the ‘needs’ of the estate.  In all cases the Yot and the 
receiving establishment is consulted before a move is made. There are four 
different kinds of transfer 
 
6.22.1. Planned transfers 
 
These transfers can be for a number of reasons including: 
 
• Increased or decreased vulnerability 
• To improve closeness to home 
• To meet special individual needs not available in existing 
placement 
• To provide access to a particular course or programme 
• Where the young person’s behaviour or the behaviour of 
others towards the young person is giving serious cause 
for concern 
• Change of legal status. 
 
6.22.2. Emergency transfers 
 
Emergency transfers may be made due to a sudden increase in vulnerability, 
placement breakdown or because of a serious one-off incident. 
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6.22.3. Prison Overcrowding Drafts 
 
Prison overcrowding drafts may have to be made to free up beds in YOIs to 
make room for new admissions from court. A protocol for the selection of 
young people and procedures to be followed in such circumstances has been 
jointly agreed between the YJB and the Prison Service. The destabilising 
impact of Overcrowding Drafts on good practice at YOI was seriously 
criticized in the joint Child Protection and Safeguards Review conducted in 
2003 [Ref 9]. The review teams were informed that commonly several young 
people of an unknown disposition would arrive together with little or no 
documentation so that the completion of safeguarding assessments for 
vulnerability by reception staff proved an impossible task. The Safeguards 
Review concluded that this was a practice that should warrant serious 
attention to ameliorate its impact on effectiveness. 
 
6.22.4.  Transfers following placement review 
 
Transfers may be made following a review of the placement by the YJB 
Placements Team or through the review process required by the YJB National 
Standards. All 15 year olds and over placed in LASCHs or STCs are regularly 
reviewed to see if they still require the level of support and programmes 
provided by establishments in these two sectors. 
 
Improvements in the Placement Function 
 
6.23 The YJB Placements Team plays a vital part in ensuring that the juvenile 
justice system works to the best of its capacity when it becomes necessary to 
deal with a young person’s offending by a period of care and training in 
security. The team is well placed to play that role and has been very 
responsive to the need to create a service environment that protects both the 
young people and the public interest. The Placements Team deals with a high 
volume of work on a daily basis in terms of the numbers of placements that 
need to be negotiated. But these also present qualitative challenges in terms 
of the complexity of judgements and the management of a constantly moving 
and changing balance between demand and supply. 
 
6.24 As noted in the foregoing paragraphs the Placements Team has 
responded positively to the lessons from the Joseph Scholes reviews and the 
independent review. The Placements Team now awaits, together with other 
parts of the YJB organisation, the introduction of a secure email network. The 
introduction of this facility should considerably enhance the organisation’s 
capacity to move vital information quickly and appropriately between these 
three systemic elements - the community based Yot, the Placements Team 
and the receiving sector providers within the secure estate. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
DEVELOPING A SAFEGUARDING POLICY FOR YOUNG PEOPLE IN YOI 
 
Fundamental Concerns 
 
7.1 In order to commence any critical examination of the safeguarding 
arrangements it is important to attempt to gain an understanding of the issues 
that confront young people during their experiences of custody and those 
aspects of that experience that make them feel unsafe or give rise to concern 
about their safety. To achieve that understanding this Operational Review has 
turned to two research based studies conducted around or shortly after the 
death of Joseph Scholes. The two studies are 1. ‘Juveniles in Custody’, a 
research study by HM Inspectorate of Prisons of 1222 young people in YOIs 
between September 2001 and March 2003 [Ref. 10] and 2. ‘Perceptions of 
Safety’, a study conducted by the Prison Service Safer Custody Group of the 
views of young people and staff living and working in the juvenile secure 
estate between March and May 2003. [Ref.11] 
 
7.2 ‘Juveniles in Custody’ presents a broad survey of the life of young 
people whilst in a YOI. The research survey was completed by 44% of the 
juvenile prison population, a total of 1089 young men and 133 young women 
then accommodated at 16 male YOIs and 5 YOIs and prisons for women. Of 
interest to this Operational Review is the information about personal safety. 
Overall, 36 % of the young men and the same proportion of the young women 
reported that at some time they had felt unsafe. There were variations 
between the responses from different YOIs, with in some cases nearly one 
half the respondents reporting that they felt unsafe. By contrast two YOIs 
reported that only one quarter felt unsafe. 
 
7.3 The research describes the impact that a range of intimidating behaviours 
and environmental aspects can have on the young people. For the young men 
this included such behaviour as experiencing threatening shouting from the 
windows on their first arrival (49%), subjection to initiation tests (17%), and 
insulting remarks by both other young people (41%) and staff (22%). A 
smaller proportion of young people reported having been picked on (13%), 
with 9% feeling that this had been because of their race or ethnic background. 
Just under one quarter of the young people said that they had been hit, kicked 
or assaulted by other young people while in custody.  
 
7.4 ‘Perceptions of Safety’ surveyed a sample of 113 young people and 51 
members of staff in 9 juvenile establishments including two special units for 
long-sentenced detainees, an STC and a Local Authority Secure Children’s 
Home. The study reported that the majority of the young people (83%) said 
that they were never or hardly felt unsafe and that their feelings of safeness 
strengthened as they progressed longer into their sentence. This was 
emphasised in the specialised units and the non-YOI establishments. Again, a 
quarter of the young people said that they had been assaulted by another 
trainee in their current establishment. 
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7.5 A quarter of the young people reported a history of self-harm. The study 
concluded that there appeared to be an association between experiences of 
bullying and thinking about self-harm. All those young people who had 
thought about and had actually self-harmed said that they had been victims of 
negative behaviours from other young people. The majority of those who had 
self-harmed in their current establishment had used negative behaviours 
against other young people.  The study also sought to understand the 
dynamic that lay behind this state of affairs where there appeared to be some 
sense of overlap between the victim and victimised roles. 
 
7.6 The study emphasised the key role that staff could play in this area, 
although it highlighted what more could be achieved. With their personal 
problems young people were more likely to go to staff than any other source, 
including their peers or their own family. However, with some exceptions, it 
generally appeared that young people did not, or were reluctant to, go to seek 
staff support for issues like bullying or self-harm. The study concluded that 
there were significant implications for support and training for existing staff 
and for recruitment policies. Where staff were motivated to engage with the 
issues, this played an important part in reducing risk for vulnerable young 
people. 
 
Prison Service Order PSO 4950 (Regimes for under 18 year olds), July 
1999 
 
7.7 The legal, policy and practical arrangements for care and detention of 
young people by the Prison Service are set out in Prison Service Order 
4950. [Ref 12A] This was originally issued in July 1999 and encapsulated a 
new approach to the custody and care of under 18 year olds and formed the 
Prison Service’s contribution to the reform of the youth justice system 
instigated by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and was also a response to 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons’ “Thematic Review of Young Prisoners”`. The 
PSO 4950 sets out in great detail the principles that underwrite the 
development of YOI regimes and the good practice that should be achieved at 
establishment level.  
 
7.8 PSO 4950 enshrines a general approach to safeguarding a young 
person’s welfare that is broader and more encompassing than any 
consideration of child protection in its more narrow sense as defined by the 
Children Act 1989 and subsequent guidance. The approach is built on the 
following elements: 
 
 A Reception and Induction process that provides the young person with 
the opportunity and be informed about measures to safeguard and 
protect, and encourages feelings of safety 
 Personal Officer and individual casework arrangements that foster a 
culture of care and that assist young people to discuss their concerns 
and difficulties 
 Anti-bullying strategies which tackle bullying as an issue and pre-empt 
the development of aggressive behaviours as well as protecting victims 
 Pastoral care arrangements and other advice services 
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 A requests and complaints procedure that is accessible to all young 
people and especially responsive in cases where harm is present or 
likely 
 A rigorous Investigation procedure with an independent element 
 Monitoring arrangements by Boards of Visitors (now the Independent 
Monitoring Board) who have a duty to satisfy themselves as to the 
treatment of individual young people. 
 
7.9 Following the publication of inter-governmental child protection guidance   
‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ in 1999, advice about collaboration 
with other agencies was included in the PSO and this signalled the need to 
work more closely in order to achieve better safeguarding. This was 
strengthened by the addition, in October 2001, of a Child Protection Protocol 
as an annex to the Order. The Child Protection Protocol built on existing 
arrangements, but these were strengthened by the establishment of a Child 
Protection Committee at each YOI, the nomination of a Child Protection 
Coordinator and deputy Coordinator, the customisation of Child Protection 
procedures at YOI level by the use of a policy/practice template and the 
encouragement of appropriate working arrangements with the local Area Child 
Protection Committee (ACPC). 
 
7.10 The Child Protection Policy template introduced into Prison Service 
culture and practice the concept of ‘significant harm’ and an awareness of the 
procedural framework promoted by ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ 
to investigate, register and work with children and families where child abuse 
is an issue. 
 
Joint Chief Inspectors’ Safeguarding Report, 2002 
 
7.11 In October 2002 the eight Chief Inspectors for services concerned with 
the delivery of child protection and other safeguarding services published a 
joint report [Ref.13]. In Chapter 8 of that joint report, major concerns were 
raised about the arrangements for safeguarding young people in YOIs. 
Earlier, in his Annual Report for 1999/2000, HM Inspector of Prisons had 
reported concerns about unacceptable levels of bullying and advised that 
steps should be taken to address this. The Joint Inspectorate Report cast their 
examination of safeguarding more broadly and confirmed that there was a 
need to strengthen procedures and the arrangements for investigations of 
assault and abuse by young people. It was felt that complaints systems and 
similar protective protocols needed to be endowed with increased credibility. 
 
7.12 The Joint Inspectorate Report concluded that young people in YOIs still 
faced grave risks to their welfare, particularly in respect to harm from bullying, 
intimidation and self-harming behaviour. They also concluded that ACPCs 
needed to make a major commitment to the welfare of young offenders, both 
those receiving services from Yots and those in YOIs. The Joint Report 
recommended that the Home Office and the YJB issue revised guidance to 
the Prison Service and the ACPC member organisations on the requirements 
and arrangements to safeguard children in YOIs. 
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The Children Act 1989 Judgement, November 2002 
 
7.13 An important turning point in the development of a robust safeguarding 
policy for YOIs was provided on 29 November 2002 by the Administrative 
Court ruling of Mr Justice Munby in testing by judicial review the assertion by 
the Howard League for Penal Reform that the Children Act 1989 applied to 
children in Young Offender Institutions [Ref.14]. Mr Justice Munby decided 
that although the Children Act 1989 did not confer or impose any functions, 
powers, duties, responsibilities or obligations on the Prison Service or the 
Home Secretary, duties that a Local Authority would otherwise owe to a child 
under Section 17 or Section 47 of the Act do not cease to be owed merely 
because a child is currently detained in a YOI. In that sense the Children Act 
1989 did apply, but he allowed that these duties took effect and operated 
subject to the necessary requirements of imprisonment. 
 
7.14 The judgement also confirmed that the Prison Service had a legal 
obligation to safeguard the well-being of children in its care by virtue of 
section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
7.15 Mr Justice Munby considered that the Prison Service’s policy for this 
sector as set out in Prison Service Order PSO 4950 was essentially sound 
and addressed obligations set out under Human Rights law. He was 
concerned, however, about the quality and pace of implementation of these 
policies. In consideration of the possible ramifications of his judgement, Mr 
Justice Munby also raised some key questions about the future shape of 
policy. These questions were: 
 
 Should the Children Act be amended to make it apply to YOIs or 
impose an express duty on the Prison Service to promote the welfare 
of children in YOIs? 
 Should the standards required in LASCHs also be required in YOIs? 
 Should child protection work in YOIs be led by local authorities and 
other child protection agencies? 
 Should the Prison Service be fully integrated into the child protection 
system and local authorities allocate more time and resources to 
children in YOIs? 
 
Child Protection and Safeguards Review 2003 
 
7.16 Following the Joint Chief Inspectors’ Report and the judgement of Mr 
Justice Munby, the Prison Service in partnership with the YJB undertook a 
thorough Review of the juvenile estate’s current arrangements for protecting 
and safeguarding the welfare of children in its care. The Review [Ref. 9] took 
place between May and November 2003 and was undertaken by a multi-
disciplinary team drawn from the Prison and Probation Services, Local 
Authority Social Services and the Social Services Inspectorate (SSI). The 
review team was supported by a steering group representative of all relevant 
stakeholders. 
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7.17 The aim and purpose was to undertake a full review of child care and 
safeguarding arrangements and in doing so to compare and contrast different 
establishments’ approaches with a view to highlighting and sharing good 
practice. The review was also concerned to assess to what extent effective 
inter-agency partnerships were present or being developed. The Review 
closely examined nine key areas of practice: 
 
 Measures in relation to the prevention of suicide and self-harm 
 Measures in preventing harm from other young people 
 Measures in relation to preventing harm from staff and other adults 
 Impact of cell and building design in relation to safeguarding children 
 Measures in place to address the consequences of historic abuse 
 Arrangements for the monitoring of serious safeguarding incidents 
 Arrangements in place with the local ACPC and other agencies to keep 
children safe and protect them 
 Managerial arrangements for driving forward the safeguarding agenda 
 Training arrangements for safe custody and child protection. 
 
7.18 The review concluded there was a growing awareness and 
understanding on the part of those agencies with a statutory safeguarding 
function that they have responsibilities towards children in Prison Service 
custody. The difficulty in making progress appeared to be the lack of a clearly 
defined framework in which to operate. Within Prison Service establishments 
safeguarding policies were generally clear and comprehensive but were not 
juvenile specific, particularly on split sites. The review found that there was 
better continuity and consistency of care, and understanding of juvenile 
issues, where there was a dedicated staff group or cross-deployment on split 
sites.  
 
7.19 The review concluded with a set of key recommendations for 
improvement and development. These are outlined as follows: 
 
 The Prison Service and the YJB should develop a central Child 
Protection and Safeguards Policy exclusively for use in establishments 
that hold children;  
 
 The Prison Service should undertake a comprehensive training needs 
analysis for staff specifically working with juveniles, which should 
include all aspects of safeguarding; 
 
 The Prison Service together with the YJB should develop a 
comprehensive and modular Child Protection and Safeguards Training 
Package for staff  training; 
 
 The YJB should seek to reconfigure the Juvenile Estate where possible 
in order to commission places in children only sites; 
 
 In the meantime, in order to safeguard children on split sites where 
services and facilities are shared with young adult prisoners, the YJB 
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and the Prison Service should work closely together to achieve 
maximum separation of children from adults and no cross-deployment 
of staff; 
 
 Local authorities with Social Services responsibilities that have YOls in 
their areas should devote permanent and significant dedicated staffing 
resources to provide safeguarding services for children held in YOls;    
 
 The DfES with assistance of the Prison Service, the Home Office and 
the YJB should issue national guidance to local authorities and YOls 
setting a detailed and comprehensive framework for their relationship. 
This would include advice to ACPCs  with YOls in their area, setting out 
how their responsibilities in relation to safeguarding children in YOls 
should be undertaken; 
 
 Children looked after by the Prison Service should be accorded the 
same status and rights in law, as children looked after by local 
authorities. This would   include entitlement to Leaving Care Services 
under the Leaving Care Act 2000; 
 
 Integrated, coordinated safeguarding arrangement should be put in 
place within each YOl;    
 
 The Prison Service and the YJB should establish a task force to cost 
and implement the recommendations of the review. 
 
7.20 The Child Protection and Safeguarding Review, 2003 provides a 
broad agenda of action that needs to be continually addressed and 
progressively developed and monitored over future years. The review made a 
wide range of recommendations for improved services and practice, and 
these have now been considered by the Minister of Correctional Services who 
has indicated his support for their implementation, subject to affordability and 
the future availability of funding.  The assessment of the quality of policy and 
practice and the identification of any existing shortcomings provide a well-
informed starting point for the examination of many of the matters that will be 
considered in later sections of this Operational Review [see paragraph 9.19 et 
seq.] 
 
Local Authority Circular LAC (2004) 26, July 2004 
 
7.21 These initiatives and developments have now been coordinated across 
local authorities and service providing agencies by the issuing of 
‘Safeguarding and Promoting the welfare of children and young people 
in custody’ LAC (2004) 26 by the Children’s Safeguards Unit at the 
Department for Education and Skills in September 2004. The circular, issued 
under section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970, sets out a 
range of actions that relevant parties need to address. These actions will be 
secured by YJB funded arrangements to enable service level agreements to 
be agreed between local authorities, the Juvenile Group at the Prison Service, 
custodial establishments and the YJB. 
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7.22 The full text of LAC (2004) 26 can be found at Annex 4. The circular sets 
out two sets of requirements. For those local authorities of areas where there 
is a YOI, prison or STC, the following action is required: 
 
 Ensure that they have agreed local protocols with custodial 
establishments in their area for referral, assessment and the provision 
of services to children in custody in line with legislation, guidance and 
local procedures, including the local Area Child Protection Committee 
(ACPC) child protection procedures. This must include procedures for 
addressing third party abuse (i.e. where a child discloses information 
about the abuse of another child);   
 
 Ensure that the governor of the custodial establishment is invited to be 
a member of the ACPC; 
 
 Ensure that the ACPC considers what arrangements they need to put 
in place in order to ensure that the welfare of children in custody is 
safeguarded. This might include, for example, agreeing local child 
protection procedures with the local custodial establishments, liaison 
arrangements for undertaking section 47 inquiries under the Children 
Act 1989 where there is reasonable cause to suspect that a child is 
suffering significant harm, and holding strategy and other meetings;  
 
 There should be agreed arrangements for representation on the YOl’s 
safeguarding committee. Further it should be agreed that ACPC child 
protection procedures including those relating to serious case reviews, 
cover the involvement of custodial establishments, where appropriate; 
 
 Ensure that local protocols are in place in the event of the death of a 
child in custody, taking into account any national guidelines from the 
Youth Justice Board, DfES and Prisons and Probation Ombudsman. 
 
7.23 All other local authorities with social services responsibilities are asked to 
take the following action: 
 
 Ensure that they fulfil their statutory responsibilities for contact with any 
children for whom they have parental responsibility who are placed in 
custody; 
 
 Where they were previously responsible for accommodating a child 
who is now in custody, or where a child who is now in custody, who 
was previously looked after by another local authority under section 20, 
plans to live in their area on release, establish arrangements to 
promote and safeguard his or her welfare on release; 
 
 Where their area contains a prison with a Mother and Baby Unit, agree 
with the establishment, local child protection procedures for 
safeguarding children living in the Unit, which are consistent with the 
ACPC’s procedures, to ensure that there are mutual arrangements in 
place for responding to all concerns raised about a child in such a Unit; 
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 Where their area contains a prison, ensure that mutually agreed 
arrangements are in place for safeguarding children visiting the prison. 
 
Prison Service Order PSO 4950 (Regimes for Juveniles), September 
2004 
 
7.24 In September 2004 the Prison Service published a revised version of 
PSO 4950 [Ref.12B]. The purpose was to capture all the main changes in 
policy and practice that had occurred since the PSO was originally published 
in 1999. The revised PSO 4950 has now a much stronger emphasis on 
safeguarding and child protection, and on developments in the area of 
learning and skills for young people.  A detailed discussion of key aspects of 
PSO 4950 as it relates to general matters of care and safeguarding follows in 
Chapters 8 to 11 of this Operational Review. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
RECEPTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE INTO YOI 
 
Standards set by PSO 4950, July 1999 
 
8.1 At the time that Joseph Scholes was admitted to Stoke Heath in March 
2002 the 1999 version of PSO 4950 was in force. The Order set YOI 
Governors the objective a making arrangements that would ensure that each 
young person who is received into custody is treated humanely so that their 
safety and dignity are safeguarded during the first 48 hours after their arrival. 
In brief, the PSO set out the following mandatory requirements: 
 
o Ensure that every young person is lawfully detained and held in lawfully 
certified accommodation 
o Ensure arrangements to obtain information critical to the identification 
of each young person’s immediate needs 
o Screen every young person on day of arrival for all immediate physical 
and mental health needs, including likelihood of self–harm or suicide, 
and substance misuse 
o Make arrangements for every young person to be interviewed within 
two hours of arrival, provide information to reduce anxiety, tension and 
uncertainty during their first night 
o Offer the young person the opportunity to telephone someone 
concerned with their well being within two hours if such an opportunity 
has not been available earlier in the day 
o Inform night duty staff if there are concerns about the young person, 
particularly where there are concerns about possible self-harming 
o Provide next of kin with information about visiting and matters 
associated with the young person’s training plan within 48 hours 
o Calculate key sentence and release dates for the young person and 
present them in writing with an oral explanation within 48 hours 
o In the 24 hours following reception prepare an in-depth assessment of 
the young person’s physical and/or mental health needs to inform 
further assessment, treatment or management as appropriate 
o Maintain accommodation in reception areas to a high standard of 
decoration and repair. 
 
8.2 These requirements were supported by careful advice that sought to 
emphasise the need to be sensitive to the young person’s situation as they 
prepared to spend their first night at the YOI after what was often a long and 
stressful day in court, followed, not infrequently, by a long escorted journey. 
The guidance stressed the importance of treating the young person in such a 
manner that they do not feel subsumed by the procedural processes for 
reception into custody, but should be able to feel safe. The guidance advised 
that this was as likely to be as true for those experienced in custody or who 
presented as arrogant, aggressive or careless as it was for the frightened, ill 
or socially ill-adept young person.  
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Standards set by revised PSO 4950, September 2004 
 
8.3 As a result of the developmental work that has taken place within the YJB 
and Prison Service over the past two years, a revised PSO 4950 was issued 
in September 2004. At Chapter 5: Enabling personal development the 
revised PSO seeks to address improved practices and procedures in the field 
of Reception into Custody and initial Assessment. The obligations remain on 
Governors to ensure that the young people are lawfully detained in certified 
accommodation and that reception areas are maintained to a high standard. 
The PSO also advises that best practice suggests there should be separate 
reception facilities for juveniles on split sites which also deal with young adult 
prisoners. The PSO then provides revised guidance on some key areas of 
reception and assessment practice. This Chapter of the Operational Review 
will examine and offer comment on those areas and associated matters.  
 
Management of Information 
 
8.4 PSO 4950 now requires Governors to ensure that they have a system in 
place for recording the receipt of key documents related to the reception of 
the young person. Key documents are listed as: 
 
 Asset Documentation 
 Pre-sentence Report 
 Post Court Report 
 YJB Risk Alert 
 Suicide/self-harm warning form 
 
The YOI should have arrangements for informing the YJB of any missing 
documentation and for ensuring that this is received as soon as possible. The 
YJB/Prison Service SLA sets a one-hour time limit (or 9.a.m. next working day 
if out of hours) for alerting the local Yot to missing Asset or Pre-Sentence 
reports. If these reports have not been received within 24 hours then the YJB 
is to be informed. The YJB have selected performance in this area as one of 
the eight secure estate Performance Indicators for 2004/5. At May 2005, 
provisional Prison Service performance figures for 2004/5 appear to show that 
over a quarter of young people (26.1%) continue to arrive at YOIs without the 
relevant paper work. This is a matter of ongoing concern.  
 
8.5 For those young people whose documentation is missing or is so 
incomplete that it gives rise to well-placed uncertainty about the vulnerability 
of a young person, then PSO 4950 requires that the young person be 
managed as ‘vulnerable’. Decisions about the most appropriate first night 
placement of young people in this situation are based on what little 
information there might be, a health care screening, the completion of form 
T1:V, Initial Custodial Reception Assessment and the cell sharing risk 
assessment. The notes also advise, wisely, that all staff should be made 
aware of this status and be asked to give increased supervision and support 
to the young person, particularly in the first few days.  
 
 72
                                                                                              
8.6 At Stoke Heath YOI reception unit staff are required, in the circumstances 
where documentation is missing, to complete a local form F2053V, Juvenile 
Vulnerability Alert Document. The guide-notes to this form advise staff that 
trainees are to be treated as vulnerable and assessed as ‘High Risk’ until 
further information in the shape of the Asset, PSR or PCR become available 
so that a better informed assessment can be made. F2053V also reminds 
reception unit staff of the ‘chasing –up timescales. The form is careful to 
remind staff that giving young people vulnerability status in this format does 
not replace the F 2052SH Self-harm At Risk Form or process. 
 
8.7 The findings of the Joseph Scholes’ investigations suggest that there are 
variations in the quality and extent of information and that it is important to 
obtain as full a picture as possible at the earliest possible point. If the proposal 
to require Yots to support their completion of the Asset assessment with 
contributing evidence is followed then this material should also travel with the 
young person. In general it would appear that the ‘fail-safe’ arrangements 
work in a satisfactory way and information is being received. [source: 
testimony of the two YOI reception units visited]. 
 
8.8 The introduction of secure email for the transfer of information should 
ensure that relevant information, if available, is accessible. Suitable flagging 
arrangements might be included in the system that could quickly signal non-
receipt. However, there will still remain quality and interpretation issues and 
these will only be addressed through improved skills and awareness on the 
part of Yot staff. 
 
Screening for Risk 
 
8.9  PSO 4950 requires that every young person is screened on the day of 
arrival to ensure their safety and identify any immediate health needs. The 
framework for this screening is set out in the YJB’s Key Elements of Effective 
Practice (KEEP) guidance manual ‘Assessment, Planning Interventions 
and Supervision’. This screening must include an assessment by a member 
of the YOI health care team of the likelihood that the young person would 
harm themselves and a further in-depth assessment of the young person’s 
physical, mental health and substance misuse history. For young women the 
screening should include consideration of any sanitary, child care or 
pregnancy issues.  
 
8.10 All young people must be interviewed by reception unit staff within one 
hour of their arrival (two hours in exceptional circumstances) to start the 
assessment of needs process and adjudge level of vulnerability. At this point 
reception unit staff complete the T1:V form. Reception and Induction staff are 
advised that they should remain aware of any apprehension and anxiety on 
the part of the young person and take this into account when interviewing and 
completing the forms.  
 
8.11 Form T1:V is a valuable assessment instrument. Although in some 
circumstances where information is missing the judgements made may need 
to err on the side of caution, the format asks the right type of question with 
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respect to vulnerability and potential victimisation or risk to others. The 
Review of Child Protection and Safeguarding, 2003 recommended 
[Practice Area 1. Rec. 3] that staff receive specific training in the completion of 
T1;Vs, as well as in broader techniques of assessment.  This Operational 
Review would strongly support that proposal. 
 
8.12 Where a risk of self-harm is identified then appropriate action has to be 
taken in accordance with PSO 2700, Suicide and Self-harm Prevention, to 
minimise that risk. Reception unit staff are then required to open a form 
F2052SH on the young person and should be trained and competent to do 
this in discussion with health care staff. As a consequence of the completion 
of a F2052Sh form a decision is made as to whether the young person should 
be located for their first night in the YOI Health Care Centre if this provides an 
inpatient facility or on a normal residential unit. This is clearly a matter of 
professional judgement, but in some circumstances this judgement may be 
conditioned by the availability of vacant beds in the Health Care Centre. 
 
 [For a fuller discussion of the F2052SH process see Chapter 9]. 
 
First Night Arrangements 
 
8.13 The YJB has recognised that the initial experience, and particularly the 
first night, of a young person’s time in custody, is critical to gaining some 
sense of safety and have taken steps to alleviate as much as possible any 
feelings of anxiety and uncertainty. As well as preparing and training YOI 
reception unit staff to be alert and sensitive to these concerns, the YJB has 
introduced ‘first night’ packs for all new admissions. These packs include 
phone cards, toiletries, reading material, pen and paper, sweets and a drink. 
This is a very sensible and supportive innovation. The revised PSO 4950 
reinforces the advice that night duty staff need to be clearly informed about 
new young people where there are concerns about vulnerability or the 
possibility of self-harm. 
 
Role of YJB Performance Monitor 
 
8.14 Whilst YOI Governors retain responsibility for ensuring that the YOI has 
appropriate systems and procedures in place to ensure the safety and welfare 
of the young people as they are admitted, YJB Performance Monitors, 
allocated according to Prison Service Areas, play a key role in monitoring 
practice. The YJB Performance Monitor utilizes the Effective Regimes 
Monitoring Framework as a tool to measure effectiveness of systems and 
raises any concerns with the management of the establishment. The Monitor 
automatically receives a copy of either the ‘Risk Alert’ or ‘First Night Alert’ and 
may be called upon by the Placements Team caseworker to review the action 
taken by the YOI to secure the young persons safety. This is particularly 
important where concerns are raised on admission of the young person about 
aspects of their care. The YJB Performance Monitor can also be asked to 
sample and advise upon specific cases. Where situations are adjudged to be 
particularly serious, the YJB Performance Monitor can report direct to YJB 
senior management. 
 74
                                                                                              
 
 
 
Provision of Information and Assistance 
 
8.15 The revised PSO 4950 provides fuller advice about the approach that 
needs to be adopted when meeting the mandatory requirements to provide 
telephone contact, to help young people resolve any immediate problems and 
to put in place arrangements to make contact with next of kin in respect to 
visiting and other matters. The advice as drafted is supportive and respects 
situations where the young people may be in some distress, particularly in 
relation to their families, including the possibility of concern as young parents 
about their own children. Reception staff are encouraged by advice in the 
PSO to make the process of admission an interactive one for the young 
person and be ready to answer questions as well as giving or soliciting 
information. 
 
8.16 As part of their first night pack, young people are provided with 
information at this stage and this is provided in the form of an information 
pack, booklet or leaflets. These provide basic information about the rules, 
facilities and timetables of the regime. The exact details of sentence and 
release dates are made available. Young people also receive information 
about complaints, the role of the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB), 
advocacy services and the Prisons and Probation Service Ombudsman. 
Young women also have access to information about mother and baby units. 
Governors are strongly advised to make available, wherever possible, 
translations in languages other than English of relevant information or provide 
interpretation. 
 
Initial Health Assessments 
 
8.17 PSO 4950 requires the provision of 24 hour health care facilities at all 
YOIs that receive young people directly from court (unless exempted by 
agreement between the YJB and the Prison Service). All young people must 
be medically examined and assessed by a qualified nurse or doctor within 24 
hours of their reception and this assessment must include an assessment of 
levels of risk of self-harm or suicide and substance misuse. National 
Standards require that these assessments commence within one hour of 
arrival at the YOI. The assessment for substance misuse should be 
conducted by a clinician in accordance with the National Specification for 
Substance Misuse. The assessment for vulnerability is achieved by the 
completion of the T1V form. 
 
8.18 Following this assessment a Health Care Plan for each young person 
must be prepared and arrangements made to provide appropriate treatment 
and medical services. This as an important part of the young person’s overall 
sentence plan. 
 
8.19 The YJB is strongly committed to the provision of this service and has 
selected this as another of the eight Secure Estate Performance Targets in 
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2004/5. At May 2005, provisional Prison Service performance figures for 
2004/5 appear to show that almost all (99.5%) young people admitted to YOIs 
were assessed as required. 
 
Maintaining Security – Body searches 
 
8.20 The revised PSO 4950 provides important advice to reception unit staff 
that seeks to ensure that a young person’s welfare is respected during this 
experience. The PSO stresses that a full body search remains an essential 
and important part of the reception procedure, but it must be conducted with 
consideration and courtesy, and should not be experienced by the young 
person as undignified or stressful. The advice reinforces this approach by 
reference to the significance of the age and level of risk of the young people 
and the likelihood of them having experienced physical or sexual abuse 
earlier in their lives.  
 
8.21 If this advice is followed and such full searching is conducted with due 
sensitivity then young people should not experience the practice as abusive or 
invasive. It has to be recognised that there are genuine security issues to deal 
with here, including the illicit concealment of drugs or potential weapons, all 
informed by wider issues of trainee safety and security.  
 
Achieving best practice 
 
8.22 The procedural framework and best practice guidance examined in the 
course of this Operational Review in respect to the provision of safe and 
responsive reception arrangements would appear generally satisfactory and 
appropriate to the task. The YJB and the Prison Service have clearly 
recognised that the experience of admission is a crucial one for young people 
and that all should be done to make that a safe and supportive experience. 
However, as with many of these issues of best practice, the success of the 
arrangements is determined by the manner in which they are delivered at 
grass roots level and by the quality of resources made available to achieve 
desired outcomes. In respect to reception arrangements there are still a 
number of systemic factors in the current delivery of services that will continue 
to inhibit best practice until actively addressed. 
 
 8.22.1 Combined Reception Units: some YOIs  still deal with both juvenile 
and adult admissions to YOI in the same reception suites. This makes for 
difficulties in management and inhibits the fullest achievement of the objective 
of a reception regime dedicated to the needs and interests of juveniles. The 
YJB should continue with the drive to provide such dedicated facilities. 
 
8.22.2 Late Arrivals: it is reported that there are circumstances where young 
people will arrive late at reception having experienced a long day in court 
followed by a long journey, both in time and distance, under escort to an 
unfamiliar destination and YOI. Although this was not an aggravating  feature 
in the case of Joseph Scholes, the additional stress for the young person 
induced by this situation is not difficult to appreciate and requires great 
sensitivity on the part of reception unit staff if a satisfactory reception process 
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is to be experienced. The Child Protection and Safeguards Review 2003 
reported that staff had complained of young people arriving tired and hungry, 
totally disoriented and having no idea where they were in the country. Some 
reported that it was not possible to complete any meaningful assessment of 
vulnerability and staff had to work hard to reassure them about their safety. 
 
8.22.3 Some of this derives from the difficulty in achieving placement of the 
young person within the 50 miles from home target. Some of it derives from 
the transport arrangements. Both negative factors will continue to operate 
whilst the secure estate is under conditions of heavy demand for both remand 
and DTO places. It is noted that the YJB has, for some time now, sought to 
develop separate arrangements for the escorting of juvenile offenders to YOI 
from court; escorting young people with adult offenders is not safe or 
satisfactory. Separate arrangements already exist for the children and 
younger detainees up to 16 years of age and the YJB plans during 2004/5 to 
extend the service to other juveniles. This move is welcome and everything 
must be done to abolish the conditions reported above. 
 
8.22.4 Numbers of young people admitted: as noted above, the reception 
processes are not simple and, if carried out comprehensively, require time 
and sensitivity on the part of the reception unit officers. The reception of 
batches of young people at any one time clearly makes that objective more 
difficult to achieve and this might also be compounded by having a mix of 
juvenile and adult trainees to process. This situation can only be managed by 
the availability of adequate staffing and clear organisational arrangements`. 
 
8.22.5 Quality of Accommodation: reception suites at YOIs experience 
heavy usage and by young people who are, on occasion, under some 
considerable stress. It is therefore important that attention is paid to 
environmental aspects, including the condition of secure rooms and holding 
cells, and the ambience of the unit. To allow deterioration in the state of this 
accommodation can give out a message that this is an unsafe place for young 
people and bodes poorly for their capacity to settle constructively to their 
period of training. 
 
8.23. This situation makes it vitally important that the YJB and the Prison 
Service use every means to closely monitor and quality assure policies and 
practice in this area. As noted, two of the eight Secure Estate Performance 
Indicators for 2004/5 are targeted on the point of admission. There are also 
other aspects of the reception arrangements that can be subject to regular 
monitoring and review, and which might complement the monitoring remit of 
the regional YJB Performance Monitor. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
SAFER REGIMES IN YOIs 
 
YOI regimes for Adolescents 
 
9.1 In the introduction to the revised PSO 4950 the Prison Service presents its 
commitment to the importance of regimes for young people being different 
from those for adults.  The statement lays emphasis on the status of the 
detained trainee as an adolescent child and argues that every care should be 
taken to ensure that conditions of custody and regimes are designed to 
promote their well-being and healthy growth. YOI staff are enjoined to take 
into account the developmental and behavioural characteristics of 
adolescents. This approach is sustained by a belief that YOI regimes that can 
move beyond mere containment can wield a positive influence on the young 
people who, as adolescents, do have the capacity to change. 
 
9.2 It is also important to note that the adolescent population in YOIs has 
some characteristics that make it a very vulnerable and disadvantaged group 
of young people. In November 2003, a joint YJB/Prison Service statement 
reported the following profile of the current juvenile population of 2,500 young 
men and 100 young women: 
 
¾ 40-49% of the young people had a history of local authority care. (In 
Safeguarding Children, 2002 [Ref 13] the Chief Inspector of Prisons 
had reported that although 50% of children had been, or were still in 
care, many had lost contact with their Social Services Department.) 
¾ 40% of young women and 25% of young men had suffered violence at 
home 
¾ 33% of girls and 5 % of boys reported sexual abuse 
¾ 50% of girls and 66% young men reported hazardous drinking 
¾ 85% of the young people showed signs of a personality disorder 
¾ 66% of young women and 40% of young men reported anxiety or 
depression 
¾ 12% of young women under 18 years old were pregnant and 3 girls 
had babies in adult mother and baby units. 
 
9.3 Perceptions of Safety, 2003 [Ref.11] also demonstrated that the 
vulnerability of many young people in custody was related to a history of care 
and self-harm, coupled with difficult and disrupted childhood experiences. 
Young people had been exposed to parental violence, relationship break ups, 
and involvement in offending and drug-use, often beginning at a young age 
and usually associated with exclusion from education. A significant number of 
young people said that they had learning and concentration difficulties, 
including some children diagnosed with ADHD. Some young people had 
experienced multiple placements with family members, foster carers, 
residential units, and failed plans for adoption before coming into custody. 
These experiences were associated with the young people having problems 
in managing feelings, particularly around trust and anger, and they found 
managing relationships difficult, both with their peers, and with adults.     
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9.4 This is therefore a unique population of young people whose need for 
safeguarding is substantial and critical.  This chapter of the Operational 
Review examines some key aspects of the safeguarding framework as it 
impacts on the general regime for all trainees, but it is important to repeat that 
PSO 4950 sees safeguarding as an essential theme that runs through and 
underpins all activities at YOIs. This chapter examines, 
  
• Induction and Sentence/Care Planning 
• Roles and responsibilities of Personal Officers 
• Anti- bullying strategies 
• Child Protection and liaison with ACPCs.  
 
 
Induction 
 
9.5 PSO 4950 requires Governors to make arrangements for every young 
person to be introduced to the culture, rule, opportunities, and standards of 
behaviour expected. This should be provided within a structured Induction 
period of at least one week’s duration. An essential aspect of the Induction 
arrangements is the provision of information. Much of this information is quite 
difficult to digest, especially for a young person who may be very unfamiliar 
with the YOI context, yet it is important that the young person quickly 
understands the regime and the requirements, rights and obligations that 
detention brings. 
 
9.6 Good quality Induction is achieved by bringing together the necessary 
information and presenting it to the young person in a form that can be clearly 
and easily be understood, and the early identification of an adult who will 
guide the young person through the Induction process and beyond. This role 
falls to the Personal Officer.  The Induction is conducted through a week long 
programme, with Education and Gymnasium Induction programmes running 
alongside.  This programme approach means that the information can be 
carefully explained and digested. 
 
9.7 The provision of information in a form accessible to the young people is 
key to satisfactory induction. An Induction booklet prepared for A Wing 
Inductees at Stoke Heath YOI offers a model of good practice in this area. 
The booklet is well laid out, has a clear text and is excellently illustrated. The 
booklet provides a wealth of information both about the YOI, the staff and the 
regime, but also about Requests and Complaints, health care and sexual 
health care, bullying, race awareness and anti-racism, substance misuse and 
self-harming.  
 
Assessment and Sentence Planning 
 
9.8 One of the key issues identified by the various investigations into the 
death of Joseph Scholes at Stoke Heath YOI related to the arrangements to 
plan for his stay at the YOI. There were issues about the organisational 
arrangements for the planning meeting and its optimum timeliness. Some of 
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the investigations recommended that a much shorter time than the YJB 
National Standard [NSF 10.10] of within 10 working days of admission should 
now be adopted.  
 
9.9 The revised PSO 4950 reinforces the requirements set out in the earlier 
1999 version and places a responsibility on Governors and Yot managers to 
ensure that each young person’s sentence plan, including an Individual 
Learning Plan, is drawn up within the 10 working days following reception. 
Plans should set specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bounded 
objectives for each young person and these should inform their daily 
programme of activity at the YOI. The plan should also look ahead to the 
young person’s resettlement in the community.  
 
9.10 The PSO also sets out a framework for good practice in care and 
sentence planning. This advises that: 
 
 Young people should be encouraged to take an active role in the 
planning process, including the signing-off of the sentence plan 
 All relevant staff, families and outside agencies should have the 
opportunity to contribute to the plan 
 Permanent, private and secure records must be maintained  
 Progress through the sentence should be constantly monitored and 
regularly reviewed within timescales set out in the PSO 
 Individual sentence plans should be open to development as the result 
of a review 
 Vulnerable young people, those experiencing great difficulty in 
achieving their objectives or adjusting to life in detention, can be 
subject to a special review 
 Consideration may be given to the benefits of location and possible 
relocation. 
 
9.11 This would appear to provide a very reasonable framework for sentence 
planning and review. Again, quality issues in respect to the availability of 
information and assessments about the young person, the quality of 
recording, and the commitment and presence of relevant people in the 
process, including the young person and possibly their family, all impact on 
the effectiveness of the plan. The investigations into the death of Joseph 
Scholes were concerned about the working of this planning framework in 
respect to responding to the needs of a very vulnerable young man.  There 
were recommendations about the timing of the planning meeting, the quality 
of recording, and issues about multiple storage locations and differential 
access to records, particularly medical records.  
 
9.12 All of the Investigations recommend that care planning for young people 
deemed to be at greatest risk should be well within the 10 day maximum limit 
set by the YJB National Standard.  Although the National Standard does not 
preclude a planning meeting taking place within a shorter period if a high level 
of risk is presented, there is case for proposing that it is made mandatory for a 
shorter, say 3-5 day, timescale to be applied to those young people who are 
adjudged as seriously at risk on admission (defined as being subject to F 
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2052SH status). This should not preclude the proposal that a full initial 
assessment that focuses on issues of vulnerability takes place within 24 hours 
as suggested by both the Prison Service Investigation and the YJB Serious 
Incident Report. This Operational Review would support and recommend 
such an amendment. 
 
9.13 The development of an efficient record storage, access and retrieval 
system across the secure juvenile estate is an important matter that needs to 
be addressed by the YJB and the Prison Service on an ongoing basis. It was 
considered outside the scope of this Operational Review, and the time 
available, to thoroughly scrutinise those administrative arrangements. Issues 
related to access to personal records between professional disciplines   
should be satisfactorily addressed by reference to best practice and the 
recognition that the young person’s needs are paramount, especially with the 
more serious at-risk cases.  
 
9.14 Most reviews and enquiries into the quality of public services have 
identified deficiencies in case recording and disciplined record keeping as an 
aspect of practice that inevitably contributes to less than satisfactory 
outcomes for service users. The Investigations into the death of Joseph 
Scholes add yet more evidence of the impact of that understanding. This need 
to bring improvement to the quality of recording is a matter that is recognised 
by the YJB and Prison Service and calls for management to make 
arrangements for the provision of suitable ongoing staff training and 
development programmes.  
 
Personal Officers 
 
9.15 PSO 4950 requires Governors to establish and develop a personal 
officer or caseworker system that provides every young person with an 
advisor with whom they have frequent, purposeful contact that could provide 
the opportunity to establish good personal and supportive relationships. This 
personal officer should be assigned during the Induction programme.  Once 
assigned, the personal officer has the responsibility of keeping in contact with 
the Yot supervising officer, the young person’s family and relevant outside 
agencies.  
 
9.16 The PSO advises that the personal officer should be seen to act as a 
‘significant adult’ and role model to the young person. Chapter 4 of PSO 4950 
spells out in some detail expectations of staff and how they are to perform 
their duties so as to set an example to the young people and in so doing 
influence their behaviour and attitudes. Personal officer status carries 
important responsibilities and arrangements have to be made to ensure that 
these are achieved. The responsibilities are to ensure that: 
 
 each young person understands to whom they can turn to discuss all 
issues of concern, including settlement 
 each young person’s sentence plan is formally reviewed and, where 
necessary, amended 
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 the personal officer attends each sentence plan review meeting and, 
where possible, the first review following transfer back to the 
community 
 there is appropriate contact with, and involvement of, each young 
person’s family and Yot supervising officer. 
 
9.17 The personal officer system can be seen to provide a cornerstone to the 
safeguarding arrangements and the development of the role is vital if more 
effective and safer regimes are to be delivered. In practical terms there is 
some tension in this that may still need to be resolved. Experience of key 
worker systems elsewhere suggests that there is always merit in one person 
being given prime responsibility for this role. However, complementing 
arrangements, including arrangements for working conditioned hours, shift 
working and holiday absence cover, militate against this in all types of 
residential provision offering care or custody. The 1999 version of PSO 4950, 
in force at the time of Joseph Scholes’s death, considered that arrangements 
that depended on a single personal officer were likely to be unsatisfactory, 
and promoted a team approach whereby a team of officers were jointly 
responsible for the through care and resettlement work of a group of young 
people. 
 
9.18 This approach was criticised in the Trafford ACPC Case Review on the 
grounds that it did not lead to a fully integrated view of Joseph, his situation 
and his needs. There is strength in this argument and given the pivotal role of 
the personal officer in the sentence plan, it should be managerially possible to  
resolve these matters through forward timetabling and some arrangements for 
deputisation or pairing where one partner has the lead and the other provides 
support and cover. This would seem to offer a pragmatic solution to the very 
real practical problems associated with the one-on-one option. 
 
Anti-Bullying Strategy  
 
9.19 The investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes all agreed that one 
aspect of YOI life that he feared or that fed his apprehension about his 
sentence was the threat or belief that he would be subject to bullying should 
he move from the Health Care Centre to a residential unit. Although Joseph 
was a very vulnerable and depressed young man, it has to be acknowledged 
that his misgivings were not without foundation. Perceptions of Safety, 2003 
reported that bullying featured as an ever present and significant issue during 
their study. It was present in varying degrees and took various forms, but 
there was always some concern and fear about bullying and its impact. The 
study concluded that some strategies for managing bullying had too high 
thresholds and that most young people were either afraid that something 
would happen to them before support became available or they did not have 
confidence in the system to protect them. 
 
9.20 Perceptions of Safety also examined the place that violent behaviour 
played in the every day lives of the children and young people. A number of 
the young people in the study viewed use of violence as a legitimate form of 
conflict resolution, retaliation or mechanism to gain influence, in some 
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circumstances using violence in a premeditated way. Again many of the 
young people had been or expected to be victims of violence at some point. 
This unattractive view of the world from a young person’s perspective is 
concerning and has to be forcefully addressed through effective anti- 
aggression and anti-bullying strategies and practice. Revised PSO 4950 
requires at Chapter 2.7 that Governors operate an anti-bullying policy 
approved by the Prison Service Area Manager. The appointment of an Anti-
Bullying Coordinator at senior level is also required. 
 
9.21 Anti-Bullying arrangements were an important area of practice examined 
by the joint YJB/Prison Service Child Protection and Safeguards Review 
2003. The Review concluded that this was an area where there were serious 
service deficits and recommended a robust programme of improvement. The 
review found that although there were anti-bullying policies at YOIs these 
were generally of a reactive rather than proactive nature. There was a lack of 
clarity and consistency within the staff group about acceptable levels of 
behaviour and at what point intervention would be appropriate. The Review 
was particularly concerned about what appeared to be a complete lack of 
training for staff with regard to managing bullying and anti-social behaviour by 
adolescents. This situation was compounded by the limited availability of 
support services for young victims and limited intervention programmes for 
both perpetrators and victims of bullying. 
 
9.22 The Child Protection and Safeguards Review 2003 made the following 
important recommendations: 
 
 The Prison Service should develop central policy for use by all 
establishments that hold children and young people. This policy should 
include: 
 Clear definitions of different types of harm (e.g. Bullying, 
intimidation and verbal abuse) 
 Clarity on levels of acceptable behaviour 
 Development of programmes for perpetrators 
 Development of measures to support victims 
 A focus that includes antisocial behaviour generally 
 Zero Tolerance 
 Establishments should ensure that anti-bullying policies and practice 
are juvenile specific. 
 Establishments should ensure that all anti-bullying policies are pro-
active rather than reactive 
 Establishments should review their personal officer scheme and 
strengthen it where necessary 
 ACPCs should offer establishments training support, assistance and 
guidance in the drafting of safeguarding policies and also ensure that 
establishments have access to casework advice. 
 
9.23 Although the above analysis suggests that this is an area of practice 
where much remains to be achieved, the Review did identify some positive 
developments and imaginative ideas to combat bullying and make regimes 
safer. Most YOIs have instituted an Anti-Bullying Committee and there is no 
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doubt that staff at all levels appreciate the serious effect that bullying can 
have on the regime of the YOI and the lives of individual young people who 
reside there.  
 
Child Protection and Liaison with ACPCs 
 
9.24 In Chapter 7 this Operational Review has described how child protection 
policies have evolved over the past two years, culminating in the issue of LAC 
26(2004) in September 2004. The current formulation of a YOI’s child 
protection responsibilities draws heavily on the findings of the Child 
Protection and Safeguards Review, 2003. Their overall recommendations 
have been set out earlier at paragraph 7.19. Following the publication of the 
Safeguards Review an Implementation team was established to examine and 
cost the proposals. The Implementation team reported in October 2004. 
 
9.25 The revised PSO 4950 gives new prominence to YOI Governors’ child 
protection and safeguarding responsibilities and requires these to be 
performed by applying the principles and standards established by the 
Children Act 1989 and associated regulations and guidance. To achieve this 
each YOI must put in place a child protection framework that relies on three 
key elements, the appointment of a member of the senior management team 
as Child Protection Coordinator, the establishment of a Child Protection 
Committee and the development of working relationships with local ACPCs 
and their constituent agencies. 
 
9.26 The PSO sets out a challenging set of objectives that have to be 
achieved by the YOI Child Protection Committee.  These in turn create a 
programme of work and service development in child protection matters. 
These objectives are set as follows: 
 
 Establish a common understanding of the purpose of child protection 
procedures 
 Agree clear child protection procedures for the YOI, based on the 
model outline Child Protection Policy annexed to PSO 4950 
 Ensure that procedures are implemented and usage monitored 
 Establish a common understanding of the role of the local ACPC 
 Agree the YOI child protection procedure with the ACPC 
 Identify a named Social Services Department (SSD) officer whom the 
YOI is to contact to make a referral or seek advice/consultation 
 Advise the Governor on the selection and training of the YOI Child 
Protection Coordinator and Deputy 
 Agree the criteria for assessing child protection incidents that may lead 
to a referral to SSD and agree in what circumstances a referral should 
be made 
 Agree a procedure for dealing with historic incidents of abuse or neglect 
occurring prior to the young person’s admission to custody 
 Agree liaison arrangements for handling cases 
 Draw up a programme of child protection training, and monitor 
effectiveness. 
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Child Protection Coordinators 
 
9.28 This is a key element in the Safeguarding Framework. Recognising that 
safeguarding is both a general approach and a specific set of activities, it is 
vitally important that one person with appropriate authority is charged with 
coordination and oversight of the programme. The Child Protection and 
Safeguards Review, 2003 found that in only a quarter of YOIs  had a senior 
Child Protection Coordinator been appointed, although in a further three YOIs 
there was an intention to create such a post. In the remaining YOIs the 
responsibility was sometimes confused. PSO 4950 removes any ambiguity 
and this is should mean that implementation across the YOI estate should 
become more consistent.   
 
9.29 The Child Protection and Safeguards Review, 2003 recommended 
that, given the crucial nature of the safeguarding agenda, these posts should 
be developed, preferably as dedicated senior Safeguards Manager posts 
with ring-fenced funding. Their view was based on an assessment of the 
commitment of time and resources required to deliver against the specified 
responsibilities of the post; responsibilities that were difficult to do justice to if 
combined with other senior or middle management remits.  There was already 
some experience of this type of appointment and these posts had 
demonstrated that it is possible to achieve significant progress and cultural 
change both within the YOI and in working relationships with a range of 
external statutory and voluntary agencies. At the present time not all YOI have 
the resources to situate the Safeguards Manager post at senior management 
team level. The Prison Service Safeguards programme is seeking to address 
this, subject to the availability of funding. 
 
9. 30 This Operational Review strongly supports this regenerated approach to 
child protection and safeguarding enshrined within revised PSO 4950. The 
appointment of Safeguards Managers and the establishment of the 
Safeguards Committee at each YOI should deliver more effective and 
improved safeguarding arrangements across the range of relevant policy and 
practice areas. The suggested integration of these arrangements at individual 
YOIs with similar ones already in place to drive forward programmes directed 
at self-harm, anti-bullying and substance misuse is also strongly supported. 
This inter-relationship between these areas of work and concern is well-
understood. 
 
Making Complaints 
 
9.31 PSO 4950 also requires Governors to ensure that there are 
arrangements for dealing with complaints and requests, and for investigating 
incidents, that deal with those matters speedily, rigorously and fairly. The 
arrangements must be sensitive to the age and maturity of the young person 
complaining or requesting assistance. The young person should also receive 
assistance from an Advocacy Service or access to the Independent 
Monitoring Board, if that is appropriate.  
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Reporting Abuse and Significant Harm 
 
9.32 The new PSO 4950 now also requires Governors to establish 
arrangements with the local ACPC for dealing with incidents in which a child 
or young person has or may have suffered significant harm. The Child 
Protection and Safeguards Review, 2003 found this a less than well-
developed area of practice. In terms of how YOIs handled information or 
disclosures of historic abuse perpetrated before the young person came into 
custody or in an earlier placement, the Review found that staff felt ill-equipped 
and inadequately trained to take on this task. There was commonly no 
systematic approach to addressing the problem and no clear means of 
dealing with disclosure. Young people were often unaware of how to disclose 
and to whom.  
 
9.33 The Safeguards Review recommended that the Prison Service and YJB 
should commission an investigation into how the issue of historic abuse may 
be addressed safely and systematically. The review proposed that YOls 
should then develop a range of appropriate services for children who do 
disclose serious historic abuse, including services such as counselling. 
Specific training and support should be offered to Personal Officers and other 
staff who deal with the complex challenges that occur in the period following 
disclosure.  
 
9.34 The issue of the categorisation of incidents that take place within the 
everyday life and regime of a YOI as ‘significant harm’ and their investigation 
is a difficult area. The issuing of LAC (2004) 26 should bring some structure to 
this process and ensure that YOIs and associated ACPCs and their member 
agencies work together to set out some protocols on the identification, referral 
and investigation of significant harm incidents as they occur in YOIs. The 
guidance on significant harm and the definitions of physical, emotional and 
sexual abuse and neglect as set out in the guidance ‘Working Together to 
Safeguard Children,1999’ (and as restated in joint practice guidance ‘What 
to do if you’re worried a child is being abused’ 2003), define the 
parameters to understanding abuse [Refs. 15A&B]. However, it is easy to 
see that some aspects of life in YOIs may be construed as significantly 
harming by the young people or some commentators, but not necessarily be 
categorized as such by the adults or some of the young people concerned. 
Greater clarity about what constitutes the significant abuse threshold and its 
relationship to the residential setting needs to be undertaken and incorporated 
into staff training and development work.     
 
9.35 The Child Protection and Safeguards Review, 2003 found that this 
was an area where much more work needed to be done. There was a 
perceived over-use of internal YOI investigation processes prior to any 
consideration of a referral to the statutory agencies, (Social Services and 
Police) who have a duty to deal with child protection enquiries. There was 
also little evidence of more general engagement between YOIs and local 
Police Child Protection Units and Social Services Departments. This 
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appeared to run in both directions. Circular LAC (2004) 26 now makes clear 
what action is required to strengthen the inter-relationship. 
 
New Social Worker Posts 
 
9.36. To help achieve maximum effectiveness of the child protection 
arrangements and safeguarding in YOIs, the YJB has recently agreed to fund 
the appointment of 25 local authority social worker posts for the sector. These 
social workers will be located throughout the YOI estate. At individual YOIs 
they will facilitate the introduction of child protection matters with YOI staff and 
address the improvements required to ensure that local authority obligations 
to children and young people in their care are appropriately discharged. This 
represents a very welcome and significant new safeguarding resource.  
  
Looked After Children 
 
9.37 As noted earlier in this Review, a substantial proportion of trainees at 
YOI had been, or remained, the responsibility of local authorities as looked 
after children or children who had been accommodated. Mr. Justice Munby’s 
judgement has now made it clear that the local authority’s duties towards 
those children still apply when they are in custody. This is a very helpful 
clarification, but means that there is a good deal of work to be undertaken to 
ensure that the young people concerned receive the full range of services, 
advice and support that the Children Act 1989 and the Leaving Care Act 2000 
allow. 
 
9.38 Circular LAC (2004) 26 specifies the action that local authorities with 
social services responsibilities must now take to achieve these ends (see 
paragraphs 7.21 to 7.23). 
 
Liaison with ACPCs 
 
9.39 When the Child Protection and Safeguards Review conducted their 
work in 2003 they revealed a very patchy picture of liaison and joint working. 
Although all juvenile YOIs had made contact with their local ACPC, in many 
areas engagement by the ACPC with the YOI was poor or non-existent. There 
was little Governor representation on local ACPCs and for their part ACPCs 
did not formally monitor safeguarding arrangements within YOIs. For 
individual cases it seemed to be difficult for some YOIs to acquire consistent 
and appropriate advice or assistance with the handling of child protection 
enquiries. Although there was evidence that some YOIs were beginning to 
make more significant progress a more consistent approach across the YOI 
estate was required. 
 
9.40 This should now be possible given the combined force of the revised 
PSO 4950 and the issuing of LAC (2004) 26. The passing of the Children Act 
2004 in November 2004 also provides an excellent context to move forward 
with this agenda. The Act requires local authorities to establish Local 
Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) by April 2006. The LSCBs will take 
the place of ACPCs, but with enhanced remits and responsibilities. LSCBs will 
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be regulated statutory bodies. The Children Act 2004 (section 13.3) 
establishes both Governors of YOIs and Directors of STCs as statutory 
members of the LSCB and thus, alongside other agencies, responsible for the 
operation of the Board and the effective discharge of its functions. The Act 
also places on Governors direct responsibility for safeguarding the welfare of 
children within their custody.  During 2005 a great deal of developmental work 
will therefore be taking place on a local basis as ACPCs engage in transition 
programmes. It will be vitally important that YOIs take a full part in this activity. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
MANAGEMENT OF SELF-HARM AND SUICIDE IN YOI 
 
1. POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
 
 
YJB/Prison Service Policies 
 
10.1 The prevention and management of self-harm and suicide in prisons and 
YOIs has been a matter of great concern over the past years. The past 20 
years has seen a growing programme of activity and procedural 
developments within the Prison Service to address this issue. This 
Operational Review will concentrate on examining the manner in which those 
developments have impacted on the care and treatment of young people held 
within the YOI estate. In order to ensure the closest integration of relevant 
policies with operational practice and support, the Home Office created in 
April 2001 the Safer Custody Group whose remit is to have oversight of all 
policy and practice matters related to safer prison design, issues of self-harm 
management and suicide prevention, and violence reduction.  
 
10.2 The Safer Custody Group works within policy parameters set by the 
Safer Custody Strategy, February 2001. This strategy was launched following 
the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons’ thematic review ‘Suicide is Everyone’s 
Concern’ 1999 and the Prison Service’s review of policy ‘Caring for the 
suicidal in custody’. The key principles and features of the strategy are as 
follows: 
 
o A move from awareness towards prevention. This includes a 
commitment to achieve a reduction in the number/rate of self-inflicted 
deaths; 
o The strategy is risk-based, focusing additional resources where the 
risks are highest; 
o An acknowledgement that suicide and self-harm cannot be dealt with in 
isolation. A holistic approach is needed, focusing on a supportive 
prison culture based on good staff/prisoner relationships, constructive 
regimes and a reduction in bullying/violence. This holistic approach is 
concerned with the safety of all who live and work in prisons; 
o A physically safe environment plays an essential role in the holistic 
approach, including reducing the opportunities for harm, by introducing 
crisis suites and environments that enhance a sense of well-being; 
o Close collaboration with other units to tackle the increased risk of 
suicide among prisoners who are undergoing detoxification and those 
with mental health problems. This involves close work with the 
Healthcare Policy Unit and Drug Policy Unit to introduce dedicated 
detoxification units and in-reach mental health teams in high-risk 
prisons; 
o Strong partnerships with the voluntary sector, particularly the 
Samaritans; 
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o The development of a new organisational structure to deliver this 
strategy. 
 
10.3 The Safer Custody Group report for 2001 ‘Self-inflicted deaths in 
Prison Service Custody’ [Ref 16] provides strong testimony to the 
seriousness of this matter for the Prison Service. During the calendar year 
2001 a total of 73 self-inflicted deaths were reported and this compared with 
42 deaths ten years earlier in 1991, an overall increase of 72%. That period 
showed a marked increase in both the number and rate of deaths in respect 
to the prison population although it should be noted that by the end of the 
period rates seemed to show a reduction from a high point in 1999. During the 
period May 2000 to September 2004 a total of 10 young men under the age of 
18 died whilst in custody. 
 
10.4 ‘Self Inflicted deaths in Prison Service Custody’ 2001 concluded with 
a range of findings from the statistical analysis that had a direct bearing on the 
direction of future policy and better practice. Although the analysis is of all 
deaths, predominantly of adults but including a small number of juveniles, 
some of these findings relate closely to aspects of the circumstances of 
Joseph Scholes’ death: 
 
 Deaths are most likely to occur soon after prisoners have been 
received into custody; 
 Most deaths occur as a result of hanging or self-strangulation. The 
most common ligature point is a window and the most common ligature 
is bedding; 
 Few prisoners had been identified as being at increased risk at the time 
of death. There is also some evidence that the period immediately 
following the closure of an F2052SH is a high-risk time; 
 Most prisoners are on ordinary location at the time of death. However, 
a disproportionate number of deaths occur in Health Care Centres, 
segregation units and vulnerable prisoners units; 
 Most prisoners are in single cells at the time of death. Those who die in 
shared cells are usually alone at the time of death; 
 Less than half of self-inflicted deaths received a verdict of suicide at 
inquest (the others being classed as misadventure, accidental death, 
open verdict or natural causes). 
 
10.5 The analysis from the above annual report and the findings of Serious  
Incident Reports and investigations into the deaths of individual young people 
have, over the past 3 years, informed the development of current policy, 
procedures and  best practice. From these reports or investigations has 
emerged a profile of an extremely vulnerable adult or young person who may 
become the victim of a self-inflicted death. This person presents as having 
multiple mental health and social problems. These may include, in any 
combination, some psychosis or neurotic illness, commonly in the form of 
depression or extreme anxiety. There may be a history of drug or alcohol 
misuse, of self-harm, of social isolation and a life history marked by family 
break-up, periods in local authority care, exclusion from school or 
joblessness. 
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10.6 The situation with respect to the management of self-harm in custody is 
an equally serious matter. Research conducted by the Safer Custody Group 
in 2003 ‘Reported Self-Harm in HM Prison Service in 2003’ [Ref. 17] 
based on an analysis of F213SH (recorded self-harm) returns reported that in 
that year there were 16,214 recorded self-harm incidents, a rate of 222 
incidents per 1000 of the prison population. A quarter of these incidents 
involved young people under the age of 21 years, with 65% of young women 
under 21 years harming themselves compared to 10% of young men. Women 
were also more likely to harm repetitively, on average up to five times during 
the year. By contrast, young men on average only self-harmed twice. The 
most common method of self-harm was cutting or scratching, but other 
incidents involved self-strangulation, hanging and poisoning. Other methods 
included head banging, wall punching, wound aggravation, burning, ligature 
making and suffocation. 
 
10.7 Such prisoners and young people challenge the capacity of the Prison 
Service to respond adequately to their needs and keep them safe.  The 
current strategy articulates an approach based on consistency, care and 
compassion coupled with vigilance and an effective suicide prevention 
system. The purpose of this Operational Review is to appraise whether that 
strategy appears to be robust enough in practice. 
 
PSO 2700 - Suicide and Self-harm Prevention 
 
10.8 Prison Service Order 2700 [Ref.18] came into effect on 1 January 2003. 
It brought together a number of earlier procedures or instructions related to 
this area of work and as such provides the current framework for the 
prevention of self-directed harm, The introduction to the PSO is careful to 
note, however, that it is not the last word and that the PSO will be revised 
substantively once other relevant aspects of the Safer Custody programme 
are assessed and codified. This revision is planned for redrafting and 
publication in 2005.  Planned developments include new guidance on working 
in this area of practice with women prisoners and with juveniles, further 
development of the guidance on self-harm and the management of 
challenging behaviour.     
 
10.9 PSO 2700 provides detailed guidance to Governors at the strategic, 
managerial and practice levels. The guidance covers the entire prison estate 
and is not, at any point, specific to YOIs or juveniles. Governors have overall 
responsibility for the implementation of the local suicide and self-harm 
prevention strategy and for procedures within their own establishment, but 
these are annually validated at Area Manager level. A model framework 
specifying the areas of policy and practice to be covered by the strategy is 
found at Annex A of the PSO.  
 
10.10 Each establishment is required to appoint a Suicide Prevention Team 
leader (SPTL), who might be supported by a deputy SPTL and/or a Suicide 
Prevention Coordinator. The SPTL also leads the Suicide Prevention Team 
that has to meet on, at least, a regular three monthly basis; it is reported that 
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most meet more frequently. The remit of the Team is not only regularly to 
review the implementation of the local preventative strategy, but also to 
examine and monitor all self-harm incidents and the quality of, and 
compliance with, F2052SH self-harm procedures. With the growing 
awareness of the broader safeguarding agenda, some juvenile YOIs have 
combined the Suicide Prevention meeting with those called for Child 
Protection and anti-bullying/violence reduction to form an integrated 
safeguards meeting. 
 
10.11 PSO 2700 picks up directly on the finding in ‘Self-inflicted deaths in 
Prison Service Custody’ 2001 about the critical significance of the 
immediate post-admission period and spells out the necessity of providing 
properly sensitised reception and first night arrangements that recognize this. 
These matters have been examined earlier in Chapter 8 of this Operational 
Review. The PSO also provides advice and guidance about action to be taken 
or reports prepared following an incident of self-harm or suicide. Instruction 
about emergency action and procedures is given at Annexes C and D of the 
PSO. 
 
10.12 At the core of PSO 2700 is advice and instruction on the management 
of prisoners identified as at risk of self-directed harm and on the operation of 
the F2052SH Self-harm form. PSO 2700 is supported by the Safer Custody 
Group’s publication of some much more detailed good practice guidance 
‘Suicide Prevention Strategies- Guidance on preventing prisoner suicide 
and reducing self-harm: the role of Samaritans; and safer custody cells 
protocols’. This guidance came into effect on 1 January 2003 [Ref. 19].  The 
guidance is generalized for the entire prison estate and not specifically 
tailored for juvenile offenders. 
 
10.13 Additional guidance in support of PSO 2700 has also been published by 
the Safer Custody Group to assist staff to understand and deal successfully 
with self-harm and suicide, or provide support. These publications include: 
 
Working with people who harm or injure themselves in prison 
[Refs 20 A and 20B] 
Two booklets: 1. Information for prison staff 
 
                       2. Information on Interventions  
 
Good practice guide for peer support schemes 
[Ref 20C] 
 Published by the Safer Custody Group with the Samaritans. This form of 
support has recently been bolstered by the introduction, at a number of YOIs, 
of the Insiders peer support scheme. 
 
Safer Custody and Self-Harm Toolkit 
 
The Self-Harm Toolkit is the latest word in the provision of comprehensive 
guidance on self-harm and suicide. Published by the Safer Custody Group in 
September 2004, the Toolkit is available in CD Rom format and on the Prison 
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Service intranet. The Self-Harm Tool kit brings together all relevant 
information and guidance on best practice and also includes a training 
package ‘Understanding Self-Harm’ that can be delivered by non specialist 
trainers or used by individuals. The Self-Harm Toolkit also provides case 
studies that aid understanding. 
 
10.14 The introduction and implementation of the Self-Harm Toolkit can only 
strengthen the support that is available to staff working in this challenging 
area.  
 
F2052SH Procedures and practice 
 
10.15 The processes to be followed following an incident of self-harm are set 
out in PSO 2700, both in the body of the PSO and in its Annexes. Annex B 
sets out the F2052SH procedures. In outline, these require YOI staff to: 
 
• Open a F2052SH Self-Harm At Risk form and complete a F213SH 
Record of Self-Harm Incident form 
• Be aware of all young people on open F2052SH forms in their charge 
and take steps to brief other staff 
• Be cognisant of observation requirements and content of support plans 
for such young people 
• Inform the young person about the F2052SH process and record their 
comments and any other relevant information in the daily supervision 
and support section 
 
Initial Action 
 
• Consult health care staff and decide, in consultation with them, whether 
the young person is to be managed on a residential unit or be referred 
to the Health Care Centre 
• If young person is placed, or remains, on a residential unit, take action 
to support and assist the young person 
• Provide an opportunity for the young person to speak to a Samaritan 
• Ensure that a case review is held within 72 hours 
 
Health care assessment 
 
• Young people who are referred for health care assessment and 
treatment under F2052SH procedures must be interviewed by a health 
care officer or nurse as soon as possible 
• There should be a referral to a doctor as soon as possible and in any 
event within 24 hours of referral 
• A doctor or nurse must decide, in consultation with other members of 
staff involved, where the young person should best be immediately 
located 
 
Case review and Support Plan 
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• An agreed support plan must be drawn up in consultation with all 
relevant departments and agencies 
• Managers of the unit where the young person resides must ensure that 
the support plan is implemented 
• Staff must ensure that further multi-disciplinary reviews are held as 
necessary. They should seek guidance from health care staff and 
cooperate with related case reviews  
• When a young person resides in the Health Care Centre they will have 
a nursing care plan that will take the place of routine case reviews 
unless they harm themselves or are due for discharge from the Health 
Care Centre when a case review will be conducted 
• Young people being discharged from the Health Care Centre must be 
seen by a member of the health care team prior to the move 
 
Closing the F2052SH  
 
• F2052SH will be closed at a case review when the young person 
appears to be coping satisfactorily 
• The case review must agree after-care or follow-up arrangements 
• Reasons for closure and after-care plans must be carefully recorded 
• Closure must not take place at the point of discharge from the health 
care unit to another location. 
 
10.16 Further detailed guidance on how individual YOIs and their staff may 
perform these procedures with confidence and provide safer support to young 
people is provided in sections 3 and 4 of Suicide Prevention Strategies. 
This guidance covers care planning, a range of good practice suggestions for 
support plans and more detailed advice on accommodation options. This 
latter matter is examined further in Chapter 11 of this Operational Review. 
 
Role of the YJB Performance Monitor 
 
10.17 As noted at paragraph 8.14 of this Operational Review, YJB 
Performance Monitors allocated according to Prison Service Areas are 
responsible for ensuring that the YOI has appropriate systems and 
procedures in place to ensure the safety and welfare of the young people. 
YJB Monitors automatically receive a copy of either the ‘risk alert’ or ‘first night 
alert’ and may be called upon by the Placements Team caseworker to review 
the action taken by the YOI to secure the young persons safety. This is 
particularly important where concerns are raised on admission of the young 
person about aspects of their care. The YJB Monitor can also be asked to 
sample and advise upon specific cases. 
 
10.18 The YJB Monitor plays an important role in quality assuring the 
safeguarding procedures in respect to the management of self-harm. YJB 
Monitors are required to undertake sampling exercises with vulnerability or 
first night alerts to ensure that systems are working effectively. In the course 
of these exercises, YJB Monitors may identify young people whom they think 
may not be placed appropriately. This can trigger a discussion with the 
Placements Team about a possible transfer. An outline sampling framework is 
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provided in the YJB Placement Protocol. The YJB Performance Monitor 
should: 
 
 Ascertain the location of the young person within the YOI and check 
that the alert has been received at that location 
 Check whether the young person has been placed on an open 
F2052SH 
 Check on adequate measures to reduce the potential for bullying, 
especially if the young person is a ‘high-profile offender’ 
 Check on the young person’s medication regime 
 Make an overall assessment of the safeness of the young person and 
the appropriateness of their care.   
 
Critique of the current arrangements 
 
10.19 Although it was not possible within the time available to the Operational 
Review to undertake a first hand appraisal of the quality of work in this area of 
practice, reference has been made to the findings of the joint ‘Child 
Protection and Safeguards Review 2003’ and to various inspection reports 
prepared by the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons. During the course of this 
Operational Review it was understood that HMIP were also focusing their 
current series of inspectorial visits to YOIs on safeguarding issues.  
 
The key issues of concern identified by these appraisals of current practice 
are as follows: 
 
YOI policy on suicide and self-harm 
 
10.19.1 Although suicide and self-harm policies are generally clear and up-to-
date, and respond to the requirements of PSO 2700, they are not juvenile- 
specific. YOIs need to take action to achieve this goal. Such policies and local 
guidance need to strike a balance between the provision of an overall 
environment that recognizes and safeguards the potential vulnerability of all 
young people accommodated and the special needs of those young people 
identified as most vulnerable.  
 
Early identification of risk 
 
10.19.2 Most YOIs acknowledge high risk during the early phase of custody 
and adopt various means to ameliorate this. This can include fast-tracking 
through reception, enhanced first night care and increased observation or 
surveillance. There has been some suggestion that the YJB-funded first night 
cover has not been used as specified. There were also concerns that the 
quality of recognition of juvenile-specific needs can be missed at split YOI 
sites with shared reception facilities. 
 
10.19.3 It was noted that the completion and quality of the T1:V Initial 
Custodial Reception Assessment form at reception varied widely and that the 
form was completed by a range of staff. A strong case has been mounted for 
YOI staff to be specifically trained in assessment and planning for the needs 
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of vulnerable young people. This would include training in the completion of 
T1:Vs [see also paragraph 8.11]. 
 
Understanding vulnerability 
 
10.19.4 In general, staff at YOIs had a basic understanding of the vulnerability 
of young people, but staff consistently articulated a need for more training in 
risk assessment and in understanding vulnerability. Whilst some YOIs 
proactively promoted training and awareness of safeguarding practice, this 
was variable across the YOI estate. It was noted that most YOIs placed the 
support role for young people on front-line staff and these staff required a 
clear support structure. There was also an identified need for the development 
of enhanced support and supervision arrangements for staff working with self-
harm and suicide. Where staff working in this practice area had access to 
support from colleagues with a mental health locus, this was much 
appreciated. 
 
Transfer of Information 
 
10.19.5 As exemplified through the investigations into the death of Joseph 
Scholes there appear to be consistent problems with the timely availability at 
the point of reception of Asset, PSR and PCR documentation from Yots. At 
one of the YOIs visited during this review it was reported that this was now 
less of an issue. But it has to be noted that at May 2005, provisional Prison 
Service performance figures for 2004/5 appear to show that over a quarter of 
young people (26.1%) continue to arrive at YOIs without the relevant paper 
work.    
 
 
Quality of F2052SH Practice 
 
10.19.6 In general, the F2052SH procedures are being followed satisfactorily 
but there is a recognized need to bring the quality of recording within the 
format up to a standard that more accurately represents the level of work and 
support offered to the vulnerable young people. In YOIs with more young-
person focused environments there appeared to be a lower incidence of the 
use of F2052SH procedures, due no doubt to an awareness of alternative 
care and support strategies. Experience suggested that more still needed to 
be done to highlight issues of practice specific to young people. 
 
10.19.7 The quality of work in this area of practice is, of course, determined 
by ensuring that there are adequate and appropriate resources available to 
secure an optimal response to the needs of the young people. The picture 
that emerges from this review and other reviews in this area is that, in 
general, staff in YOIs want to be responsive to young people who self-harm 
and are serious in their approach to achieving a safe environment. Managers 
and staff have, in this respect, being considerably assisted by the practice 
development and training support work driven by the Safer Custody Group 
and this will continue to deliver improvement as recent initiatives provide 
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additional strengthening. But there are still some factors that can be seen to 
have the potential to inhibit further progress. 
 
Mis-matching of demand against staff resources 
 
10.19.8 There is some concern that as the number of young people who 
might be assessed as having some level of vulnerability grows within the 
juvenile offender population, then the obligations imposed on staff by virtue of 
F2052SH status will become increasingly difficult to meet at a satisfactory 
level. In these circumstances prioritization of staff resources to meet the 
challenges posed by the most seriously vulnerable young people will almost 
inevitably weaken the network of care provided for the still not insignificant 
number of young people who would appear to present less serious concerns. 
Whilst the safeguarding of this group of young people will hopefully benefit 
from the general development of safer regimes and more young person 
focused programmes of care and support, without close individual oversight 
some less vulnerable young people at critical or very stressful moments can 
collapse and present very serious management problems. 
 
10.19.9 This issue can be seriously exacerbated where the YOIs are faced 
with having to manage one or more extremely seriously disturbed and/or 
disruptive young people. The management of these young people will be 
extremely consuming of staff resources, time, energy and emotional 
commitment. Their extreme behaviour normally gives rise to great anxiety on 
the part of staff who are trying to care for them. There is the understood 
anxiety and concern that all must be done to inhibit the young person’s 
destructiveness, whether directed towards themselves or to their immediate 
environment, including their carers. But there are also strong feelings about 
the staff’s own capacity to manage the situation successfully and what others 
will say and do, including the wider world, if they are seen to fail in this duty to 
protect. 
 
10.19.10 In these extreme situations it is important for staff to feel and know 
that they have all possible resources available to them. When working with 
young people who are serious self-harmers, staff need to feel that as well as 
being equipped with as much knowledge and understanding as they need, 
they are going to receive support and assistance from their colleagues and 
from specialists. In most cases this will mean access to medical, and 
especially psychiatric, resources that will help them care for the young people 
who have health needs with greater confidence.  
 
Mis-matching of demand to physical resources  
 
10.19.11 Where a young person is assessed as exhibiting the likelihood of 
behaving in a serious self-harming manner then decisions need to be taken 
as to whether they can be managed in a normal residential location or might 
best be treated and accommodated in the Health Care Centre. The F2052SH 
process makes this an early explicit decision. However, accommodation in 
Health Care Centres represents a resource with finite and limited capacity and 
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most young people subject to F2052SH status are managed outside Health 
Care Centres.  
 
10.19.12 Any substantial growth in the number of young people with F2052SH 
status will introduce pressure into this situation and more of such young 
people may find themselves on residential units at times when their distress is 
such that they should be in health care. This could lead to local management 
being tempted to keep beds in the Health Care Centre as free as possible so 
as to offer a flexible and responsive service when it is most required. This is 
understandable from a resource management perspective, but is not practical 
or realistic. It could possibly lead to a situation where young people might be 
encouraged to consider moving out of the Health Care Centre prematurely.  
 
Arrangements for Support 
 
10.20 It is important that young people who are at risk of self-harm or suicide 
have easy recourse to confidential support, counselling and advocacy 
services. This is fully recognised by the Prison Service and, through the Safer 
Custody Group developmental initiatives, a great deal has been achieved to 
bring such schemes and facilities into establishments. The three main planks 
of this strategy are the involvement of the Samaritans, Samaritan–supported 
Listener schemes, and peer support. The involvement with the Samaritans is 
of very long standing and they have played a vital role in the Suicide 
Prevention Strategy for many years. Their role is codified in Chapter 5 of PSO 
2700 and additional detailed guidance is provided at Section 5 of practice 
guidance Suicide Prevention Strategies. 
 
10.21 The Samaritan-supported Listener scheme has also been developed 
throughout the adult prison estate. This is a scheme whereby selected 
prisoners are trained and supported by Samaritans to listen in confidence to 
their fellow prisoners at times of crisis, when they may welcome a sympathetic 
ear. It has been agreed that this scheme is not suitable or appropriate for 
juveniles. Currently the YJB is working with 13 voluntary agencies who are 
involved with the development of helplines, to provide an advocacy service to 
individual YOIs. This development is commended by this Operational Review. 
 
10.22 Peer support is another initiative that might provide an additional tool to 
assist with the management of young people in distress. It is understood that, 
following a successfully evaluated pilot scheme. This service, known as the 
Insiders peer support scheme, has been introduced at some YOI to support 
young people during their reception. It should be noted that this is not a 
confidential service.  
 
ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Team work) 
 
10.23   As part of the Prison Service Safer Custody Programme, Manchester 
University were commissioned to evaluate the existing F2052SH (Self-Harm 
At-Risk Form) system in 2002. The research has identified both the strengths 
and weaknesses of the old system, and laid the groundwork for the 
introduction of ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) 
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approach. During the 2005/6 it is intended to replace the F2052SH with ACCT 
with a target of its introduction at all prisons by the end of 2006. 
 
10.24 ACCT has been designed to build on the strengths of the F2052SH 
system whilst addressing its deficits including the inflexibility of the F2052SH 
(for example, in the management of people with a long-term pattern of self-
injury); the emphasis on watching rather than care; poor communication 
between healthcare and other staff and action plans not being carried out. 
ACCT is seen as a means whereby staff can work together to provide 
individual care to prisoners who are in distress in order to help defuse a 
potentially suicidal crisis or help individuals with long-term needs (such as 
those with a pattern of repetitive self-injury) to better manage and reduce their 
distress. 
 
10.25 The ACCT approach is planned to differ from the F2052SH in its overall 
approach to caring for at-risk prisoners.  It focuses on individual assessment, 
uses accountable Case Managers, trained Assessors and flexible care.  The 
ACCT approach promotes teamwork by joining up care provided by 
residential staff with healthcare systems for mental health care and 
drug/alcohol withdrawal.  It provides a much clearer emphasis on post-closure 
and post-release care with a stress on “people not processes”, and a culture 
that involves prisoners more directly, treating them as individuals and 
ensuring they feel cared for.  
 
10.26 The proposed introduction of the ACCT approach to replace the 
F2052SH arrangements post-dated the compilation of this Operational 
Review. This new approach is to be welcomed as it seeks to address some of 
the accepted shortcomings of the present system. Early evaluation of the 
ACCT approach at pilot sites has elicited a positive view of the new 
arrangements, citing increased prisoner involvement/ responsibility in care 
planning, more individual, flexible and holistic care, more appropriate referrals 
to healthcare, an awareness of increasing sign of risks/ triggers to future self-
harm, and some evidence of a culture change whereby staff were more 
concerned with care than form filling.  
 
10.27 A briefing note describing the introduction of ACCT prepared by the 
Prison Service [ now the National Offender Management Service (NOMS)] 
has been attached at Annex 6  
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CHAPTER 11 
 
 
MANAGEMENT OF SELF-HARM AND SUICIDE IN YOIs 
 
2. SAFER PRACTICE  
 
CARE IN HEALTH CARE CENTRES 
 
YJB Health Promotion Policy 
 
11.1 As noted in Chapter 3, the four investigations into the death of Joseph 
Scholes at Stoke Heath YOI were unanimous in their condemnation of the 
physical environment and accommodation provided at the YOI Health Care 
Centre in 2002. It is pleasing to report that the situation in 2004 has been 
greatly improved with the provision of a new, purpose-designed and equipped 
Health Care Centre. The £4 million Health Care Centre now provides first 
class facilities for health care, including suites for medical and dental 
examination and consultation and a range of suitable accommodation (12 
beds) for the medical care and treatment of the young people. This 
accommodation includes suitably designed and equipped cells for the care of 
very distressed young people. 
 
11.2 Since taking on responsibility for developing the secure juvenile estate in 
2000, the YJB has committed itself to a major enhancement of the quality of 
health care available to the young people. This has included the provision of 
funding for 24 hour health care in all YOIs that take children and young people 
straight from court, and screening arrangements for both physical and mental 
health. The YJB has also moved to integrate YOI health services into 
mainstream NHS management arrangements by agreeing the transfer of 
responsibility for YOI health provision to local Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). It 
is hoped that through these developments young people will experience a 
high quality of support for their health needs, recognizing that the population 
of young people in YOIs present higher risk factors in mental health and 
substance misuse than the general population of their age group. 
 
11.3 PSO 4950, September 2004 spells out YOI responsibilities for 
maintaining the physical, mental and social health of each young person. The 
policy adopts a ‘public health’ approach based on prevention and the 
promotion of healthy behaviour and lifestyle. PSO 4950 also sets out 
requirements for the implementation of a substance misuse strategy within 
YOIs. These policies and practices must accord with standards and good 
practice guidance set out in the Prison Service Health Performance Standard: 
Health Services for Prisoners, the NHS Children’s National Service 
Framework and the YJB Key Elements of Effective Practice (KEEP) booklet 
on ‘Mental Health’. 
 
11.4 The overall approach to the provision of health care services is one 
based on multi-disciplinary working. Where young people are identified as 
having significant health needs and are receiving support, either as in-patients 
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or on an out-patient basis, there should be a health care plan that is reviewed 
and discussed weekly by the multi-disciplinary team. Depending on the young 
person’s needs, care planning may include support from specialist medical, 
mental health or substance misuse staff. This approach to health care and 
promotion is appropriate and given improved management and resourcing at 
individual YOIs should deliver improved services and benefits. 
 
Mental Health Services 
 
11.5 PSO 4950 requires that mental health services for the young people 
must be provided by a multi-disciplinary team trained in child and adolescent 
mental health. As has been demonstrated in the case of Joseph Scholes, the 
availability of specialist psychiatric support advice and services for distressed 
young people is essential if they and the nursing and other staff caring for 
them at times of crisis, are to be properly supported. As has been noted in 
Chapter 10 the effectiveness of the F 2052SH procedures are predicated on 
the availability and expertise of health care professionals, and in the most 
serious of cases, on the availability of suitable accommodation and staffing 
levels in the Health Care Centre. 
 
11.6 Experience has shown however that the present service has some 
resource constraints that place limitations on the capacity of the service to 
always respond as well as it might wish. These have been noted, in part, at 
paragraphs 10.18.8 to 10.18.11. This situation is of considerable concern as 
the number of adolescents in the community who present serious mental 
health challenges would appear to be growing and a substantial proportion of 
these young people are sent to YOIs. As more challenging young people are 
accommodated, the task of maintaining a safe environment for other young 
people becomes that more difficult. The issue is one that bears down on both 
the level of mental health support that can be appropriately provided by a YOI 
Health Care Centre and the facilitation of alternative treatment options. 
 
11.7 PSO 4950 sets out requirements in cases where it is considered that a 
young person should be referred for in-patient psychiatric treatment in an 
NHS hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983. The young person must 
receive a psychiatric assessment and an application for transfer must be 
made to the Home Office. It is understood that although this process may be 
satisfactorily undertaken, the problem remains one of availability and 
accessibility of suitable secure in-patient psychiatric beds. This is a major 
problem that is currently being addressed in discussions between the YJB 
and the NHS, but comment about it has been included here as this serious 
and constrained resource issue will continue to act as a major inhibitor to the 
realisation of the safeguarding objectives set for Health Care Centres. 
 
USE OF UNFURNISHED ACCOMMODATION AND SAFER CELLS 
 
11.8 Best practice in the management of young people who self-harm 
suggests that successful intervention should be based on an active 
engagement with the young person, drawing on all available resources from 
social, educational and health care. Wherever possible this intervention 
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should take place in a normal residential setting and progress without 
recourse to the use of alternative facilities. However, as noted earlier, ordinary 
resources may, in the most serious and challenging of cases, be considered 
inadequate in the face of a determined attempt by a young person to inflict 
injury or death on themselves. In these instances steps need to be taken to 
place the young person in a safer physical environment that offers far fewer 
opportunities for self-harming.  
 
11.9 The Prison Service has set out in Suicide Prevention Strategies the 
policy and good practice guidance in respect to the provision of both 
unfurnished and ‘safer’ accommodation. The guidance recognises that the 
Prison Service has received repeated criticism for the continued use of 
unfurnished cells for prisoners identified at risk of self-inflicted harm. Prisoners 
have reported that being placed in these conditions does not in itself lessen 
suicidal feelings and often has the reverse effect as they feel worse for the 
experience, degraded and punished. Evidence also suggests that fear of 
being placed in unfurnished conditions is a factor that discourages prisoners 
from disclosing suicidal feelings. The guidance accepts that the use of such 
accommodation can provide a temporary respite, but is not successful as a 
long term measure. The guidance concludes that the use of unfurnished cells 
alone is wholly inappropriate for use with prisoners identified as a risk of 
suicide or self-harm.  
 
11.10 Whilst accepting this basic premise, the management of some very 
seriously disturbed prisoners can be facilitated by their accommodation in a 
safer physical setting to enable short term intervention at times of greatest 
crisis. The Prison Service has therefore developed the ‘safer’ cell 
specification. These are individual cells that are located in primary high risk 
areas in a prison or YOI. These locations have been specified as first night 
accommodation, induction units, Health Care Centres, detoxification units and 
‘care and separation’ or segregation units. Safer cells are designed to make 
the act of suicide or self-harm as difficult as possible by the removal or 
reduction of all possible ligature points. Specially designed ‘anti-ligature’ 
furniture and fittings are installed as an integral part of the cell fabric. Detailed 
design specifications for ‘safer’ cells in each of the specific locations identified 
above are provided in the guidance. 
 
11.11 Suicide Prevention Strategies reinforces the view that the use of a 
‘safer’ cell cannot be considered safe in its own right. The accommodation is 
provided to complement a protective and care regime that is directed at 
understanding and helping the young person. The aim is to provide an 
environment that reduces stress in the individual and so allows the staff 
working with them to more fully address their needs and not just the 
manifestation of their self-harming behaviour.  It is also important to note that 
no cell can ever be considered safe. Whilst the focus of concern is on the 
removal of ligature points, the opportunities for self-harming by head-banging 
or damage to limbs and cutting still remain, and experience has also shown 
that there still remains a risk of self-strangulation.   
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11.12 When in 2003 the joint ‘Child Protection and Safeguards Review’ 
reviewed the accommodation provided, they reported that many cells that 
YOIs referred to as ‘safer’ cells did not meet the standard Safer Custody 
Group specification. There was also great variance in policies at different 
YOIs in respect to the use of ‘safer’ cells. The Safeguards Review therefore 
advised that the Prison Service should undertake a review of ‘safer’ cell 
installations within the juvenile estate in order to establish which did and 
which did not meet Safer Custody Group specifications. The aim was to bring 
all such accommodation up to specification as set out in guidance. 
  
Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) 
 
11.13 The use of CCTV for the surveillance and monitoring of young prisoners 
who self-harm or threaten suicide would appear to provide a useful, but 
secondary aid to their effective management. All Prison Service published 
guidance warns about over-reliance on this form of monitoring and advises 
that it is not a satisfactory alternative to a programme based on interaction 
and engagement with the young person. The joint Child Protection and 
Safeguards Review 2003 noted that not all establishments had CCTV 
facilities; and where it was installed its usage and local protocols in regard to 
storing tapes was variable. In some YOIs the CCTV equipment was in 
disrepair. 
 
11.14 The current Prison Service position on the use of CCTV is that whilst 
there are some perceived benefits to be gained from its installation, the facility 
does not offer a panacea and should be installed with careful thought and 
discretion. The Safer Custody Group’s view is that CCTV is a good idea in 
some ‘safer cells’, but not all of them. CCTV can be useful in cases where 
young people are moving off constant observation. 
 
11.15 The availability of CCTV can provide an aid to staff supervision, but is 
not an alternative. For instance, where a young person is moving off constant 
observation, recourse to CCTV surveillance does not allow for the interaction 
that occurs during that supervisory experience. In other situations the young 
person’s care plan may indicate that they would find surveillance by CCTV 
disturbing and offer the potential to increase the risk of self-harm.  It is 
important to stress that the facility becomes redundant if staff are not available 
to watch the monitor screen. Reported experience suggests that that could be 
the case and local protocols need to be drawn up to ensure this and to advise 
on the handling of those situations where observed prisoners or trainees have 
‘played up’ to the camera by indulging in deliberate attention-seeking, 
provocative or offensive behaviour. 
 
11.16 CCTV can be a useful additional tool and its use, whilst noting its 
limitations, should be further explored and developed by YOIs. The 
Safeguards Review recommended that CCTV should be installed in all 
juvenile YOls and that a standard set of stringent and consistent protocols 
should be in place covering its use and the storage of recorded data for 
evidential purposes. That advice is endorsed by this Operational Review.    
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Observation and Supervision policy and practice 
 
11.17 When Joseph Scholes was accommodated in the Stoke Heath YOI 
Health Care Centre he was subject to a prescribed 30 minute observation 
regime. His death occurred within 20 minutes of the last recorded observation. 
The Trafford ACPC Chapter 8 Case Review recommended that YOIs adopt a 
15 minute observation interval where young people are assessed as at risk of 
self-harm and are accommodated in a ‘safer’ cell. If the cells are not deemed 
’safer’ then the Chapter 8 Review recommended continuous, direct 
observation. In all circumstances, managers should monitor compliance with 
these arrangements on a daily basis. This Operational Review has examined 
the practicability of that recommendation. 
 
11.18 Guidance on the matter of observation levels and supervision of at risk 
prisoners is provided in PSO 2700 Suicide and Self-Harm Prevention at 
section 4.2 Supervision of at-risk prisoners.  
 
11.19. PSO 2700 sets the parameters for intermittent observation which 
must only be authorised by a Governor in consultation with a doctor or nurse 
or vice versa. PSO 2700 already allows for intermittent observation at the 
level suggested by the Trafford ACPC Chapter 8 Review. This specifies that 
prisoners subject to intermittent supervision should be observed at least five 
times each hour at irregular intervals. Experience has indicated that deaths 
have occurred when a prisoner has been aware that checking will be taking 
place at a regular and predictable interval. A record of the checks must be 
maintained in the daily supervision and support record of the F2052SH. 
 
11.20 The PSO also sets out the conditions for authorising and instituting a 
constant observation regime, again only to be authorised by a Governor in 
consultation with medical staff or vice versa. A judgement has to be made that 
the prisoner presents an acute risk of self-inflicted harm and that the risk is 
heightened by the awareness that the prisoner is immediately determined to 
carry out the act. Constant observation requires a designated member of staff 
to remain constantly in the prisoner’s presence. The guidance stresses that 
this form of supervision, especially with the suicidal, should be active and 
include supportive contact and interaction rather than mere observation. 
 
11.21 Constant observation is viewed by the Prison Service and the guidance 
as a measure to be used only in extreme circumstances and with prisoners 
who present the most acute and critical challenges to their satisfactory care. 
There is a recognition that these prisoners are most likely to require mental 
health intervention and the PSO points to the need to make an urgent referral 
once a decision to place under constant observation is made. The constant 
observation regime also requires local management to establish a very active 
and frequent case review process based on a four hour cycle during the first 
24 hours of the crisis. Should the crisis extend beyond that period, the 
guidance requires that reviews be held at least three times each working day. 
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11.22 Although the approach towards care planning for at-risk prisoners is 
moving away from one of prescription to one that prioritises individualised 
care plans based on a broad range of interventions, there will still be 
situations where the depth of a young person’s crisis means that they require 
constant observation, at least for the most critical period. Constant 
observation is, however, very resource intensive and cannot be perceived as 
a particularly constructive experience for staff and prisoners alike; indeed 
there is a view that constant observation can, if sustained for a protracted 
period, exacerbate the propensity to self-harm because of its perceived 
oppressive nature. 
 
11.23 This Operational Review accepts that this is a very difficult policy and 
practice area. The availability of constant observation for all young people 
demonstrating acute at-risk behaviour is not feasible beyond its use as a very 
short term crisis-intervention tool. Without additional resources, the impact on 
individual staff and on staffing resources and deployment steers away from 
endorsing the Trafford ACPC proposal. The answer must lie, as with other 
matters noted elsewhere in this Review, with the development of more 
imaginative care planning and a wider range of more positive interventions.  
 
Monitoring of telephone calls 
 
11.24 The Prison Service team who investigated the death of Joseph Scholes 
at Stoke Heath YOI heard evidence of a telephone call between Joseph and 
his mother that might have alerted supervising staff to his intentions had a 
transcript of the conversation been promptly available or the conversation 
directly monitored. The Investigation noted that although telephone calls are 
routinely recorded, there are no arrangements to directly monitor the 
conversation of trainees under ‘at risk’ supervision and for relevant 
information to be passed immediately to staff supervising individual trainees. 
The Investigating team recommended that such arrangements be introduced 
at HMYOI Stoke Heath and also be considered for adoption throughout the 
Prison Service. 
 
11.25 It has not been possible for this Operational Review to come to a clear 
view about this recommendation. The matter has been aired with Governors 
and operational staff during the course of the review and whilst there is 
general acceptance that the practice could provide additional and vital 
information that might better safeguard the young person and assist with their 
support, there are substantial issues of resourcing and practicability to 
consider. It is understood that at any one time there are an estimated 1,500 
F2052SHs open across the secure estate. The proposal may take on more 
manageable proportions if limited to those young people at-risk and housed in 
the Health Care Centre and this solution is therefore suggested as a feasible 
compromise recommendation. 
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Alternatives to Safer Accommodation 
 
11.26 As noted in Suicide Prevention Strategies, Prison Service guidance 
on this matter is strongly biased towards the minimum use of ‘safer’ cells for 
the management of self-harm and suicide. Although ‘safer’ cells can be seen 
as a supportive tool in preventing self inflicted harm, but the development of 
individualized support is more important. This approach is strongly supported 
by this Operational Review. The guidance provides advice to Governors about 
alternatives, accepting that each establishment is differently designed and 
resourced so that some developments may require longer-term 
implementation. The guidance offers some examples of effective alternatives 
that have been shown as successful in reducing, but not totally eliminating, 
risk: 
 
 Increasing the level of observation and supervision   
 Enhancing unfurnished cells by removal of obvious ligature points and 
refurbishment 
 Installation of a gated cell to facilitate direct observation and interaction 
 Use of CCTV 
 Installation of a care suite, to accommodate both prisoner and Listeners 
 Increased use of listeners or peer support 
 Increased access to Samaritans 
 Maximisation of multi-occupied ward accommodation in Health Care 
Centres 
 Re-assessment of staffing levels and skill mix in Health Care Centres. 
 
USE OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING 
 
11.27 At the conclusion of the Coroner’s Inquest into the death of Joseph 
Scholes, attention was drawn to the jury’s unhappiness with the use of safer 
clothing that Joseph wore for the first four days of his stay in the Stoke Heath 
YOI Health Care Centre. The Inquest also heard the opinion of Robin Hughes, 
author of the Trafford ACPC Chapter 8 Case Review, that he considered the 
practice ‘de-humanising’. In the light of this concern it was agreed that this 
practice should be reviewed within this Operational Review.  
 
Current Prison Service Policy 
 
11.28 Prison Service statistics show that for the majority of the 237 self--
inflicted deaths by hanging between 2001 and 2003 involved bedding as the 
ligature, not clothing. Around 70% of the deaths involved bedding, 25% 
involved clothing (including shoelaces and belts) and 5% involved other 
ligatures.  However, clothing still has to be perceived as a readily available 
resource and it is important that there is a clear policy framework and practice 
guidance to support best practice. 
 
11.29 The Prison Service accepts that depriving vulnerable prisoners of items 
of clothing, and by so doing drawing the attention of others to them in the 
process, can worsen their distress. It accepts that such practice may make 
them feel degraded and punished. Prisoners may have fear of losing their 
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normal clothing and this might act to discourage them from disclosing suicidal 
feelings. The current policy is that normal clothing, or individual items of 
clothing or possessions, must not be removed from at-risk prisoners as a 
matter of course. Decisions should be taken on a case-by-case basis as a last 
resort and as necessary for the immediate safety of the prisoner, and then 
only for the shortest time possible. 
 
11.30 PSO 2700 Suicide and Self-Harm Prevention [paragraph 4,4] states 
that personal items including shoelaces and belts must not be removed from 
at-risk prisoners as a matter of course. PSO 1600 Use of Force [paragraph 
4.5.2] states that a prisoner may be deprived of normal clothes only if this is 
considered essential to prevent self-harm or injury to others, or where the 
prisoner’s clothing represents a hazard to their health, the health of other 
prisoners or to the staff. It is reported that in some YOIs, local management 
agrees that protective clothing can also used as an additional preventative 
measure during the night when supervision levels by staff are more limited. 
The prisoner’s clothes should be returned at the earliest opportunity. 
 
11.31 When the prisoner’s normal clothing has been removed Governors are 
required to provide the prisoner with protective clothing so that they can be 
decently dressed [PSO 1600 paragraph. 4.5.1]. This decision has to be made 
in consultation with a health professional. The Governor is required to visit the 
prisoner prior to them being placed in protective clothing and thereafter the 
prisoner should be visited by a Senior Manager at least twice in every 24 hour 
period. The decision should also be notified as soon as possible to the 
Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) and reports about cases made available 
to IMB members on visits subsequent to the event. The decision to return a 
prisoner to normal clothing has to be taken by the multi-disciplinary team with 
oversight of the prisoner’s care plan. 
 
Protective Clothing 
 
11.32 The term ‘protective clothing’ is now considered most appropriate to 
describe the alternative wear to normal clothing in these circumstances. The 
former terms, including the terms ‘strip’ or ‘safer’ clothing are not now 
considered appropriate as experience has demonstrated that there is really no 
such material as ‘safer’ clothing. No garments have yet been found that 
represent a safe and decent alternative to normal clothing. However, it is 
understood that the search for a suitable garment continues. 
 
11.33 Whilst the Prison Service confirms that the use of protective clothing is 
to be avoided wherever possible, where it is considered that the young 
prisoner is at acute risk of taking their own life using normal clothing, then the 
young person is required to dress in a ‘protective gown’. This is a ‘dressing-
gown’ type of garment made from heavy duty flame retardant material. The 
garment is loose fitting and is worn without underclothing. The gown can be 
fastened by Velcro strip. The young person will also be issued with bedding in 
the same material.  This ‘protective gown’ should only be worn in unfurnished 
or ‘safer’ cells and is very much part of a package of measures to manage the 
most serious of self-harming situations. 
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11.34 Certainly the garment is not 100% safe. YOI staff demonstrated how 
the garment could be unpicked at the hem and also exhibited a potential 
ligature that had been made from a strip of the ‘safe’ material.  
 
11.35 The Prison Service also requires that the garment uphold the dignity of 
the young person wearing it. This is a more difficult matter to judge. Within the 
culture of a Health Care Centre setting it would not be unusual for patients to 
not be wearing their normal everyday clothing. However protective clothing is 
so different to normal night attire that this analogy does not hold.  Accepting 
that the use of protective clothing is not meant to provide a long-term solution, 
and operational guidance reinforces its use for the shortest possible time, 
wearing the clothing is still a mark of ‘difference’. Although in many cases the 
clothing is required to ensure the young person’s safety or even survival, it 
can be potentially stigmatising and so add to their distress and poor self-
image.  
  
11.36 This Operational Review recognizes the realities of these situations and 
it must be appreciated that there are young people who, despite the very best 
endeavour of staff to help them with their self-harming behaviour by recourse 
to other means, do find themselves in situations where there appears to be no 
reasonable alternative to this course of action. In these difficult circumstances 
staff will require good practice guidance and support to help them assess the 
situation and more confidently explore alternative management strategies and 
approaches. 
 
11.37 However, the fact remains that in the local authority secure sector it has 
not been found necessary to resort to the use of such ‘safer’ clothing. There 
are differences between the two sectors in terms of staffing levels and it is 
always difficult to say that the young people accommodated in such sectors 
represent equivalent levels of difficulty although it is generally accepted that 
LASCHs do care and contain some very seriously disturbed young people. 
YOIs also receive disturbed young people who are deemed unsuitable for 
LASCHs. But there is a view that difference is more likely to lie in the 
approach and culture of the two sectors. The YOI has the task of balancing 
the special needs of a small, but very demanding, group of young people 
against the general and more diverse needs of a very much larger group. The 
LASCH can focus their management sharply on the needs of a small group of 
young people who broadly present similar sets of needs for welfare, care, 
treatment and control. Accepting these differences, it would still seem useful 
to continue to encourage cross-fertilisation of ideas and practices between the 
two sectors.  
 
Best and Safe practice 
 
11.38 This Operational Review has noted that the Prison Service has 
developed new draft guidance on this subject to be attached to a revised 
version of PSO 2700 due for publication in 2005. This new guidance should 
be very valuable to staff and assist them with the management of very 
vulnerable young prisoners. The main messages from that draft guidance are 
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set out in the following paragraphs as they demonstrate good practice and 
reinforce what appears to be the resolve in the Prison Service to ensure that 
the dignity and welfare of young prisoners is safeguarded wherever and 
whenever possible.  
 
11.39 It is important to note that this draft guidance has yet to be distributed 
for wider consultation, nor has it been through the Prison Service Operational 
Policy Group for approval. It should therefore be noted that the final published 
version may differ from the outline provided in this Review. 
 
Alternatives to the removal of clothing 
 
11.40 The Prison Service recognizes that the removal of clothing can only be 
considered as a short term preventative measure to manage the immediate 
threat of a self-harming episode. It does not address the underlying causes for 
the behaviour and this work should continue through care planning under the 
auspices of F2052SH. The draft guidance presents a range of strategies that 
the care planners may wish to consider that alleviate the need to remove 
normal clothing. In essence these proposals are based on ideas that actively 
engage the young person in the management of their own self-harming 
behaviour or allow for an environment that will be experienced as supportive 
and ‘therapeutic’ rather than demeaning. 
 
11.41 The following alternative strategies are suggested in the draft guidance. 
They are not mutually exclusive and elements of most may feature in the care 
plans for the most vulnerable young people: 
 
 Increase levels of staffing interaction and observation; 
 Provide constant observation of the young prisoner in the most serious 
cases. This should be undertaken in accordance with guidance about 
authorisation and medical oversight. A case review should be held 
within four hours and at similar intervals during the working day; 
 
 Use a safer cell as this may reduce the need for protective clothing as 
ligature points have been removed. But be alert to the possibility of 
self-strangulation; 
 Devise protocols for checking that clothing has not been tampered 
with; 
 Use CCTV. CCTV is an aid to staff supervision, not an alternative. 
There should be a local protocol to guide staff in the use of this aid; 
 
 Consider placing in shared accommodation; 
 Provide activities to encourage and engage the young prisoner e.g. in-
cell TV and other creative activities/past-times; 
 Help young person with more time out of cell; 
 
 Utilise available therapeutic resources; 
 Consider admission to the Health Care Centre; 
 Seek professional help for those young people with drug or alcohol 
misuse problems; 
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 Provide practical help with problems; 
 Increase use of peer supporters; 
 Involve Chaplaincy; 
 Involve external sources of support, including family, Samaritans and 
external agencies. 
 
Initial decisions to remove normal clothing 
 
11.42 The draft guidance reinforces the advice that the removal of clothing 
should be considered a last option in caring for vulnerable young people. In 
coming to that decision staff will need to make a judgement about whether the 
level of current presenting risk and knowledge about the young person’s past 
history of self-harming suggest that clothing will play a significant part in any 
potential self-harm attempt. Staff may wish to consider the following factors:  
 
 Is the young person going through a period of crisis? 
 Has there been a significant event that has triggered the episode? 
 Is the young person depressed or anxious? 
 Is their behaviour unusual? 
 Is the young person saying that they are going to self-harm or wish to 
die? 
 Do they have a specific plan to self-harm? 
 
 Has the young person self-harmed using clothing before? 
 Are the current circumstances similar to earlier episodes? 
 Is the pattern of self-harm worsening? 
 Are incidents becoming more frequent or methods more dangerous? 
 
 
Protecting Trainees’ rights 
 
11.43 A strong theme that runs through the draft guidance and is commended 
relates to the acceptance that the removal of normal clothing is a last option 
within any self-harm management plan. The draft guidance encourages staff 
to consider how the activities of the trainee can be normalized, but there are 
strong strictures about ensuring that trainees are not seen to be dressed in 
protective clothing when being moved about the YOI or on association. In 
these situations young people should be given the opportunity to change back 
into normal clothing, but additional staff supervision or escorting may be 
required. 
 
11.44 In some circumstances prisoners will object to the wearing of protective 
clothing and will not cooperate. The draft guidance sets out the grounds for 
requiring the change of clothing by using authorized force, but stresses that 
this should be an absolute last resort, the justification for which must be 
proven to be necessary to prevent death. This action must be endorsed by the 
Governor and health care staff and clearly documented. 
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Reviewing the use of Protective Clothing 
 
11.45 The draft guidance sets out the requirement for the circumstances to be 
reviewed at highly frequent and regular intervals. This requirement aims to 
protect the welfare of the individual prisoner and to use this exceptional mode 
of protective intervention in place for the minimum time possible. The draft 
guidance sets out the following agenda for review meetings: 
 
 Consider how many hours each day, or night, the trainee should spend 
in protective clothing; 
 What alternatives there are to protective clothing? 
 How and when will the trainee be returned to normal clothing? 
 Determine level and frequency of observation; 
 Assess the trainee’s behaviour; 
 Assess the effect that wearing the protective clothing is having on the 
trainee. 
 
  
Quality Assurance 
 
11.46 The use of protective clothing as an aid to the management of young 
people who threaten self-harm and suicide will remain a contentious issue. 
The aim must be to reduce recourse to this practice to an absolute minimum. 
It will therefore be important for the Prison Service and the YJB to closely 
monitor its incidence and level of use. This should be achieved through the 
institution of regular sampling exercises by the YJB Performance Monitor. 
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CHAPTER 12  
 
 
TRAINING MATTERS 
 
12.1 Training for the Asset Assessment framework 
 
12.1.1 This Operational Review has taken note of a number of training 
initiatives and developments that have been promoted by the YJB during 
2004. These initiatives have been conducted within the YJB’s National 
Qualifications Framework that provides youth justice services with a range of 
staff training and developmental tools to support better practice. A new 
qualification, the Professional Certificate in Effective Practice (Youth 
Justice), is a higher education qualification for a broad range of youth justice 
workers that can be completed in nine months whilst remaining at their posts. 
The YJB has set itself a target of 80% of youth justice practitioners having 
achieved this award by 2006. 
 
12.1.2 Module 1 of the programme is devoted to training in the understanding 
and completion of the Asset framework, with a strong emphasis on working 
with and managing risk. The YJB has also developed some new shorter skills 
enhancement programmes know as Effective Practice In-Service Training 
(INSET). These programmes have been available to Yots since June 2004 
and cover each of the 15 Key Elements of Effective Practice (KEEP) 
subject areas. The YJB has indicated that it would like to see the INSET on 
training in Asset given some priority and so has, as a condition of funding, 
required Regional Human Resources (HR) Consortia to prioritise this 
programme from April 2004 so as to ensure that all staff can undertake 
detailed training in Asset based on local need. 
 
12.1.3 The material and concerns examined in this Operational Review, which 
relate to the management of risk and to the understanding and clarification of 
the concept of vulnerability, reinforce the importance of supporting this 
initiative. The lessons from the investigations into the death of Joseph 
Scholes and similar Serious Incident Reviews demonstrate how key the 
Asset framework is to the entire process and how important it is that Yot staff 
and other colleagues in the juvenile justice system use it fully and with 
confidence. The new guidance on the management of risk will need to be 
appropriately incorporated into the INSET training once the new assessment 
materials have been produced.     
 
12.1.4 It has been noted that the planned INSET training on Asset takes 
between one to three days and concentrates on the completion of the core 
Asset and the importance of early identification of risk. The programme seeks 
to help staff feel more confident with their assessments of risk and underlines 
the importance of sharing information on risk with the young people and their 
families. To this needs to be added training on working with other agencies 
and coordinating bodies, such as the Multi Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements (MAPPA) or ACPC (to become the Local Safeguarding 
Children’s Board in 2006), to highlight risk management approaches adopted 
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by those agencies that could link with the work of youth justice services. 
Experience also suggests that some additional force might well be included in 
the training programme related to seeing the Asset assessment as a ’living’ 
document that is ongoing and should be open to constant updating and not 
just at the stipulated review intervals. This area will be covered in the risk 
training materials that are currently being finalised and which are to be rolled 
out to practitioners by the end of April 2005. 
 
12.1.5 This Operational Review welcomes the training initiatives that the YJB 
has planned and resourced. They are closely linked with the important 
developmental work on the management of risk instigated by the YJB and the 
need to respond positively to changes in the external world of children’s 
services with its strong emphasis on even greater and closer inter-agency 
working. 
 
12.2 Juvenile Awareness Staff Programme (JASP) 
 
12.2.1 The Child Protection and Safeguards Review 2003 concluded that 
the Prison Service should commission a comprehensive analysis of training 
needs specifically of those staff working with juveniles. The Review found that 
the degree of safeguarding and child-focus across the YOI estate was very 
varied. In general, juvenile-only YOIs appeared to have an enormous 
advantage over spilt sites in managing children’s safeguarding. Although 
some split sites were more successful than others, split sites were more likely 
to evidence: 
 
 Lack of child specific policies 
 Lack of staff trained specifically in the care of vulnerable children 
 Inability to achieve a child-centred philosophy and regime where a 
‘whole prison’ philosophy is pursued 
 Cross deployment of staff between adult and juvenile sections of the 
YOI 
 Targets and standards of practice more designed for adults. 
 
12.2.2 One important way to address this was through the development of 
specialised training in safeguarding and vulnerability alongside action to bring 
about cultural change through management initiatives and regime design. The 
review recommended that the Prison Service and YJB should develop a 
comprehensive modular child protection and safeguards training package that 
would build on the recently revised Prison Officer Entry Level Training 
(POELT) scheme for staff working with under-18 year olds. The package of 
modules should cover: 
 
 Self-Harm and suicide prevention 
 Anti-bullying and anti-social behaviour 
 Anti-discrimination and diversity 
 Prevention of harm from other young people 
 Prevention of harm from staff and other adults 
 Investigations of significant harm. 
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12.2.3 This Operational Review strongly supports the commissioning of the 
training needs analysis and the development of the proposed safeguarding 
training package. It is anticipated that a positive input to this training 
development will be provided by the new group of social workers appointed 
under the safeguarding initiative. These staff should be able to provide an 
invaluable resource of child protection knowledge and information about local 
contacts and services.  
 
12.2.4 It is understood that current Prison Service recruitment policies and 
processes do not necessarily give Governors the fullest flexibility to interview 
potential Prison Officers to determine their suitability for working with 
juveniles, a demanding and specialised aspect of prison work. It has been 
argued, with some force, that the key to the success and effectiveness of any 
safeguarding strategy is the availability of a workforce specifically selected to 
meet the requirements of the young people in the YOI’s care. These features 
are clearly reflected in the wording, guidance and instruction provided by PSO 
4950. It has not been within the remit of this Operational Review to examine 
and comment upon recruitment issues. Suffice it to say that well-designed and 
focussed training programmes will be that much more effective if targeted at 
staff who have been chosen, from the outset, by a process that seeks to 
establish their suitability for the specific job in hand. 
 
12.2.5 The Juvenile Awareness Staff Programme (JASP) is a new 
development for YOI staff. JASP is a two week modular training package that 
has been developed for staff in the secure juvenile YOI estate. This 
Operational Review is remitted to comment on the JASP training programme 
for Vulnerability Assessment. This is a very focussed course based on 12 
sessions that are programmed to be delivered by a trainer over a 7 day 
period; an initial 3 day course followed by a further 4 day period.  
 
12.2.6 The ground covered by the Vulnerability Assessment module appears 
very appropriate to the task and the curriculum picks up on many of the 
training and preparation issues highlighted by this Operational Review, 
namely the importance of understanding the Asset assessment, 
understanding about vulnerability, pre-sentence reporting and prisoner escort 
reports, and completion of the T1:V and T1:VR forms. The training adopts a 
very practical approach to the subject matter and majors on techniques that 
should be adopted to obtain the clearest information from documentation and 
from the young person through interviews. 
 
12.2.7 If there is any criticism to be made of this scheme is that it more time 
should be allocated to its delivery. With the changes in the understanding of 
vulnerability reported by the Operational Review in earlier chapters, more time 
could be allotted to a discussion of this topic, prior to the application exercises 
with the T1:V procedures  
 
12.3 Training in Suicide Prevention 
 
12.3.1 The guidance manual Suicide Prevention Strategies reinforces the 
need for suicide prevention training to be developed as an important part of 
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each YOI’s local suicide and self-harm prevention strategy. The Prison 
Service provides a comprehensive range of suicide prevention training 
programmes. The programmes assume that all training should reflect the 
importance of involving and working with different disciplines and recognize 
that all staff, and not solely health care staff, have an ability to engage with 
and assist young people at risk of self-harm and suicide.  The role of 
Samaritans and Listeners forms part of such training; it is promoted as good 
practice to actively involve Samaritans and Listeners themselves in the 
delivery of the programme. However, the Listener programme is not 
considered appropriate for juvenile trainees. 
 
12.3.2 At entry to the service, all new officers are given the opportunity to 
undertake suicide prevention training and so acquire the values and attitudes 
required in this important area of work. In this training the emphasis is on the 
‘duty of care’ owed to all prisoners, underpinned by the service’s core values 
and the importance of the officer/prisoner relationship in generating a 
supportive culture. The guidance recommends that the core module for the 
training  ‘Caring for prisoners at risk of self-harm and suicide’ is delivered 
by local suicide prevention trainers to all staff, including specialist health 
professionals and contract staff such as teachers, who have a direct contact 
with young trainees. The guidance also emphasises the need for night duty 
staff to be included in all training initiatives in this area of work. 
 
12.3.3 The training also includes practical advice about the response to, and 
management of, suicide attempts. This action is detailed at Annex C of PSO 
2700. Staff are provided with specific training in First Aid that encompasses 
this advice including training in the cutting down of those who have attempted 
suicide and are suspended by a ligature. These training arrangements are of 
vital importance and the guidance Suicide Prevention Strategy advises that 
establishments also consider the institution of refresher training in suicide 
prevention and relate these more closely to the experience and incidence of 
self-harm and suicide at the individual YOI. 
 
Safer Custody and Self-Harm Toolkit 
 
12.3.4 As noted earlier [at paragraph 10.12], the Self-Harm Toolkit provides 
comprehensive guidance on self-harm and suicide. Published by the Safer 
Custody Group in September 2004, the Toolkit is available in CD Rom format 
and on the Prison Service intranet. The Self-Harm Tool kit brings together all 
relevant information and guidance on best practice and also includes a 
training package ‘Understanding Self-Harm’ that can be delivered by non-
specialist trainers or used by individuals.  This is an excellent new resource 
that will assist understanding of this complex area of practice.  
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CHAPTER 13  
 
 
TOWARDS GREATER EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Quality Assurance in the Secure Estate 
 
13.1 This Operational Review has looked in considerable detail at the 
operational procedures and practices that have developed within the secure 
juvenile estate, with a particular focus on YOIs, to ensure that the quality of 
life for young people is the best that it can be given in the abnormal 
circumstances represented by detention in custody. In particular, the review 
has examined closely the arrangements for safeguarding children and young 
people, and for their special protection and care when they threaten to indulge 
in very risky behaviour and self-harm. But how do we know whether any of 
this will work or prove as effective or safe in actual practice as the procedures 
might suggest? 
 
13.2 In the course of this examination, attention has been drawn to the checks 
that have been built into the operational procedures and the line management 
arrangements; and to the balances that are provided by reporting and 
monitoring arrangements. Where there is full compliance with these 
requirements in both management and practice, these arrangements should 
be adequate to secure optimum performance given the availability of 
adequate and appropriate resources.  But we know that in everyday practice 
such an ideal world is difficult to achieve, particularly in such a demanding 
field as youth justice and in such complex settings as YOIs and the rest of the 
secure juvenile estate. It is therefore important to develop mechanisms for 
assessing how effective performance really is, or not, and how far there is to 
travel before full confidence in the quality of performance can be assured. 
 
13.3 The development of an active programme of quality assurance within the 
secure juvenile estate is essential if progress towards the achievement of the 
YJB’s aspirations and targets for the estate is to be achieved.  It is very 
encouraging to see the amount of work that has already been developed in 
this area, particularly in the past year or so. Good quality assurance 
programmes are not just about counting numbers or assessing indicators, but 
should be interactive and provide material with which the organisation can 
learn about itself and how it might perform better and more effectively. 
 
13.4  The outputs from quality assurance programmes should impact on any 
cultural obstacles and non-compliance issues that appear to be inhibiting 
change and improvement. Quality assurance outputs can also inform 
arguments about resources and the impact that an assessed resource 
shortfall can have on the quality of work, in both the short and long term. 
Quality assurance has also a great deal to contribute to ensuring the welfare 
of individual young people, by setting goals for their achievements, dealing 
with their complaints, monitoring their periods of stress and seeking their 
views, for instance, about their feelings of safety. 
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13.5  This Chapter of the Operational review reports on two major aspects of 
the Quality Assurance arrangements for the secure juvenile estate. Both 
provide an invaluable range of material for organisational learning and 
development. 
 
¾ The YJB Effective Regimes Monitoring Framework 
 
¾ The YJB Serious Incident reporting arrangements 
 
 
Effective Regimes 
 
13.6 Over the past year the YJB has sought to develop and introduce an 
overarching scheme for monitoring and performance managing the secure 
juvenile estate. This work has resulted in the establishment of the Effective 
Regimes monitoring framework. After some piloting in the latter part of 2003, 
the framework has been fully operational since July 2004. The framework is 
designed to monitor all three sectors of the secure juvenile estate and has 
considerable potential not only for measuring and describing how the secure 
estate is functioning, but also, by investing in appropriate means for feedback 
and interaction between commissioners and providers, for bringing about 
improvements in the quality and effectiveness of the services provided to 
young people. 
 
13.7 The Effective Regimes framework brings together a range of monitoring 
and performance measures already present in the secure estate. The 
framework is underpinned by sets of published standards including the 
National Standards for Youth Justice Service, the National Specification for 
Learning and Skills and the National Specification for Substance Misuse, 
together with provision-based standards such as those promulgated by the 
Prison Service and national minimum standards for Children’s Homes. These 
standards are also enshrined in contracts or service level agreements with 
providers. 
 
13.8 The Effective Regimes framework also incorporates pointers to best 
practice provided by the Key Elements of Effective Practice set of guidance 
booklets that create their own quality assurance framework.  
 
Secure Estate Performance Measures 
 
13.9 The YJB, in exercising its statutory responsibility for advising the Home 
Secretary on the operation of the youth justice system, has put in place a 
performance management framework that both shapes the work of the youth 
justice system and measures its effectiveness in preventing and reducing 
offending by children and young people. It is noted that these performance 
management arrangements have been commended by the Audit Commission 
in their report “Youth Justice, 2004”. There are 14 performance measures 
for Youth Offending Teams and there are eight performance measures for the 
secure estate.[see Annex 5].  
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13.10 The YJB reports that the performance measurement approach has 
taken longer to bed into the practice of secure estate service providers and it 
has only been since 2003 that regular reporting against the measures 
commenced. New contractual arrangements with local authorities and the 
service level agreement with the Prison Service have ensured that 
arrangements are now firmly in place for consistent reporting and for practice 
to be driven by performance measures. The YJB report that more has yet to 
be done to ensure a similar level of embedding within the STCs. 
 
13.11 The YJB aspires to use the set of performance measures in order to 
drive up the quality of outcomes for the lives of the young people.  It does not 
want them to be seen just as a set of percentage indicators. This requires a 
high level of interaction between providers and the YJB as commissioners. 
Independent mechanisms including research and inspection also need to be 
utilised to provide more detailed qualitative information about reported 
performance. It is, for instance, very interesting and important to note that 
Performance Measure 8: Safety is assessed on an annual basis by a 
questionnaire-based survey conducted by HM Inspectorate of Prisons. 
 
Monitoring and compliance 
 
13.12 As noted in earlier chapters of this Operational Review the secure 
estate has established a wide range of monitoring obligations, especially with 
respect to safeguarding and the management of risk. These monitoring 
responsibilities are now encompassed within the Effective Regimes 
monitoring framework and this should, over time, provide a more 
comprehensive and more fully informed view of the performance of individual 
YOIs or other secure establishments, or the estate as a whole. 
 
13.13 The Child Protection and Safeguards Review 2003 recommended 
that the Prison Service develop a juvenile-specific Child Protection and 
Safeguards monitoring framework, gathering together data that is mostly 
already collected, but in a more integrated format that can be interrogated for 
improved practice purposes. This would provide a very useful tool in the 
hands of YOI Safeguards Managers. The review proposed that the set of 
monitored items should include: 
 
 Reports of self-harm, attempted suicides and suicides 
 Incidents of harm sustained from another young person 
 Incidents of racial harassment 
 Incidents of harm from staff or other adults 
 Number and analysis of child protection referrals to local authorities 
 Incidents of control and restraint 
 
This set of monitored indicators is now included in the Effective Regimes 
framework. 
 
 
13.14 Ensuring compliance is an issue for all complex businesses and the 
development of the Effective Regimes framework should offer a new 
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opportunity to address this issue in circumstances where a consistent pattern 
of monitoring and reporting suggests some under-performance. The 
monitoring framework provides an opportunity to ask questions and seek 
reasons for performance issues and to identify remedies. The Effective 
Regimes framework requires monthly reporting, with serious matters being 
specifically identified by exception reporting. The scheme provides feedback 
in the form of a monthly report to regional YJB management and this operates 
on the basis of the ‘traffic lights’ approach to assessment of individual item 
and overall performance. 
 
13.15 As has been noted, the Effective Regimes monitoring framework is still 
in the very early stages of implementation. The assessment of its own 
effectiveness and potency to achieve its intended goals of raising quality 
standards in provision, and by so doing raise the quality of life and improve 
the safeguarding of young people, will only be judged in future years. But the 
approach clearly has great potential, and as long as the incipient threat of 
over-bureaucratisation of such a complex framework can be resisted, the 
management of the secure juvenile estate should benefit. 
 
Learning from Serious Incidents 
 
13.16 As the investigations into the circumstances of the death of Joseph 
Scholes and this consequent Operational Review of effectiveness and 
safeguarding exemplifies, it is helpful to examine in some depth these serious 
incidents so that lessons can be learnt, both for the present and for future 
practice. These lessons can have impact at both local and national level. They 
are an important element in the frame-work for keeping the system under 
close scrutiny, although the circumstances in which Serious Incident Reviews 
become necessary are challenging and often demand skilled management 
and handling. 
 
13.17 Since its inception, the YJB has always had in place arrangements for 
undertaking Serious Incident Reviews (SIRs). The original guidance was 
issued in 2001 and this was the procedure by which the death of Joseph 
Scholes was reviewed (see paragraph 2.2). That guidance has now been 
revised in the light of changes to both the manner in which serious incidents 
are investigated and the need to align the YJB’s procedures with other case 
review mechanisms. A revised version of the guidance was published in July 
2005. 
 
13.18 The YJB categorises serious incidents that are subject to the SIR 
process as follows: 
 
o the death of a young person who is in a secure facility placement 
commissioned by the YJB; 
  
o  the attempted suicide of a young person who is under community 
supervision by a Youth Offending Team or other YJB-supported 
project, where the event is assessed as life-threatening; 
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o a grave allegation of, or conviction for: murder, attempted murder or 
serious sexual assault by a young person either in a secure facility or in 
the community while subject to a criminal court order. 
 
13.19 These are by their nature rare occurrences, but they raise important 
issues of public confidence in the capacity of the youth justice system to 
protect young people and the community. In the period March 2003 until early 
April 2004 there were 26 Local Management Reviews completed, including 
one death in custody and nine in the community, due in some cases to drug 
overdose or fatal motor vehicle accidents. About half of the SIRs related to 
young people who were alleged to have committed, or had committed, very 
serious offences against people, including 12 young people charged with 
murder or assault  and three with rape. 
 
13.20 On 1 April 2004 the responsibility for the investigation of deaths 
involving young people in YOI custody became the responsibility of the Prison 
and Probation Ombudsman. In the near future the Prison and Probation 
Ombudsman’s remit is to be extended to encompass fatal incidents in STCs. 
The revised SIR procedural guidance recognises this and also sets out to 
coordinate investigations carried out under these auspices with those 
established for Child Protection under Chapter 8 of Working Together to 
Safeguard Children, 1999 and the Commission for Social Care Inspection 
(CSCI). 
 
13.21 The revised SIR process retains the two-tiered approach with Local 
Management Reports (LMRs) being required on all incidents and Serious 
Incident Reviews being commissioned, where the death of a young person 
occurs in custody or, at the discretion of the YJB Chief Executive, where a 
young person commits a particularly serious offence whilst on an Intensive 
Surveillance and Supervision Programme (ISSP). These SIRs will also be 
prepared to inform any parallel ACPC Chapter 8 case review, CSCI inspection 
or Prisons and Probation Service Ombudsman’s enquiry. 
 
13.22 The Serious Incident Review manager based at YJB Headquarters 
oversees the SIR process for the YJB. The SIR process is supported by clear 
procedural and good practice guidance that spells out how and when 
investigations are to be conducted and how they are to be handled within the 
YJB line management arrangements. Strict timescales have been inserted 
into the process and these reflect the urgency and importance of the 
investigations. Local Yot managers have 20 days in which to complete an 
LMR and submit it to the YJB regional manager and the YJB’s Serious 
Incident Review manager. A further 20 days is allowed for the completion of 
an SIR if the incident falls into the respective category. In the event of a death 
in custody, this timescale does not apply. At the end of this process a final 
report with recommendations is presented to the YJB. 
 
13.23 The revised SIR process includes a model format for the preparation of 
reports based on experience of the former process. The procedures are also 
posted as the Serious Incident Management Pack on the YJB website. This 
practice is commended. The decision to align the SIR processes with other 
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review frameworks is a sound and welcome move. In respect of alignment 
with Chapter 8 procedures, whereby the LMR or SIR can be treated as an 
individual agency management review, it may be helpful to directly draw the 
YJB reviewer’s attention to the model analytical framework for such reviews 
as set out in the guidance. This would facilitate the preparation of the Chapter 
8 Overview report. (see Working Together to Safeguard Children, 1999, 
paragraphs 8.20 to 8.24). 
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CHAPTER 14 
 
 
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Preamble 
 
This Operational Review has provided an opportunity to look in some detail at 
matters of safeguarding and the management of risk as highlighted by the 
Investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes at Stoke Heath YOI in March 
2002. Since that time the YJB and the Prison Service have actively sought to 
address those issues within a much broader programme of work aimed at 
bringing greater effectiveness and safety to the treatment of young people in 
the YOI sector of the secure juvenile estate. That work, particularly that 
related to the care and protection of vulnerable children and young people 
who may self-harm or threaten suicide, has been described and assessed by 
this Operational Review. 
 
Overall, the primary conclusion of the Operational Review is that the YJB and 
the Prison Service, through the work of the Safer Custody Group and the 
Juvenile Group, have developed a set of policies and procedures that focus 
directly on the issues and have the potential capacity to deliver a more 
effective and, most importantly, a safer service. Clearly the manner in which 
these policies and procedures are implemented and resourced will remain at 
the core of concerns about the safety, or otherwise, of the YOI experience for 
young people. The policies and procedures examined would appear to 
support the drive towards safer YOI communities and more satisfactory 
outcomes for the young people as a result of their experience, but it is also 
clear that many adverse factors, both cultural and operational, still retain the 
capacity to thwart best intentions and inhibit best practice. 
 
So it is important to again stress the key part that both quality control, through 
compliance and active management, and quality assurance - through 
inspection, monitoring and active learning, must play in ensuring that the 
safeguarding framework is fully implemented and embedded in the work of 
the Yot and the YOI. Procedures of themselves do not take you very far. It is 
also important to develop a workforce that is dedicated to their underlying 
philosophy of care in custody and committed to the task of ensuring that the 
welfare of the young person is paramount. It was very encouraging to note 
such a level of commitment by staff at the two YOIs visited as part of this 
Operational Review. This offers the possibility of eventually securing the 
safeguarding objectives for the YOI estate expressed by the YJB and the 
Prison Service.  
 
The following summaries of the various issues examined by the Operational 
Review are referenced back to the main themes that arose from the 
investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes, as set out in Chapter 3, and 
to other aspects of the terms of reference of this Review. In the course of the 
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Operational Review a broader approach was taken to some matters and 
these are also summarized here. [Recommendations for future development 
and improvement have been underlined]. 
 
14.1 Appropriateness of Placement 
 
All of the Investigations into the circumstances of the death in custody 
of Joseph Scholes concluded that young men who presented his level 
of risk are not appropriately placed in YOIs and that every effort should 
be made to secure their placement in a Local Authority Children’s Home.  
There should be consideration of the development of discrete facilities 
within the YOI sector for young people demonstrably at risk of self-harm 
or suicide. 
 
 The YJB has drafted an overall strategy that emphasises the 
importance of reducing reliance on custody and reducing the number of 
secure places commissioned, by the development of more intensive 
and effective punishments in the community. 
 
 There are marked differences between the three types of provision - 
YOI, STC and LASCH - that comprise the secure juvenile estate and 
an understanding of these differences is key to determining a 
placement policy. 
 
 A contemporary assessment of the level of demand for places for those 
children and young people identified as ‘vulnerable’ still indicates that 
there are, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, insufficient 
places for such children outside the YOI sector. This remains a 
situation of concern. 
 
 It is important that the YJB has a clear placement policy that articulates 
how the places within the secure estate are to be utilised and how 
access to these places is managed through the effective working of the 
YJB Placements Team. 
 
 The YJB is committed to placing children and young people in a secure 
establishment that can most effectively manage their identified needs 
and risk factors identified by Yots and make decisions based on the 
best ‘fit’ between the vulnerability of the young person, the availability 
of places within the three sectors and the needs of other young people 
already placed. The YJB is committed to placing all boys under 15 and 
girls under 17 in the LASCH and STC sectors. 
 
 The YJB has recently published for consultation its strategic vision for 
the secure juvenile estate for the next three years. The YJB accepts 
that it will take some time to achieve this vision and much will depend 
on sentencing trends and the level of funding available to the juvenile 
offender sector.   
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 The YJB has agreed that an initiative should be launched that will 
explore the development of smaller scale ‘intermediate’ units within 
selected YOIs. The units will be designed and appropriately managed 
and more intensively staffed so as to meet the needs of a minority of 
older young people identified as ‘particularly needy’. 
 
 The YJB is also exploring alternatives to full security, including the 
possibility of extending the quantity of open YOI accommodation 
(currently and the provision of units with a secure perimeter only. 
 
 The YJB has restated its commitment to maintaining a strategic 
safeguarding policy for the YOI estate.  
 
 
14.2 Quality of Assessment Work and the  Management of Risk 
 
 All the Investigations concluded that, by one means or another, the 
court considering Joseph’s sentence had received explicit advice about 
his vulnerability, his history of self-harm and attempted suicide. 
Comparison was drawn between the quality of the pre-sentence report 
and the Asset assessment, the latter being considered incomplete and 
lacking in supporting evidence. 
 
The effective use of Asset 
 
 This Operational Review strongly supports the YJB’s belief that 
planning action and services to meet the needs of children and young 
people can only proceed on the basis of a comprehensive assessment 
that takes into account the full extent of the young person’s personal 
circumstances, attitudes and beliefs. 
 
 The Asset assessment tool provides a structure for recording and 
analysing a wide range of relevant information. The assessment 
instrument is designed to look at the young person’s offending 
behaviour and identify the multiple factors or circumstances that may 
have contributed to that behaviour. 
 
 Whilst there is no doubt that Asset provides a valuable, well designed 
and validated assessment framework, as with any instrument of this 
nature its effectiveness relies heavily on the quality of and relevance of 
information gathered to inform the assessment, either by interview, 
case history work or reports sought from other agencies relevant to the 
young person’s life and family, and the skill and judgement of the 
assessor.   
 
 Although the Asset assessment tool allows for ‘don’t know’ responses, 
in all instances information about why there is an information or 
judgement gap needs to be provided. Unless this is the case then 
degrees of uncertainly will remain in the minds of those who have 
cause to utilise the Asset report to inform their own decisions.  
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 Users of Asset must ensure that judgements are clearly and 
substantially informed by evidence. This is a matter that needs to be 
strengthened, perhaps by management action to reinforce the notes of 
guidance and through professional supervision. 
 
 The strength of the Asset approach is that it provides a standardised 
framework, supported by preparation and training tailored to the 
approach. At Yot level, different professional disciplines drawn from a 
balanced agency mix should bring strength to the various components 
in the assessment process. Sharing expertise and experience across 
teams should lead to better informed assessments. 
 
 The Government’s proposal under Every Child Matters to develop a 
common assessment framework for children in need provides a further 
opportunity to enhance aspects of the Asset assessment in 
collaboration with other agencies. 
 
 Communicating with children and young people is an area of practice 
where experience and expertise play an important part and Yot 
workers should be encouraged to develop their skills. This is especially 
necessary when working with vulnerable, disadvantaged or disabled 
children or young people. 
 
Identification and Management of risk 
 
 New draft YJB guidance ‘Managing Risk in the Community’ offers a 
detailed examination of the management of risk in both a policy and 
practice context. The guidance is comprehensive in its coverage of 
matters related to the assessment and management of risk and the 
preparation and support of Yot staff. The guidance provides sound 
advice. 
 
 This Operational Review endorses the approach set out in ‘Managing 
Risk in the Community’ and considers that the publication, 
implementation and integration of this guidance into Yot practice 
should represent a major step towards improving the understanding 
and management of this challenging area of work.   
 
 The availability of specialised guidance to Yots on the issue of 
‘vulnerability’ would be beneficial. ‘Managing Risk in the Community’ 
suggests a graduated approach to defining different levels of 
vulnerability.  
 
 This Operational Review considers that the suggested categorisation 
has merit. It helps to ‘unpack’ the concept of risk and allows differential 
approaches and interventions to be thought about and adopted. 
 
 ‘Managing Risk in the Community’ builds on the current guidance on 
vulnerability in the Asset framework and provides well-informed advice 
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geared directly to the various judicial and practice processes 
undertaken by Yot Teams.   
 
 In recent years much progress has been made in enjoining agencies, 
particularly in the field of safeguarding children and young people, to 
share information on an open and confident basis. The Yot has played 
a full part in this. It is appreciated, however, that some obstacles still 
remain, particularly with respect to the interface with mental health 
services and psychiatry and how information from those sources is 
handled within Yots.  
 
 The Government, through the Children Act 2004, is committed to the 
creation of an integrated set of services for children and young people 
and an important part of that resolve is to engineer a shared 
information base about children. This resolve should provide leverage 
to assist the YJB and Yots overcome any residual problems with 
Information exchange. 
 
 
14.3 Placement of children and young people at High Risk in the 
Secure Estate 
 
All the Investigations closely examined the operations of the YJB 
Placements Team. There was a generally agreed conclusion that, 
accepting the complexity of the team’s task and the difficulties inherent 
in managing three sectors with differential levels of availability, more 
clarity needed to be introduced into the placement arrangements. Issues 
concerning the quality and transmission of information, and the 
arrangements for transfer between placements were also highlighted.  
 
Review of the YJB Placement function 
 
 In December 2003 the YJB commissioned an Independent Review of 
the placement function and work of the Placements Team. The aim of 
the independent review was to assess the robustness of placement 
procedures and practice, so as to ensure that decisions made by the 
Placements Team maximised the safeguarding of young people at 
highest risk.   
 
 The Independent Review recognised the difficulty of the team’s work 
and concluded that, although the team were able to demonstrate some 
considerable achievements, a range of operational factors remained 
that inhibited maximum effectiveness. These factors included 
processes for the transfer of information, an under-developed computer 
based information retention and retrieval system, and the continued 
use of unreliable Fax. 
 
 The Independent reviewer was unable to affirm confidence in the ability 
of the Placements Team to make effective and informed judgements 
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about placement decisions, due primarily to the lack of information of 
an acceptable quality supporting requests for placements. The system 
of Vulnerability Alerts operating at that time also captured too many 
children and young people; the system failed to sufficiently discriminate 
and identify those children most at risk. 
 
 Positive action has now been taken by the YJB to address issues 
raised by the Independent Review and the investigations into the death 
of Joseph Scholes. 
 
 This Operational Review is pleased to conclude that the YJB 
Placements Team has demonstrated a very responsive approach to 
the need to create a service environment that protects both the young 
people and the public interest. The Placements Team deals with a high 
volume of work on a daily basis in terms of the numbers of placements 
that need to be negotiated. These also present qualitative challenges in 
terms of the complexity of judgements and the management of a 
constantly moving and changing balance between demand and supply. 
 
Current Placement arrangements 
 
 The YJB has now revised the YJB Placements Protocol.  This gives 
prominence to issues of vulnerability and risk.  The protocol now 
provides clearer guidance on the placement process and the 
information required to make a well-informed placement decision. The 
revised protocol has strong child-focus and safeguarding threads 
running through it. 
 
 The Placements Protocol clearly sets out arrangements and 
requirements for the safeguarding of vulnerable young people on their 
admission to a YOI and the processes by which transfers of young 
people between establishments can be achieved.   
 
 Applications for places now use the new YJB Placement Alert Form. 
This form travels with very clear and informative guide-notes that set 
out procedures to be followed for the different categories of young 
person. The new application form is a marked improvement on the 
earlier format and should provide Placements Team caseworkers with 
better quality and fuller information about the young person and their 
placement needs.    
 
 As a consequence of the Joseph Scholes investigations, both the new 
form and supporting guidance notes ask the Yot to specify their 
preferred sector for the young person’s placement and provide 
information about placement policy in the three sectors. There is also 
now added emphasis on the provision of quality information by the Yot 
concerning vulnerability and the assessment of risk.  
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Priority Setting   
 
 Whilst the full completion of the Asset documentation remains at the 
heart of the assessment process, the Placements Team need as much 
supporting evidence as possible if they are to undertake with maximum 
confidence the task of prioritization of placement of those young people 
at greatest risk. 
 
 The current internal YJB Placements Team framework for rating 
vulnerability and risk, the ‘Key indicators of Risk’ should be re-
developed so as to align with the proposed 4-tiered categorization of 
vulnerability articulated by ‘Managing Risk in the Community’.   This will 
bring some congruence to the assessment of risk and facilitate even-
playingfield discussions about prioritization between Yot officers and 
the Placements Team case workers. 
 
o This Operational Review strongly supports the aim of  reaching  and 
maintaining a higher and more confident level of decision making, but 
this will only be attained by the consistent development of features of 
the placement process already in place, as described in the body of 
this review report.      
 
 The most crucial element in this framework is the development of 
mutually confident dialogue and shared working between the staff of 
the Yot and the YJB Placements Team.  This will help overcome 
tensions on the part of some Yot staff about the nature and impact of 
placement in custody for young people and concerns about regimes at 
some YOIs. It is important that Yot staff are provided with good quality 
and contemporary information about positive developments within the 
YOI estate. 
 
Review and transfer between placements 
 
 The Placement Protocol now requires the Placements Team 
caseworker to review, within three working days, all placements where 
an alert has been sent. If sufficient concerns about suitability of 
placement are identified a move of placement would be considered. In 
all cases the placement caseworker will continue to monitor all 
placements of young people considered to be at most risk when placed 
in a YOI.     
 
 Lessons from the Investigations of Joseph Scholes’ death point to the 
necessity of Yots making it clear at the earliest possible stage that, 
following what they may consider an inappropriate placement of a 
young person in a YOI, they will be seeking an alternative bed in a 
LASCH and preparing a case for transfer immediately post sentence. 
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 The Placements Protocol confirms that it is possible for young people 
to be transferred across the secure estate depending on their 
circumstances and, in some instances, the needs of the estate.  
 
 In the case of planned transfers, emergency transfers and transfers 
following placement review, decisions to facilitate a transfer would 
appear to be appropriately based on a consideration of the young 
person’s needs and behaviour, and the suitability of their current 
placement to meet those needs. This Operational Review supports the 
further development of transfer policy and practice where based on 
these principles. 
 
 This Operational Review strongly supports the conclusion of the joint 
Child Protection and Safeguards Review, 2003, that the practice of 
moving young people around the YOI estate through Prison 
Overcrowding Drafts has a destabilizing impact both on the 
effectiveness of regimes and on the best interests of the young people 
transferred.  
 
 Although it has been noted that a protocol for the selection of young 
people, and the procedures to be followed in such circumstances, has 
been agreed between the YJB and the Prison Service, it is 
recommended that this practice be kept under close review and all 
means of amelioration explored. 
 
14.4 Reception of young people into YOIs 
 
The Investigations into Joseph Scholes’ death concluded that at his 
admission all reception procedures in force at that time were carried out 
satisfactorily and that Joseph received a high level of care and attention. 
However, all four Investigations expressed reservation and uncertainty 
about the robustness of the transmission of information between the 
Yot and the YOI; in particular the timely availability of his psychiatric 
history. 
 
Revised framework for reception into a YOI 
 
 As a result of the developmental work that has taken place within the 
YJB and Prison Service over the past two years, a revised Prison 
Service Order PSO 4950 was issued in September 2004. The revised 
PSO seeks to promote improved practices and procedures in the field 
of reception into custody and initial assessment. 
  
 The procedural framework and best practice guidance examined in the 
course of this Operational Review in respect to the provision of safe 
and responsive reception arrangements would appear generally 
satisfactory and appropriate to the task. The YJB and the Prison 
Service have clearly recognised that the experience of admission is a 
crucial one for young people and that all should be done to make that a 
safe and supportive experience. There remain, however, some 
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features of the current arrangements that work to inhibit best 
performance. 
 
Collection and handling of Information 
 
 PSO 4950 now requires Governors to ensure that they have a system 
in place for recording the receipt of key documents related to the 
reception of the young person.  
 
 Each YOI is required to put in place arrangements for informing the 
YJB of any missing documentation and for ensuring that this is 
received as soon as possible. The YJB/Prison Service service level 
agreement sets a one-hour time limit (or 9.a.m. next working day if out 
of hours) for alerting the local Yot to missing Asset or Pre-Sentence 
Reports. If these reports have not been received within 24 hours then 
the YJB is to be informed. 
 
 The YJB have selected performance in this important area of practice 
as one of its eight secure estate Performance Indicators for 2004/5. At 
May 2005, provisional Prison Service performance figures for 2004/5 
appear to show that over a quarter of young people (26.1%) continue 
to arrive at YOIs without the relevant paper work. This is a matter of 
ongoing concern. The YJB and Prison Service should maintain 
pressure across the youth justice system to improve performance in 
this area of practice. 
   
 
 For those young people whose documentation is missing or is so 
incomplete that it gives rise to well-placed uncertainty about the level of 
risk of a young person, then PSO 4950 requires that the young person 
be managed as ‘vulnerable’.   
 
 Decisions about the most appropriate first night placement of young 
people in this situation are based on what  limited information  might be 
available, a health care screening, the completion of form T1:V, Initial 
Custodial Reception Assessment and the cell-sharing risk 
assessment. The PSO guidance notes also advise, wisely, that all staff 
should be made aware of this status and be asked to give increased 
supervision and support to the young person, particularly in the first few 
days. 
 
 The Investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes suggested  that, at 
that time, there were variations in the quality and extent of information 
available to staff at YOIs on reception. and that it is important to obtain 
as full a picture as necessary at the earliest possible point. If the 
proposal to require Yots to support their completion of the Asset 
assessment with contributing evidence is followed then it makes sense 
that this material should also travel with the young person.  
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 Within the limits imposed on the remit of this Operational Review to 
directly examine practice on the ground, it would appear that the ‘fail-
safe’ arrangements are working in a satisfactory way and that 
information is now being received more consistently. But there remains 
much room for improvement.  
 
 In future, the introduction of secure email for the transfer of information 
should ensure that relevant information, if available, is accessible. 
Suitable flagging arrangements might be included in the system that 
could quickly signal non-receipt. However, there will still remain quality 
and interpretation issues and these will only be addressed through 
improved skills and awareness on the part of Yot staff. 
 
Initial health Assessments and Screening for Risk  
 
 PSO 4950 requires that every young person is screened on the day of 
arrival to ensure their safety and to identify any immediate health 
needs. This screening must include an assessment by a member of the 
YOI health care team of the likelihood that the young person would 
harm themselves and a further in-depth assessment of the young 
person’s physical, mental health and substance-misuse history. For 
young women the screening must also include consideration of any 
sanitary, child  care or pregnancy issues. 
 
  PSO 4950 requires the provision of 24 hour health care facilities at all 
YOIs that receive young people directly from court.   All young people 
must be medically examined and assessed by a qualified nurse or 
doctor within 24 hours of their reception and this assessment must 
include an assessment of mental health needs and substance abuse. 
 
  Following this assessment a Health Care Plan for each young person 
must be prepared and arrangements made to provide appropriate 
treatment and medical services. This as an important part of the young 
person’s overall sentence plan. 
 
 The YJB is strongly committed to the provision of this service and has 
selected this as one of the eight Secure Estate Performance Targets in 
2004/5. 
 
 All young people must be interviewed by reception unit staff within one 
hour of their arrival (two hours in exceptional circumstances) to start 
the assessment-of-needs process and judge level of vulnerability. At 
this point, the reception unit or other relevant staff complete the T1:V 
form.    
 
 Form T1:V is a valuable assessment instrument. Although in some 
circumstances, where information is missing the judgements made 
may need to err on the side of caution, the format asks the right type of 
question with respect to vulnerability and potential victimisation or risk 
to others.  
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 The joint Review of Child Protection and Safeguarding, 2003 
recommended that staff receive specific training in the completion of 
T1;Vs, as well as in broader techniques of assessment. This 
Operational Review would strongly support that proposal. 
 
 Where a risk of self-harm is identified then appropriate action has to be 
taken in accordance with PSO 2700, Suicide and Self-harm 
Prevention, to minimise that risk. Reception unit staff are then required 
to open a form F2052SH on the young person. Reception staff  should 
be trained and competent to do this in discussion with health care staff. 
 
  As a consequence of the completion of a F2052SH form, a decision is 
made as to whether the young person should be located for their first 
night in the YOI Health Care Centre or on a normal residential unit. 
This is clearly a matter of professional judgement, but in some 
circumstances this judgement may be conditioned by the availability of 
vacant beds in the Health Care Centre. 
 
First night and initial support arrangements 
 
 The YJB has recognised that this initial experience and particularly the 
first night of a young person’s time in custody, is critical to gaining 
some sense of safety and have taken steps to alleviate as much as 
possible any feelings of anxiety and uncertainty.  
 
 The YJB has introduced ‘first night’ packs for all new admissions. This 
is a very sensible and supportive innovation. The revised PSO 4950 
reinforces the advice that night duty staff need to be clearly informed 
about new young people where there are concerns about vulnerability 
or the possibility of self-harm. As part of their first night pack, young 
people are also provided with information about the rules, timetables 
and facilities at the YOI. 
 
 The revised PSO 4950 provides fuller advice about the approach that 
needs to be adopted when meeting the mandatory requirements to 
provide telephone contact, to help young people resolve any immediate 
problems and to put in place arrangements to make contact with next 
of kin in respect to visiting and other matters. The advice as drafted is 
supportive and respects situations where the young people may be in 
some distress, particularly in relation to their families, including the 
possibility of concern as young parents about their own children.   
 
Security screening 
 
 The revised PSO 4950 stresses that a full body search remains an 
essential and important part of the reception procedure, but it must be 
conducted with consideration and courtesy, and should not be 
experienced by the young person as undignified or stressful. The 
advice reinforces this approach by reference to the significance of the 
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age and level of risk of the young people and the likelihood of them 
having experienced physical or sexual abuse earlier in their lives.  
 
 For many people, full body searching of young people presents a 
contentious issue. Yet it has to be recognised that there are genuine 
security issues to deal with here, including the illicit concealment of 
drugs or potential weapons, all informed by wider issues of trainee 
safety and security. The conclusion of this Operational Review is that if 
the PSO advice is closely and faithfully followed, and full body 
searching is conducted with due sensitivity, then young people should 
not experience the practice as unnecessarily abusive or invasive. 
 
Achieving best practice in Reception 
 
 Some YOIs  still have to deal with both juvenile and adult admissions to 
the YOI in the same reception suites. This makes for difficulties in 
management and inhibits the fullest achievement of the objective of a 
reception regime dedicated to the needs and interests of juveniles. The 
YJB should continue with the drive to provide such dedicated facilities. 
 
 It is reported that there are circumstances where young people will 
arrive late at reception having experienced a long day in court followed 
by a long journey, both in time and distance, under escort to an 
unfamiliar destination and YOI. The additional stress for the young 
person induced by this situation is not difficult to appreciate and 
requires great sensitivity on the part of reception unit staff if a 
satisfactory reception process is to be experienced. 
 
 Some of this additional stress would appear to derive from the difficulty 
in achieving placement of the young person within the 50 miles from 
home target set by the YJB. Some of it derives from the transport 
arrangements. Both negative factors will continue to operate whilst the 
secure estate is under conditions of heavy demand for both remand 
and DTO places. 
 
  It is noted that for some time now the YJB has sought, with some 
success, to develop separate arrangements for the escorting of 
juvenile offenders from court to YOI. This move is welcome and this 
initiative should continue and lead to the abolition of the conditions 
reported above. 
 
 The reception at YOI reception units of batches of young people at any 
one time clearly makes the objective of arranging an ordered and 
sensitive reception experience for the individual trainee more difficult to 
achieve. This might also be compounded by having a mix of juvenile 
and adult trainees to process at the same time. It is appreciated that 
this situation can only be more effectively managed by the availability 
of adequate staffing and better arrangements for programming arrivals. 
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 Reception suites at YOIs experience heavy usage and by young 
people who are, on occasion, under some considerable stress. It is 
therefore important that attention is paid to environmental aspects, 
including the condition of secure rooms and holding cells, and the 
ambience of the unit. Otherwise the accommodation can give out a 
message that this is an unsafe place for young people and bodes 
poorly for their capacity to settle constructively to their period of 
training. 
 
 This situation makes it vitally important that the YJB and the Prison 
Service use every means to closely monitor and quality assure policies 
and practice in this area.  Key aspects of the reception arrangements 
can be subject to regular monitoring and review, and these should 
complement the monitoring remit of the regional YJB Performance 
Monitor. 
 
14.5 Care and Sentence Planning 
 
One of the key issues identified by the various investigations into the 
death of Joseph Scholes related to the arrangements to plan for his stay 
at the YOI. There were concerns about the organisational arrangements 
for the planning meeting and its optimum timeliness. Some the 
investigations recommended that a much shorter time than the YJB 
National Standard [NSF 10.10] of within 10 working days of admission 
should now be adopted. The Investigations also expressed concern 
about arrangements for recording at YOIs 
 
 The revised PSO 4950 reinforces the requirements set out in the 
earlier 1999 version and place a responsibility on Governors and Yot 
managers to ensure that each young person’s sentence plan, including 
an Individual Learning Plan, is drawn up within the 10 working days 
following reception at the YOI. Plans should set specific, measurable, 
achievable, realistic and time-bounded objectives for each young 
person and these should inform their daily programme of activity at the 
YOI. The plan should also look ahead to the young person’s 
resettlement in the community.  
 
 PSO 4950 sets out an appropriate framework for care and sentence 
planning, and review. Quality issues in respect to the availability of 
information and assessments about the young person, the quality of 
recording, and the commitment and presence of relevant people in the 
process, including the young person and possibly their family, will 
continue to impact on the effectiveness of the plan and will demand 
ongoing management attention.   
 
 All of the Investigations recommend that care planning for young 
people deemed to be at greatest risk should be well within the 10 day 
maximum limit set by the YJB National Standard. This Operational 
Review has considered the case for introducing a shorter, say 3-5 day, 
timescale that would apply to those young people who are adjudged to 
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be seriously at risk at admission (defined as being subject to F 2052SH 
status). This should not preclude the proposal that a full initial 
assessment that focuses on issues of vulnerability takes place within 
24 hours as suggested by both the Prison Service Investigation and the 
YJB Serious Incident Report. This Operational Review supports and 
recommends such an amendment. 
 
  
 PSO 4950 requires Governors to establish and develop a personal 
officer or caseworker system that provides every young person with an 
advisor with whom they have frequent, purposeful contact that offers 
opportunities to establish good personal and supportive relationships.  
Personal officer status carries important responsibilities and 
arrangements have to be made to ensure that these are achieved.   
 
 The role and function of the personal officer system can be seen to 
provide a cornerstone to the safeguarding arrangements and the 
development of the role is vital if more effective and safer regimes are 
to be delivered.    
 
 Experience of key worker systems elsewhere suggests that there is 
always merit in one person being given prime responsibility for this 
role. However, complementing arrangements, including arrangements 
for working conditioned hours, shift working and holiday absence 
cover, militate against this in all types of residential provision offering 
care or custody.  This Operational Review has considered various 
solutions to these manning issues, including team-working and various 
arrangements for deputisation. 
 
  On balance, the strengths of the single responsible officer approach 
suggest that this policy should be implemented wherever possible. 
Given the pivotal role of the personal officer in the sentence plan, it 
should be managerially possible to resolve these matters through 
forward timetabling and some arrangements for deputisation or pairing 
where one partner has the lead and the other provides support and 
cover. This would seem to offer a pragmatic solution to the very real 
practical problems associated with the one-on-one option. 
 
 Most reviews and enquiries into the quality of public services have 
identified deficiencies in case-recording and disciplined record-keeping 
as an aspect of practice that inevitably contributes to less than 
satisfactory outcomes for service users. This need to bring 
improvement to the quality of recording is a matter that is recognised 
by the YJB and Prison Service and calls for management to make 
arrangements for the provision of suitable ongoing staff training and 
development programmes. 
 
14.6 Provision of Health Care 
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Each of the four Investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes 
concluded that the care and attention given to Joseph by the medical, 
nursing and YOI staff at the YOI Health Care Centre was of good quality 
and appropriate to his level of need. There was unanimous criticism of 
the physical state of the Health Care Centre. 
 
 This Operational Review is pleased to report that the situation in 2004 
has been greatly improved with the provision of a new, purpose 
designed and equipped Health Care Centre. The Health Care Centre 
now provides first class facilities for health care, including suites for 
medical and dental examination and consultation and a range of 
suitable in-patient accommodation (12 beds) for the medical care and 
treatment of the young people. This accommodation includes suitably 
designed and equipped cells for the care of very distressed young 
people. 
 
 The YJB has committed itself to a major enhancement of the quality of 
health care available to the young people. This has included the 
provision of funding for 24-hour health care in all YOIs that take 
children and young people straight from court, and screening 
arrangements for both physical and mental health. The YJB has also 
moved to integrate YOI health services into mainstream NHS 
management arrangements by agreeing the transfer of responsibility 
for YOI health provision to local Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). 
 
 It is hoped that through these developments young people will 
experience a high quality of support for their health needs. It is 
recognised that the population of young people in YOI present higher 
risk factors in mental health and substance misuse than the general 
population of their age group. The overall approach to the provision of 
health care services is one based on multi-disciplinary working.  
 
 Where young people are identified as having significant health needs 
and are receiving support, either as in-patients or on an out-patient 
basis, they should have in place a health care plan that is reviewed and 
discussed weekly by the multi-disciplinary team. Depending on the 
young person’s needs, care planning may include support from 
specialist medical, mental health or substance misuse staff.  
 
 The Operational Review fully supports the appropriateness of this 
approach to health care and promotion and, given improved 
management and resourcing at individual YOIs, considers that the 
policy should deliver improved services and benefits to the young 
people. 
 
Mental health 
 
 The current situation gives cause for considerable concern as the 
number of adolescents in the community who present serious mental 
health challenges would appear to be increasing and a substantial 
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proportion of those young people are sent to YOIs. As a greater 
number of more challenging young people are accommodated, the task 
of maintaining a safe environment for other young people becomes that 
much more difficult. The issue is one that bears down on both the level 
of mental health support that can be appropriately provided by a YOI 
Health Care Centre and the facilitation of alternative treatment options. 
 
 PSO 4950 sets out requirements in cases where it is considered that a 
young person should be referred for in-patient psychiatric treatment in 
an NHS hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983. The young person 
must receive a psychiatric assessment and an application for transfer 
must be made to the Home Office.  
 
 It is understood that although this process may be satisfactorily 
undertaken, the problem remains one of availability and accessibility of 
suitable secure in-patient psychiatric beds. This is a major problem that 
is currently being addressed in discussions between the YJB and the 
NHS.  This Operational Review strongly supports those initiatives. Until 
this serious and constrained resource issue attracts some relief, it will 
continue to act as a major inhibitor to the realisation of the 
safeguarding objectives set for Health Care Centres. 
 
14.7 Management of self-harm and suicide in YOIs 
 
Overall, the Investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes concluded 
that the YOIs suicide awareness strategy was sound and that it was 
applied with care and attention. The Prison Service Investigation 
recommended that some tightening of procedures would improve 
effectiveness. 
 
 
 PSO 2700 Suicide and Self-Harm Prevention provides detailed 
guidance to Governors at the strategic, managerial and practice levels.  
 
 Although suicide and self-harm policies at YOIs are generally clear and 
up-to-date, and respond to the requirements of PSO 2700, they are not 
juvenile-specific. YOIs need to take action to achieve this goal. Such 
policies and local guidance need to strike a balance between the 
provision of an overall environment that recognizes and safeguards the 
potential vulnerability of all young people accommodated and the 
special needs of those young people identified as most vulnerable. 
  
 Staff at YOIs are reported to have a good basic understanding of the 
vulnerability of young people, but  articulate a need for more training in 
the assessment and understanding of risk. Most YOIs placed the 
support role for young people on front-line staff and these staff required 
a clear support structure and the development of enhanced support 
and supervision arrangements for staff working with self-harm and 
suicide.   
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 In general, the F2052SH Self-Harm procedures are being followed 
satisfactorily, but there is a recognized need to bring the quality of 
recording within the format up to a standard that more accurately 
represents the level of work and support offered to the vulnerable 
young people. 
 
 Experience suggests that more still needs to be done to highlight 
issues of good practice in the management of self-harm specific to 
young people. 
 
 There is some concern that as the number of young people who might 
be assessed as having some level of vulnerability grows within the 
juvenile offender population, then the additional obligations imposed on 
staff by virtue of F2052SH status will become increasingly difficult to 
meet at a satisfactory level.  
 
 In these circumstances prioritization of staff resources to meet the 
challenges posed by the most seriously vulnerable young people will 
almost inevitably weaken the network of care provided for the still not 
insignificant number of young people who would appear to present less 
serious concerns.   
 
 This issue can be seriously exacerbated where the YOIs are faced with 
having to manage one or more extremely seriously disturbed or 
disruptive young people. The management of these young people is 
extremely consuming of staff resources, time, energy and emotional 
commitment.    
 
 Working with young people who are serious self-harmers, staff need to 
feel that as well as being equipped with as much knowledge and 
understanding as they need, they are going to receive support and 
assistance from their colleagues and from specialists. In most cases 
this will mean access to medical, and especially psychiatric, resources 
that will help them care for the young people who have health needs 
with greater confidence. 
 
 It is important that young people who are at risk of self-harm or suicide 
have easy recourse to confidential support, counselling and advocacy 
services. This is fully recognised by the Prison Service and, through 
the Safer Custody Group developmental initiatives, a great deal has 
been achieved to bring such schemes and facilities into 
establishments.   
 
 Currently the YJB is working with 13 voluntary agencies who are 
involved with the development of helplines, to provide an advocacy 
service to individual YOIs. This development is commended by this 
Operational Review. 
 
 The Operational review welcomes the phased introduction of ACCT to 
replace the F2052SH system. 
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14.8 Accommodation of young people at risk in ‘safer’ cells 
 
 When in the Health Care Centre at Stoke Heath YOI, Joseph Scholes 
was subject to a prescribed 30 minute observation regime. As Joseph 
died within 20 minutes of the last recorded observation, the Trafford 
ACPC Chapter 8 Review recommended that YOIs adopt a 15 minute 
observation interval where young people are assessed as at serious risk 
of self-harm and are accommodated in a ‘safer’ cell. The Chapter 8 
Review recommended continuous, direct observation in all other 
circumstances. The Prison Service Investigation recommended that 
telephone conversations of trainees under ‘at risk’ supervision be 
monitored. 
 
 
 The Prison Service has set out in Suicide Prevention Strategies the 
policy and good practice guidance in respect to the provision of both 
unfurnished and ‘safer’ accommodation. This guidance is clear and 
supportive, and underwritten by good practice. The guidance 
concludes that the use of unfurnished cells alone is wholly 
inappropriate for use with prisoners identified as at risk of suicide or 
self-harm.  
 
 The management of some very seriously disturbed prisoners can be 
facilitated by their accommodation in a ‘safer’ physical setting to enable 
short term intervention at times of greatest crisis. The ‘safer’ 
accommodation is provided to complement a protective and care 
regime that is directed at understanding and helping the young person. 
The aim is to provide an environment that reduces stress in the 
individual and so allows the staff working with them to more fully 
address their needs and not just the manifestation of their self-harming 
behaviour.   
 
 It is important to note that no cell can ever be considered entirely ‘safe’. 
 
Observation, Supervision and monitoring 
 
 The parameters for Intermittent observation set by PSO 2700 
already allow for observation at the level suggested by the Trafford 
ACPC Chapter 8 Review. This specifies that prisoners subject to 
intermittent supervision should be observed at least five times each 
hour at irregular intervals. Experience has indicated that deaths have 
occurred when a prisoner has been aware that checking will be taking 
place at a regular and predictable interval. This Operational Review 
supports the retention of current requirements. 
 
 Constant observation is viewed by the Prison Service and the PSO 
guidance as a measure to be used only in extreme circumstances and 
with prisoners who present the most acute and critical challenges to 
their satisfactory care. 
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 This Operational Review accepts that this is a very difficult policy and 
practice area. The availability of constant observation for all young 
people demonstrating acute at-risk behaviour is not feasible beyond its 
use as a very short term crisis-intervention tool. Without additional 
resources, the impact on individual staff and on staffing resources and 
deployment steers away from endorsing the Trafford ACPC proposal. 
The answer must lie, as with other matters noted elsewhere in this 
Review, with the development of more imaginative care planning and a 
wider range of more positive interventions.  
 
 CCTV can be a useful additional tool and, while it has some limitations, 
its use should be further explored and developed by YOIs. The 
Safeguards Review recommended that CCTV should be installed in all 
juvenile YOls and that a standard set of stringent and consistent 
protocols should be in place covering its use and the storage of 
recorded data for evidential purposes. That advice is endorsed by this 
Operational Review.    
 
 It has not been possible for this Operational Review to come to a clear 
view about the recommendation that telephone conversations of at-risk 
young people be monitored. Whilst there is general acceptance that the 
practice could provide additional and vital information that might better 
safeguard the young person and assist with their support, there are 
substantial issues of resourcing and practicability to consider. The 
proposal may take on more manageable proportions if limited to those 
young people at-risk and housed in the Health Care Centre and this 
solution is therefore suggested as a feasible compromise 
recommendation. 
 
 
14.9 Use of Protective Clothing 
 
At the Coroner’s Inquest into the death of Joseph Scholes the Jury were 
concerned to learn about the use of protective clothing and 
recommended a review of the practice. 
 
 The Prison Service accepts that depriving vulnerable prisoners and 
trainees of items of clothing, and by so doing drawing the attention of 
others to them in the process, can worsen their distress. It accepts that 
such practice may make them feel degraded and punished. 
 
 The current policy is that normal clothing, or individual items of clothing 
or possessions, must not be removed from at-risk prisoners or trainees 
as a matter of course. Decisions should be taken on a case-by-case 
basis as a last resort and as necessary for the immediate safety of the 
trainee, and then only for the shortest time possible. 
 
 When the trainee’s normal clothing has been removed, Governors are 
required to provide the trainee with protective clothing so that they can 
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be decently dressed [PSO 1600 paragraph. 4.5.1]. This decision has to 
be made in consultation with a health professional. 
 
 Where it is considered that the young person is at acute risk of taking 
their own life when wearing normal clothing, then they are required to 
dress in a ‘protective gown’. This is a loose fitting, ‘dressing-gown’ type 
of garment worn without underclothing and made from heavy duty 
flame retardant material. 
 
 The term ‘protective clothing’ is now considered most appropriate to 
describe the alternative wear to normal clothing in these 
circumstances. It is important to note that no garments have yet been 
found that represent a completely safe and decent alternative to normal 
clothing. It is understood that the search for a suitable garment 
continues. 
 
 The protective garment currently in use is not 100% safe. YOI staff 
demonstrated how the garment could be unpicked at the hem and also 
exhibited a potential ligature that had been made from a strip of the 
‘protective‘ material. 
 
 Accepting that the use of protective clothing is not meant to provide a 
long-term solution, and noting that operational guidance reinforces its 
use for the shortest possible time, this Operational Review notes that 
wearing the clothing is still a mark of ‘difference’. Although in many 
cases the clothing is required to ensure the young person’s safety or 
even survival, it is potentially stigmatising and can add to their distress 
and poor self-image.  
 
 In these difficult circumstances, staff will require good practice 
guidance and support to help them assess the situation and more 
confidently explore alternative management strategies and 
approaches. The Operational Review commends the Prison Service for 
developing new draft guidance on this important subject. 
 
 The draft guidance is due for publication in 2005, subject to the 
satisfactory completion of consultation, in the form of a revised version 
of PSO 2700. This Operational Review has concluded that the new 
guidance provides very sound and sensitive advice and should prove 
very valuable in assisting staff with the management of very vulnerable 
young people. The draft guidance demonstrates good practice and 
reinforces what appears to be the resolve in the Prison Service to 
ensure that the dignity and welfare of young prisoners is safeguarded 
wherever and whenever possible. 
  
 The draft guidance presents a range of strategies that the care 
planners may wish to consider that alleviate the need to remove normal 
clothing. In essence, these proposals are based on ideas that actively 
engage the young person in the management of their own self-harming 
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behaviour or allow for an environment that will be experienced as 
supportive and ‘therapeutic’ rather than demeaning. 
 
 A strong theme that runs through the draft guidance relates to the 
acceptance that the removal of normal clothing is a last option within 
any self-harm management plan. The draft guidance encourages staff 
to consider how the activities of the trainee can be normalised.  The 
draft guidance sets out the requirement for the circumstances to be 
reviewed at highly frequent and regular intervals. This requirement 
aims to protect the welfare of the individual prisoner and to have this 
exceptional mode of protective intervention in place for the minimum 
time possible.  
 
 The use by the Prison Service of protective clothing as an aid to the 
management of young people who threaten self-harm and suicide will 
remain a contentious issue. The aim must be to reduce recourse to this 
practice to an absolute minimum. It will therefore be important for the 
Prison Service and the YJB to closely monitor its incidence and level of 
use. It is recommended that this should be achieved through the 
institution of regular sampling exercises by the YJB Performance 
Monitor. 
 
14.10 Anti-Bullying Strategies  
 
The Investigations into the death of Joseph Scholes all agreed that one 
aspect of YOI life that he feared or that fed his apprehension about his 
sentence was the threat or belief that he would be subject to bullying 
should he move from the Health Care Centre to a residential unit.   
 
 The joint Child Protection and Safeguards Review 2003 concluded 
that anti-bullying policy and practice was an area where there were 
serious service deficits.  The Review recommended a robust 
programme of improvement.  
 
 The joint Review found that although there were anti-bullying policies at 
YOIs these were generally of a reactive rather than proactive nature. 
There was a lack of clarity and consistency. 
 
 The joint Review was particularly concerned about what appeared to 
be a complete lack of training for staff with regard to managing bullying 
and anti-social behaviour by adolescents. This situation was 
compounded by the limited availability of support services for young 
victims and limited intervention programmes for both perpetrators and 
victims of bullying. 
 
 Following the recommendations of the joint Review, the Prison Service 
established a much stronger and more determined framework for 
developing anti-bullying practice. 
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 Whilst much remains to be achieved, the Review had also identified 
some positive developments and imaginative ideas to combat bullying 
and make regimes safer. Most YOIs have now instituted an Anti-
Bullying Committee and there is no doubt that staff at all levels 
appreciate the serious effect that bullying can have on the regime of 
the YOI and the lives of individual young people who reside there. 
 
 This Operational Review endorses the approach to anti-bullying 
articulated by the joint review framework. Anti-bullying policy and 
practice should be more closely integrated with other aspects of 
safeguarding, in collaboration with other local agencies charged with 
similar responsibilities. 
 
 
14.10 Wider Safeguarding of Young People in YOIs 
 
 This Operational Review strongly supports the regenerated approach to 
child protection and safeguarding enshrined within revised PSO 4950. 
The appointment of Safeguards Managers and the establishment of the 
Safeguards Committee at each YOI should enable the delivery of more 
effective and improved safeguarding arrangements across the range of 
relevant policy and practice areas. 
 
 The suggested integration of these arrangements at individual YOIs 
with similar ones already in place to drive forward programmes directed 
at self-harm, anti-bullying and substance misuse is also strongly 
supported. The close inter-relationship between these areas of work 
and concern is well-understood. 
 
 This Operational Review welcomes the prominence that the revised 
PSO 4950 gives to YOI Governors’ child protection and safeguarding 
responsibilities. These responsibilities will in future be strengthened by 
the Children Act 2004 (section 13.3) that establishes Governors of 
YOIs and Directors of STCs as statutory members of the new  Local 
Safeguarding Childrens Boards and thus, alongside other agencies, 
responsible for the operation of the Board and the effective discharge 
of its functions. The Act also places on Governors direct responsibility 
for safeguarding the welfare of children within their custody.   
 
 To achieve this each YOI must put in place a child protection framework 
that relies on three key elements: the appointment of a member of the 
senior management team as Child Protection Coordinator, the 
establishment of a Child Protection Committee and the development of 
working relationships with local ACPCs and their constituent agencies. 
 
 The joint Child Protection and Safeguards Review, 2003 
recommended that dedicated senior Safeguards Manager posts 
should be developed with ring-fenced funding. At the present time not 
all YOI have the resources to situate the Safeguards Manager post at 
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senior management team level. The Prison Service Safeguards 
programme is seeking to address this, subject to the availability of 
funding. This resolve is strongly supported.  
 
 The issue of the categorisation of incidents that take place within the 
everyday life and regime of a YOI as ‘significant harm’ and their 
investigation is a difficult area. The issuing of LAC (2004) 26 should 
bring some structure to this process and ensure that YOIs and 
associated ACPCs and their member agencies work together to set out 
some protocols on the identification, referral and investigation of 
significant harm incidents as they occur in YOIs. 
 
 Greater clarity about what constitutes the significant abuse threshold 
and its relationship to the residential setting needs to be undertaken 
and incorporated into staff training and development work.  
    
 To help achieve maximum effectiveness of the child protection 
arrangements and safeguarding in YOIs, the YJB has recently agreed 
to fund the appointment of 25 local authority social worker posts for the 
sector. These social workers will be located throughout the YOI estate. 
At individual YOIs they will facilitate the introduction of child protection 
matters with YOI staff and address the improvements required to 
ensure that local authority obligations to children and young people in 
their care are appropriately discharged. This represents a very 
welcome and significant new safeguarding resource.  
 
14.11 Training 
 
Training for Asset 
 
 This Operational Review welcomes the training initiatives that the YJB 
has planned and resourced. They are closely linked with the important 
developmental work on the management of risk instigated by the YJB 
and the need to respond positively to changes in the external world of 
children’s services with its strong emphasis on even greater and closer 
inter-agency working. 
 
 The material and concerns examined in this Operational Review, which 
relate to the management of risk and to the understanding and 
clarification of the concept of vulnerability, reinforce the importance of 
and focus the YJB’s training initiatives. It is noted that Module 1 of the 
Professional Certificate in Effective Practice (Youth Justice) 
programme is devoted to training in the understanding and completion 
of the Asset framework, with a strong emphasis on working with and 
managing risk. 
 
 The YJB has also developed some new shorter skills enhancement 
programmes know as Effective Practice In-Service Training 
(INSET).   The YJB has indicated that it would like to see the INSET on 
training in Asset given some priority and so has, as a condition of 
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funding, required Regional Human Resources (HR) Consortia to 
prioritise this programme from April 2004 so as to ensure that all staff 
can undertake detailed training in Asset based on local need. 
 
 This Operational Review welcomes the training initiatives that the YJB 
has planned and resourced. They are closely linked with the important 
developmental work on the management of risk instigated by the YJB 
and the need to respond positively to changes in the external world of 
children’s services with its strong emphasis on even greater and closer 
inter-agency working. 
 
Training in self-harm and risk in YOIs 
  
 The Juvenile Awareness Staff Programme (JASP) is a new 
development for YOI staff. JASP is a two-week modular training 
package that has been developed for staff in the secure juvenile YOI 
estate. This Operational Review is remitted to comment on the JASP 
training programme for Vulnerability Assessment. This is a very 
focussed course based on 12 sessions that are programmed to be 
delivered by a trainer over a seven day period. 
 
 This Operational Review strongly supports the commissioning of the 
training needs analysis and the development of the proposed 
safeguarding training package. It is anticipated that a positive input to 
this training development will be provided by the new group of social 
workers appointed under the safeguarding initiative. These staff should 
be able to provide an invaluable resource of child protection knowledge 
and information about local contacts and services.  
 
 The ground covered by the Vulnerability Assessment module appears 
very appropriate to the task and the curriculum picks up on many of the 
training and preparation issues highlighted by this Operational Review, 
namely the importance of understanding the Asset assessment, 
understanding about vulnerability, pre-sentence reporting and prisoner 
escort reports, and completion of the T1:V and T1:VR forms. 
 
  The training adopts a very practical approach to the subject matter and 
majors on techniques that should be adopted to obtain the clearest 
information from documentation and from the young person through 
interviews. 
 
 The Self-Harm Tool kit brings together all relevant information and 
guidance on best practice and also includes a training package 
‘Understanding Self-Harm’ that can be delivered by non-specialist 
trainers or used by individuals.  This is an excellent new resource that 
will assist understanding of this complex area of practice. 
 
 This Operational Review supports the introduction of JASP and the 
development of training materials related to the better understanding 
and management of at-risk young people.  With the growing awareness 
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of the complexities of this area of practice within the YJB and the 
Prison Service as reported in this Operational Review, consideration 
might be given to whether more time could be allotted to these matters 
within the JASP curriculum.      
 
 The Prison Service provides a comprehensive range of suicide 
prevention training programmes. The programmes assume that all 
training should reflect the importance of involving and working with 
different disciplines and recognize that all staff, and not solely health 
care staff, have an ability to engage with and assist young people at 
risk of self-harm and suicide.   
 
14.12 Quality Assurance in the Secure Estate 
 
Effective Regimes Framework 
 
 The development of an active programme of quality assurance within 
the secure juvenile estate is essential if progress towards YJB targets 
and aspirations is to be achieved. 
 
 The Effective Regimes monitoring framework brings together a range 
of monitoring and performance measures for the secure estate. The 
framework has great potential for measuring and describing how the 
estate is functioning and should lead to improvements in the quality 
and effectiveness of services. 
 
 The YJB has put in place a performance management framework for 
the youth justice system. This has taken longer to bed into the practice 
of secure juvenile estate providers, although recent agreements have 
secured greater commitment. 
 
 The Effective Regimes monitoring framework provides a new 
opportunity to address issues of compliance and under-performance. 
Regular reporting provides the opportunity for management oversight 
and intervention if appropriate. 
 
 Within the Effective Regimes monitoring framework can be housed a 
subsidiary Child Protection and Safeguards monitoring framework that 
can assist Safeguards Managers at YOIs to keep track of the 
achievements of local safeguarding arrangements. 
 
 Over-bureaucratisation of the reporting framework should be avoided. 
 
Investigating Serious Incidents 
 
 The recently-revised Serious Incident Review procedures are a 
welcome addition to the YJB’s quality assurance mechanisms. 
 
 The revised procedures are helpfully aligned with those of other 
serious incident reviewing agencies. 
 146
                                                                                              
 
 The strict timetable for the completion of Local Management Reviews 
and Serious Incident Reports properly reflects the urgency and 
importance of the investigations. 
 
 The procedures provide a helpful model framework for the preparation 
of Local Management Reports. This might be more closely aligned with 
that for agency management reviews for Chapter 8 case reviews. 
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OPERATIONAL REVIEW 
 
 
ACRONYMS used in the text 
 
 
ACCT  Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork 
 
ACPC  Area Child Protection Committee 
 
ASSET  Assessment Tool (Developed by Youth Justice Board) 
  
ADSS  Association of Directors of Social Services 
 
CCTV  Close Circuit TV 
 
DfES   Department for Education and Skills 
 
DH   Department of Health   
 
F2052SH Prison Service Self-harm management system 
 
Juvenile   Under-18 year old Offender 
 
LASCH Local Authority Secure Children’s Home 
 
LASSRs  Local Authority with Social Services Responsibilities  
 
LGA   Local Government Association 
 
LMR  Local Management Report = first stage of YJB SIR 
 
MAPPA  Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
 
Nite-San  Night-time Personal Sanitary Arrangements 
 
NOMS National Offender Management Service 
 
PSR   Pre-Sentence Report 
 
PCR   Post Court Report 
 
PS0 4950  Prison Service Order 4950 
 
SCG   Safer Custody Group 
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SIR   YJB Serious Incident Review 
 
SSD   Social Services Department 
 
STC  Secure Training Centre 
 
TI :V   Vulnerability Assessment Form (YJB) 
 
YOI   Young Offender Institution 
 
YJB   Youth Justice Board  
 
Yots   Youth Offender Teams 
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